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Although fair use is an intentionally vague doctrine, its 
application to education has been described as only one of two 
categories where outcomes remain “quite difficult to predict.”  To 
combat this uncertainty, courts have looked to negotiated 
educational guidelines, which Congress included in its House of 
Representatives Report accompanying the Copyright Act of 1976.  
Courts’ use of the guidelines has had two unintended and 
destructive consequences.  First, it erroneously gave the guidelines 
the appearance of law under § 107’s fair use analysis, sometimes 
inadvertently characterizing them as setting maximum limits on 
permissible copying. Second, it forced educational institutions to 
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rely on the guidelines as the law, improperly crafting their own 
copyright policies to reflect the guidelines’ contours.  Educational 
institutions began using the guidelines as maximum limits on 
allowable copying under their policies, constraining their 
instructors’ ability to teach effectively. 
To remedy these problems, this Article proposes a new model 
for evaluating educational fair use: the administrative agency.  
Although previous scholars have delineated new approaches to 
copyright infringement and fair use, few deal explicitly with fair 
use in education.  That is exactly what this Article does.  Building 
off of a previous scholar’s suggestion that Congress create an 
agency to administer fair use, this Article takes an additional step 
by creating a model that develops and enforces regulations 
specific to educational fair use.  This new agency is likely to 
reduce uncertainty for educators, slenderize educators’ risk of 
litigation—thereby simultaneously decreasing educational 
expenses and increasing the amount of time and money spent on 
educational advancement—and substantially ameliorate, if not 
eliminate, the guidelines’ negative effects on education. 
INTRODUCTION 
As a devoted teacher, you constantly seek new and innovative 
ways to educate your students.  This often requires using 
copyrighted materials.  After reading a fascinating book, for 
example, you may want to use two of its chapters, which include 
photographs, in your class on modern contemporary art.  Or maybe 
it was the first, fourth, and last chapters of the book you just 
finished on modern African tribal warfare that you wanted to copy 
for your African history class.  Perhaps it was a twelve-minute clip 
(or two six-minute clips or four three-minute clips) from Seinfeld 
that you thought would illustrate several important points in your 
annually-taught freshman class, Heidegger, Kierkegaard, and 
Sartre.  Because you do not know whether these uses are legal, you 
guess at where you might find the answer: maybe your school has 
a copyright or copying policy. 
You think that it probably does, but you do not know for sure, 
and, if it does, you are unaware of its contents.  But you are 
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conscientious and want to comply with the law (never mind that 
the school policy is not the law).  So you search for it.  Once you 
find the copying policy, you read something about “Classroom 
Guidelines endorsed by Congress” and something else about 
“brevity” and lots of terms you do not fully comprehend.1  Even if 
you do understand these “Guidelines,” though, you notice that 
these are the maximum amounts of allowable copying under your 
copyright policy.2  If you want to make copies outside these 
“Guidelines,” you have to go to the “General Counsel,” which you 
take to mean the school’s “main lawyer,” even though you have 
never met her.3 
This means that all of the above uses are technically 
impermissible under your school’s policy unless you seek the 
permission of the school’s lawyer, who may deny your request.  
Even if your request is likely to be granted—a likelihood you have 
no way of ascertaining—contacting the school’s lawyer seems 
intimidating.  You also think that constantly asking administrators 
and lawyers for permission to use certain portions of works in class 
makes you appear meddlesome and officious.  After all, you are up 
for tenure in the spring, and why risk ruffling the administrative 
feathers for a helpful text?  Instead, you forgo the use(s) and 
choose to skip that segment in your class.  As a result, the students, 
as well as society, do not receive their benefit—and maybe the 
authors and copyright owners lose some publicity as well. 
Scenarios like those just described happen in practice—and 
they happen repeatedly over the course of many semesters and 
school years: that makes the effect of the restrictive guidelines, in 
terms of deterrence and educational benefits, even more 
pronounced.4  And, despite educational institutions’ use of 
 
 1 For a more complete description of how these policies function, see infra Part I.C. 
 2 While the Educational Guidelines state that they are the minimum permissible 
copying, see H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 68 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 
5681–82, schools—and some courts—apply them as the maximum limit on copying. See 
infra Part I. 
 3 This is a popular component of copying policies at universities. See, e.g., infra text 
accompanying note 134. 
 4 This scenario is reminiscent of the Supreme Court’s statement in Wickard v. 
Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942), that, 
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restrictive policies to protect themselves from liability, there are no 
hard-and-fast rules in fair use.  Indeed, these examples illustrate 
how the mystery of copyright law scares educators and educational 
institutions into thinking that they need permission to use or copy 
almost any segment, however small, of copyrighted works. 
In the educational milieu, copyright law is misunderstood and 
maligned.  Many educators have little or no understanding of 
copyright law, its basic principles, or its application to their 
classrooms.  This lack of understanding can have serious 
consequences for teachers, school districts, universities, and 
students. 
Teachers without a solid understanding of copyright law’s 
demands and requirements create a liability risk for themselves and 
their schools: teachers will either blithely violate the law or 
drastically limit their use of copyrighted materials to avoid doing 
so.  Either of these reactions renders a school district’s fair use 
policy irrelevant; that, in turn, means that the school may become 
liable as a result of risk-taking teachers.  Or, perhaps worse, 
teachers’ risk aversion will reduce the educational benefits students 
receive.  Because the copyright policy of an institution is one 
indication of good faith, violation of this policy could defeat the 
“innocent infringer” defense, escalating statutory damages to 
astronomical amounts.5 
Furthermore, students who are instructed by teachers with an 
inadequate understanding of copyright law learn either that 
copyright law should not be taken seriously, or that it should be 
taken so seriously that it may limit student learning.  The latter 
lesson—where the law “chills” students’ or teachers’ uses of 
copyrighted materials—may erroneously teach students that the 
 
even if [an individual’s] activity be local and though it may not be 
regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by 
Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate 
commerce, and this irrespective of whether such effect is what might 
at some earlier time have been defined as “direct” or “indirect.” 
In other words, if a practice, even a “small” and “local” one, becomes widespread, it can 
have large-scale effects. 
 5 See Ann Bartow, Educational Fair Use in Copyright: Reclaiming the Right to 
Photocopy Freely, 60 U. PITT. L. REV. 149, 205–06 (1998). 
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law’s boundaries, whether in copyright or elsewhere, are narrower 
than they actually are. 
These problems result from copyright law itself.  Prior to 1976, 
teachers had almost no guidance on how to determine whether 
their uses of copyrighted materials were “fair.”6  At that point, 
“fair use” was a common law doctrine—made and elucidated by 
judges.7  Some clarity came when Congress enacted the Copyright 
Act of 19768 (“Copyright Act” or “Act”), codifying the doctrine of 
fair use.9  Although this doctrine is somewhat amorphous, the 
House of Representatives Report (“House Report”) accompanying 
the Act did note that a committee had convened and created fair 
use guidelines that applied to non-profit educational institutions.10 
Courts have misapplied and misused these guidelines, mostly 
at the behest of copyright owners.11  These judicial errors have 
created unworkable and faulty standards that restricted fair use in 
the educational environment,12 which demands a more expansive 
view of this doctrine.  The limitations imposed upon teachers have 
hampered their ability to use copyrighted material to prepare for or 
teach a class, thereby undermining the mission of teachers seeking 
to effectively and legally educate their students. 
Although numerous scholars have suggested alterations or 
modifications to fair use,13 little scholarship or legislative activity 
has been directed toward assisting teachers to determine what uses 
are fair.  To that end, this Article explores a new model for 
evaluating educational fair use.  To do this, the courts’ use of the 
guidelines appearing in the House Report to assess educational 
uses of copyright is examined.  Then, this Article analyzes how 
this treatment has affected the conduct of educational institutions, 
 
 6 See Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1105 
(1990). 
 7 See Robert Kasunic, Fair Use and the Educator’s Right to Photocopy Copyrighted 
Material for Classroom Use, 19 J.C. & U.L. 271, 281–84 (1993). 
 8 Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541. 
 9 See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 65–66 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 
5678–79. 
 10 Id. at 68. 
 11 See infra note 80 and accompanying text; infra Part I.B. 
 12 See infra Part I.C. 
 13 See infra Part II. 
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showing that the effects largely are negative.  Because the adoption 
of these guidelines has not benefited educators or students, this 
Article reviews the current proposals to modify fair use and then 
proposes the development of a new administrative agency—
designed specifically for defining and regulating educational fair 
uses of copyrighted material—that sets standards and rules by 
which teachers can assess their uses of copyrighted material. 
Part I reviews the basics of fair use and how the doctrine 
applies to educators.  It also inspects the 1976 Act’s language and 
legislative history, including the fair use educational guidelines14 
developed for educators as stated in the House Reports.  It further 
assesses and criticizes these guidelines, beginning by reviewing 
and examining how courts have analyzed and used them in 
determining fair use.  This analysis demonstrates that court 
decisions have pressed educational institutions to accept the 
guidelines as law, which, in turn, has distorted and deformed their 
purpose, implementation, and use. 
After this analysis, Part II evaluates the possible approaches 
taken to modify the current state of the law.  It examines both 
modifications to the infringement analysis as well as fair use.  
Focusing on infringement, adding new elements to the 
infringement cause of action is explored.  As to fair use, a variety 
of approaches are reviewed, including adding a burden-shifting 
component; modifying the fair use factors and their application; 
developing a code of best practices; and creating a new entity to 
resolve fair use disputes.  The problems with each of these 
approaches as applied to educational fair use are explored vis-à-vis 
the problems of educational fair use outlined in Part I. 
Part III proposes a solution to the problems of educational fair 
use.  Building off a recent scholar’s suggestion that Congress 
create an executive agency to “administer fair use,”15 a fuller 
 
 14 These guidelines are discussed in more detail infra Part I. 
 15 Jason Mazzone, Administering Fair Use, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 395, 415 (2009).  
Others also have argued, to varying degrees, for a siphoning off particular “sectors” of 
fair uses and providing a modified framework for them. See, e.g., Edward 
Lee, Technological Fair Use, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010), available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1535389 (abstract) (arguing that current fair use law is ill-
equipped to deal with new technologies and proposing that the four fair use factors be 
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account of how Congress and this new agency might address 
educational fair use is developed.  Focusing on the use of positive 
law, this Part proposes that Congress enact a specific fair use law 
that, among other things, creates a specific agency to administer 
educational fair uses of copyrighted materials.  This model is 
designed to provide teachers with more guidance when using 
copyrighted materials in conjunction with educational activities.  It 
also seeks to dispel the mysticism surrounding, and the 
misunderstanding that many educators and educational 
administrators have about, copyright law and fair use.  In sum, this 
model is designed to enhance education though certainty and 
practicality. 
Finally, Part IV raises and responds to possible objections.  
These include the increased cost of creating a new agency; the 
need for an agency specific to education; the rigid nature of fair 
use rules; and the complexity that may result from promulgating 
rules on educational fair use.  After each objection is addressed, 
the Article concludes that these are not sufficient reasons to discard 
the model proposed in Part III, which will enhance education by 
promoting fair use. 
I. UNDERSTANDING THE PROBLEM: FAIR USE, JUDICIAL 
TREATMENT OF THE CLASSROOM GUIDELINES, AND THE 
EDUCATIONAL RESPONSE 
Fair use in the educational context is in danger, and this Part 
outlines why.  That explanation requires a brief introduction to fair 
use and the educational guidelines—which the House of 
Representatives included in its report accompanying the Copyright 
Act—that govern fair use.  After explaining the educational 
guidelines’ origins, this section examines how courts have treated 
them.  This analysis shows that courts have continually reinforced 
the idea that the guidelines are law.  This, in turn, has caused 
educational institutions to limit their uses of copyrighted materials, 
 
tailored to address these technologies); David A. Simon, Reasonable Perception and 
Parody in Copyright Law (forthcoming 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
1516378 (abstract) (arguing that parody should be its own category of fair use and 
proposing a new test for parody that discards the four fair use factors). 
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which inhibits teachers’ ability to effectively instruct their students 
and jeopardizes the educational mission. 
A. A Brief Primer: Fair Use and the Educational Guidelines 
Although Congress passed the first Copyright Act in 1790,16 
and the doctrine of fair use had been recognized in England under 
the Statute of Anne,17 it was not until 1841 that any United States 
court applied the doctrine.18  Since its application in Folsom v. 
Marsh, however, fair use has changed, if not in substance then in 
form.19  In 1976, Congress amended the Copyright Act, codifying 
the common-law doctrine of fair use.20  Under current law, the 
Copyright Act defines fair use this way: 
the fair use of a copyrighted work, including such 
use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by 
any other means specified by that section, for 
purposes such as criticism, comment, news 
reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for 
classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an 
infringement of copyright.  In determining whether 
the use made of a work in any particular case is a 
fair use the factors to be considered shall include—  
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including 
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for 
nonprofit educational purposes; 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used 
in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and 
 
 16 Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 24 (repealed 1831); see also U.S. COPYRIGHT 
OFFICE, CIRCULAR 1A: A BRIEF INTRODUCTION AND HISTORY (2009), http://www.copy 
right.gov/circs/circ1a.html (“Congress enacted the first federal copyright law in May 
1790, and the first work was registered within two weeks.”). 
 17 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 576 (1994); Leval, supra 
note 6, at 1112 (quoting Gyles v. Wilcox, (1740) 26 Eng. Rep. 489 (P.C.)). 
 18 See Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841); Leval, supra note 6, at 
1105. 
 19 See Leval, supra note 6, at 1105–12. 
 20 Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codifying fair use, inter 
alia, at 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006)). 
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(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market 
for or value of the copyrighted work.21 
While the fair use provision provided a framework for courts to 
assess whether the educational use of a copyrighted work was 
infringing, Congress did specifically exempt some educational uses 
of copyrighted works in § 110(1) and 110(2).22 
Section 110(1) exempts the performance or display of images 
used in teaching.23  Section 110(2) also exempted certain uses,24 
and “was enacted in 1976 on the basis of a policy determination 
that certain performances and displays of copyrighted works in 
connection with systematic instruction using then-known forms of 
distance education should be permitted without a need to obtain a 
license or rely on fair use.”25  As the Senate Report notes, this was 
a policy choice, grounded in neither case law nor substantive legal 
doctrine.  Congress later made an additional policy choice when it 
decided educational institutions needed further protection, and, in 
2002, expanded § 110(2) to cover unanticipated technologies.26 
 
 21 17 U.S.C. § 107 (emphasis added). 
 22 Id. § 110(1)–(2). 
 23 Id. § 110(1) (exempting from infringement “[the] performance or display of a work 
by instructors or pupils in the course of face-to-face teaching activities of a nonprofit 
educational institution, in a classroom or similar place devoted to instruction, unless, in 
the case of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, the performance, or the display of 
individual images, is given by means of a copy that was not lawfully made under this 
title, and that the person responsible for the performance knew or had reason to believe 
was not lawfully made”). 
 24 Id. § 110(2). 
 25 S. REP. NO. 107-031, at 4 (2001). 
 26 This amendment was titled, Technology, Education, and Copyright Harmonization 
Act (TEACH Act), Pub. L. No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1910 (2002) (amending 17 U.S.C. § 
110(2)).  It was designed to “facilitate the growth and development of digital distance 
education” by “updat[ing] the distance education provisions of the Copyright Act for the 
21st century.” S. REP. NO. 107-031, at 3–4.  Congress sought to achieve this objective by 
“expand[ing] the exempted copyright rights, the types of transmissions, and the 
categories of works that the exemption covers beyond those that are covered by the 
existing exemption for performances and displays of certain copyrighted works in the 
course of instructional transmissions.” Id. at 4. 
 Section 110(2) also exempts, under certain conditions, “the performance of a 
nondramatic literary or musical work or reasonable and limited portions of any other 
work, or display of a work in an amount comparable to that which is typically displayed 
in the course of a live classroom session, by or in the course of a transmission.” 17 U.S.C. 
§ 110(2).  For this exception to apply, the performance or display of the work must be 
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The Copyright Act, therefore, explicitly provides an exemption 
for the use of copyrighted materials for teachers performing or 
displaying a copyrighted work in their class.27  The specific 
exemption provided by § 110(2), however, covers a limited 
situation: where the teacher performs or displays a work;28 it fails 
to cover other more prevalent situations, such as the creating 
multiple copies of articles or book chapters for classroom use. 
That is where the doctrine of fair use, codified by § 107, 
operates to protect teachers.29  As noted above, § 107 specifically 
mentions “teaching” as a favored use that may be considered “fair” 
and, therefore, not infringing.30  That, however, does not mean that 
all educational uses are non-infringing.  The statute provides that 
every use must be assessed using the factors articulated in § 107.31  
Furthermore, the exempted use for “teaching (including multiple 
copies for classroom use)” 32 is vague.  It does not define teaching, 
state how much of a copyrighted work may be copied, or explain 
how many copies are permissible. 
 
made by an instructor as part of the curriculum under 17 U.S.C. § 110(2)(A), and must be 
“directly related and of material assistance to the teaching content of the transmission.” 
Id. § 110(2)(B).  Additionally, the transmission of this material must be made and 
received by students enrolled in the course for which it is being shown. Id. § 110(2)(C) 
(“[T]he transmission is made solely for, and, to the extent technologically feasible, the 
reception of such transmission is limited to—(i) students officially enrolled in the course 
for which the transmission is made; or (ii) officers or employees of governmental bodies 
as a part of their official duties or employment . . . .”).  The institution transmitting the 
material must have adequate copyright policies in place and inform its “faculty, students 
and relevant staff” of its policies and how to comply with copyright law. Id. § 110(2)(D).  
There also are additional technological measures that an educational institution must take 
to prevent subsequent retention of and infringing uses of the copyrighted material. See id. 
 27 17 U.S.C. § 110(1). 
 28 Id. § 110(2). 
 29 Id. § 107. 
 30 See, e.g., Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 236–37 (1990) (explaining the specific 
examples of fair use provided by Congress in § 107); Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling 
Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537, 2580 (2009) (“Teaching, scholarship, and research 
are three of the six favored uses in the preamble to § 107.” (footnote omitted)). 
 31 17 U.S.C. § 107 (stating that “[i]n determining whether the use made of a work in 
any particular case is a fair use[,] the factors to be considered shall include” and 
enumerating the four fair use factors (emphasis added)). 
 32 Id. 
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1. The Ad Hoc Committee 
The ambiguity inherent in the fair use provision did not go 
unnoticed during the drafting of the Copyright Act, and section 
110(2)(A)’s guiding principle—a specific exemption provided to 
teachers by law33—was not lost on the educational community.  
Educators clamored for specific fair use provisions that permitted 
copying, which author and publisher groups opposed.34  Although 
the House Report rejected “‘a specific exemption freeing certain 
reproductions of copyrighted works for educational and scholarly 
purposes from copyright control,’” it recognized that teachers 
needed guidance when it came to fair use.35  The Senate Report, 
written a year prior to the House Report, also noted that “there are 
few if any judicial guidelines” for “copying by teachers.”36  To that 
end, Congress urged educators and members of the media industry 
to meet and devise a potential compromise that accommodated all 
interests.37  Of course, neither Houses of Congress participated in 
the negotiations; instead, various individuals from education and 
media convened to form the Ad Hoc Committee of Educational 
Institutions and Organizations on Copyright Law Revision (“The 
Ad Hoc Committee”).38 
 
 33 Id. § 110(2)(A). 
 34 Kenneth D. Crews, The Law of Fair Use and the Illusion of Fair-Use Guidelines, 62 
OHIO ST. L.J. 599, 615 n.62 (2001). 
 35 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 66–67 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 
5680. 
 36 S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 62 (1975).  The Copyright Office has noted that “[t]he House 
Report was written later than the Senate Report, and in many cases it adopted the 
language of the Senate Report, updating it and conforming it to the version of the bill that 
[Congress] enacted into law.” U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, CIRCULAR 21: REPRODUCTION OF 
COPYRIGHTED WORKS BY EDUCATORS AND LIBRARIANS 4 (2009), http://www.copy 
right.gov/circs/circ21.pdf.  
 37 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 67; see Crews, supra note 34, at 614–19. 
 38 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 67.  The Ad Hoc Committee’s history began in 1955, 
when Congress commenced its efforts to reform copyright law. HARRY N. ROSENFIELD, 
MAJOR PROBLEMS OF COPYRIGHT LAW AS VIEWED BY THE AD HOC COMMITTEE ON 
COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION 1 (1970) (on file with the author), available at 
http://www.eric.ed.gov/ERICDocs/data/ericdocs2sql/content_storage_01/0000019b/80/3
3/74/6f.pdf.  That effort resulted in several reports, conferences, and draft bills—and, in 
1963, the National Education Association called an exploratory Conference on Copyright 
Law Revision, which “fifty-two individuals representing forty-seven national educational 
organizations attended.” Id. at 1–2; see id. at ex.1 (listing participating organizations).  
The participants discussed how copyright could best accommodate educators.  One 
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From 1963 until 1976, the Ad Hoc Committee convened 
several times and consulted with numerous interest groups, 
including trade and textbook publishers; music publishers; film 
producers; librarians; and authors.39  The Ad Hoc Committee noted 
that educators face special problems with respect to fair use, in 
part, because “good teaching practice may not always be legal 
copyright practice,”40 and, in part, because “it is legally risky for 
teachers to rely wholly on fair use.”41  The primary issue, 
according to the Ad Hoc Committee, was “the need to legitimize 
current and developing reasonable educational practices so that 
teachers will not be forced either to drop them or to continue them 
‘under the table.’”42 
Originally, the Ad Hoc Committee pushed for a broad fair use 
exemption for educational uses.43  In the minds of educators, the 
flexibility of the fair use provisions was a liability, not a benefit—
in a broad exemption they sought safety.44  Ultimately, they were 
rebuffed; authors wanted a case-by-case review and the 
establishment of a “Copyright Royalty Tribunal” (“CRT”).45  To 
create the certainty that educators sought, the Committee 
eventually agreed on a set of educational guidelines.46  Despite this 
 
representative suggested the establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee, which convened 
for its first meeting on September 5, 1963. Id. at 3. 
 39 ROSENFIELD, supra note 38, at 4. 
 40 Id. at 6. 
 41 Id. at 51. 
 42 Id. at 7. 
 43 Kasunic, supra note 7, at 279–80. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id.  The CRT was enacted by the 1976 Copyright Act.  The Tribunal’s principal duty 
was to determine statutory royalty rates. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, CIRCULAR 92: CHAPTER 
8 OF 1976 ACT: PROCEEDINGS BY COPYRIGHT ROYALTY JUDGES (1976), http://www. 
copyright.gov/title17/92chap8.html.  In 1993, Congress replaced the CRT with the 
Copyright Arbitration and Royalty Panel (“CARP”). Copyright Royalty Tribunal Reform 
Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-198, 107 Stat. 2304 (amending, inter alia, ch. 8 of 17 
U.S.C.).  On November 30, 2004, Congress enacted the Copyright Royalty and 
Distribution Reform Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-419, 118 Stat. 2341, replacing CARP 
“with a system of the Copyright Royalty Board (CRB), which determines rates and terms 
for the copyright statutory licenses and makes determinations on distribution of statutory 
license royalties collected by the Copyright Office.” U.S. Copyright Office, Copyright 
Arbitration Royalty Panels, http://www.copyright.gov/carp/index.html#general (last 
visited July 18, 2009). 
 46 Crews, supra note 34, at 616–17. 
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apparent agreement, the agreed-upon “guidelines were negotiated 
with little participation by educators and no participation by 
students, and were adopted over the opposition of major 
universities and scholarly organizations, such as the American 
Association of Law Schools.”47 
2. The Educational Guidelines 
The House Report accompanying the Copyright Act of 1976 
included an agreed-upon recommendation from the Ad Hoc 
Committee’s meetings occurring between September 1975 and 
March 1976, which was entitled, Agreement on Guidelines for 
Classroom Copying in Not-For-Profit Educational Institutions 
(“The Classroom Guidelines” or “The Guidelines”);48 “it refer[red] 
only to copying from books and periodicals, and [was] not 
intended to apply to musical or audiovisual works.”49  The House 
Report also contained guidelines for the educational use of music 
(“Music Guidelines”).50  Additionally, a 1979 House Report 
 
 47 Jennifer E. Rothman, The Questionable Use of Custom in Intellectual Property, 93 
VA. L. REV. 1899, 1958 (2007). 
 48 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 67–68 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 
5681–82. 
 49 Id. at 67. 
 50 Like the Classroom Guidelines, infra, “[t]he purpose of the [Music] [G]uidelines is 
to state the minimum and not the maximum standards of educational fair use.” H.R. REP. 
NO. 94-1476, at 70.  The Music Guidelines, like the Classroom Guidelines, divide uses 
into two categories.  Instead of the single/multiple copy dichotomy used by the 
Classroom Guidelines, however, the Music Guidelines divide uses into “permissible 
uses” and “prohibitions.” See id. at 71–73.  There are five types of permissible uses. Id. at 
71.  First, teachers may make an “emergency copy to replace a purchased copy” but must 
eventually replace that copy with a purchased one. Id.  Second, teachers may, for 
“academic purposes other than performance,” make one copy per pupil of music excerpts, 
which may never exceed 10% of the total work. Id.  The teacher may, for teaching or 
scholarship purposes, make one copy of an “entire performable unit (section, movement, 
aria, etc.) that is” out of print or available only in a larger work. Id.  Third, teachers may 
edit or simplify “printed copies which have been purchased” so long as the edits do not 
distort the “fundamental character of the work.” Id.  Fourth, teachers may make single 
copies of the recording of student performances “for evaluation or rehearsal purposes.” 
Id.  The school can retain this copy. Id.  Fifth, teachers may make, and the school or 
teacher may retain, a copy of sound recordings owned by the school or an individual 
teacher to “[construct] aural exercises or examinations.” Id.  These guidelines address fair 
use as to the “copyright [in] the music itself,” but not the sound recording. Id. Compare 
17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2) (2006) (copyright exists in “musical works, including any 
accompanying words”), with id. § 102(a)(7) (copyright subsists in “sound recordings”), 
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articulated guidelines for off-air recording of broadcast 
programming for educational purposes (“Off-Air Guidelines”).51  
This Article focuses mainly on the Classroom Guidelines52 because 
courts have discussed these most frequently,53 and because 
educators photocopy works frequently as part of their teaching 
duties. 
Prior to stating the terms of the Classroom Guidelines, the Ad 
Hoc Committee cautioned that the Guidelines “state[d] the 
minimum and not the maximum standards of educational fair use 
under Section 107.”54  It also warned that the Classroom 
Guidelines did not proscribe any uses articled by case law or those 
that may arise in the future, even if those uses fall outside the 
Classroom Guidelines.55 
 
and id. § 101 (“‘Sound recordings’ are works that result from the fixation of a series of 
musical, spoken, or other sounds, but not including the sounds accompanying a motion 
picture or other audiovisual work, regardless of the nature of the material objects, such as 
disks, tapes, or other phonorecords, in which they are embodied.”). 
 51 The Off-Air Guidelines were developed after the Photocopying and Music 
Guidelines.  Similar to those Guidelines, the Off-Air Guidelines were developed by “a 
Negotiating Committee consisting of representatives of education[al] organizations, 
copyright proprietors, and creative guilds and unions.” H.R. REP. NO. 97-495, at 8 (1982).  
Unlike the other two sets of Guidelines, however, the Off-Air Guidelines were not 
preceded by a cautionary statement that they represented the minimum standard of fair 
use. See id. at 3–9.  Instead, the report stated that “[t]he purpose of establishing these 
guidelines,” which apply only to non-profit schools, “is to provide standards for both 
owners and users of copyrighted television programs.” Id. at 8. 
 These Guidelines allow schools to record television programs, which must include a 
copyright notice, id. at 9, and retain a copy of them for forty-five consecutive days, after 
which time the copy must be destroyed. Id. at 8–9.  Within the first ten days of copying, 
teachers may use these recordings once in a classroom or similar place, and once more 
“only when instructional reinforcement is necessary.” Id. at 9.  After the first ten days of 
recording, schools can use the copy only to evaluate its necessity in the curriculum. Id.  
Schools cannot make off-air recordings at the request of anyone except a teacher, cannot 
regularly record programs “in anticipation of requests,” and cannot record the same 
program “more than once at the request of the same teacher.” Id.  The Off-Air Guidelines 
also prohibit altering the copies or merging copies to “constitute teaching anthologies or 
compilations.” Id.  Schools are expected to create further procedures to ensure 
compliance with the guidelines. Id. 
 52 All of these guidelines are referred to collectively as “the Educational Guidelines.” 
See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 68. 
 53 See, e.g., infra Part I.B. 
 54 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 70. 
 55 See id. at 68 (“The parties agree that the conditions determining the extent of 
permissible copying for educational purposes may change in the future; that certain types 
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The Ad Hoc Committee divided the Classroom Guidelines for 
reproduction of books and periodicals into two groups: “single 
copying for teachers,” and “multiple copies for classroom use.”56  
The Classroom Guidelines permit teachers to make single copies 
of the following for scholarly research or use in preparing for or 
teaching a class: 
A chapter from a book; 
An article from a periodical or newspaper; 
A short story, short essay or short poem, whether or 
not from a collective  work; 
A chart graph, diagram, drawing cartoon or picture 
from a book, periodical, or newspaper.57 
As to multiple copies, the Classroom Guidelines permit 
teachers to make not more than one copy per student for use in 
their class if three conditions are met.58  The first condition 
requires that the use satisfy the tests of “spontaneity” and 
“brevity.”59  The Classroom Guidelines state that spontaneity 
consists of two components.60  First, “[t]he copying [must be] at 
the instance and inspiration of the individual teacher.”61  Second, 
“[t]he inspiration and decision to use the work and the moment of 
its use for maximum teaching effectiveness are so close in time 
 
of copying permitted under these guidelines may not be permissible in the future; and 
conversely that in the future other types of copying not permitted under these guidelines 
may be permissible under revised guidelines.  Moreover, the following statement of 
guidelines is not intended to limit the types of copying permitted under the standards of 
fair use under judicial decision and which are stated in Section 107 of the Copyright 
Revision Bill.  There may be instances in which copying which does not fall within the 
guidelines stated below may nonetheless be permitted under the criteria of fair use.”). 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. at 69. 
 59 Id. at 68.  The Senate Report also contained comments suggesting that spontaneity 
should be a primary concern in determining fair use.  It stated that “[t]he fair use doctrine 
in the case of classroom copying would apply primarily to the situation of a teacher who, 
acting individually and at his own volition, makes one or more copies for temporary use 
by himself or his pupils in the classroom.” S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 63 (1975). 
 60 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 68. 
 61 Id. 
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that it would be unreasonable to expect a timely reply to a request 
for permission.”62 
The “brevity” requirement is more detailed and changes 
depending on the type of work used.63  For poetry, the teacher may 
copy “(a) [a] complete poem if less than 250 words and if printed 
on not more than two pages or, (b) from a longer poem, an excerpt 
of not more than 250 words.”64  For prose, the teacher may copy 
“(a) [e]ither a complete article, story or essay of less than 2,500 
words, or (b) an excerpt from any prose work of not more than 
1,000 words or 10% of the work, whichever is less, but in any 
event a minimum of 500 words.”65  Brevity for illustrations means 
a copy of “[o]ne chart, graph, diagram, drawing, cartoon or picture 
per book or per periodical issue.”66  For so-called “special 
works,”—“[c]ertain work in poetry, prose or in ‘poetic prose’ 
which often combine language with illustrations and which are 
intended sometimes for children and at other times for a more 
general audience [that] fall short of 2,500 words in their 
entirety”—teachers “may not . . . reproduce[] [them] in their 
entirety.”67  They may, “however, [make copies of] an excerpt 
comprising not more than two of the published pages of such 
special work and containing not more than 10% of the words found 
in the text.”68 
The second condition for multiple classroom copies requires 
the use to satisfy the “cumulative effect” test.69  This test has three 
requirements.  First, the teacher may make copies “for only one 
course in the school in which the copies are made.”70  Second, the 
teacher cannot copy “more than one short poem, article, story, 
essay or two excerpts . . . from the same author, nor more than 
three from the same collective work or periodical volume during 
 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. at 68–69. 
 64 Id. at 68. 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. at 69. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id. at 68–69. 
 70 Id. at 69. 
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one class term.”71  Finally, the teacher cannot make multiple copies 
of works more than nine times for one course during one term.72  
The Classroom Guidelines state that these latter two requirements 
of the cumulative effect test do not apply to current newspapers 
and periodicals.73 
The final condition requires each copy bear a notice of 
copyright.74  In addition to these three conditions for making 
multiple copies, the Classroom Guidelines provide express 
prohibitions on particular uses of works.75  Among these are 
prohibitions on copying designed to replace compilations or 
anthologies, “consumable workbooks,” or the purchase of books 
generally.76  Under the Guidelines, students cannot be charged 
more than the cost of copying the work.77 
B. Judicial Treatment of the Guidelines 
The Educational Guidelines discussed above have an allure—a 
certain mathematical character that makes their application seem 
mechanical and almost algebraic.78  At least they seem that way 
compared to the fair use factors, which lend themselves to judicial 
decisions that employ post-hoc rationale.79  Indeed, some courts 
endorse the certainty-enhancing characterization of the 
 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. (“There shall not be more than nine instances of such multiple copying for one 
course during one class term.”). 
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. at 68. 
 75 Id. at 69–70. 
 76 Id. at 69. 
 77 Id. at 70. 
 78 Kate Irwin, Note, Copyright Law—Librarians Who Teach: Expanding the Distance 
Education Rights of Libraries by Applying the Technology Education and Copyright 
Harmonization Act of 2002, 29 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 875, 894 (2007) (opining that 
“[t]he Classroom Guidelines provide a more mathematical and rigid scheme than the 
four-factor fair use test for determining whether a use of copyrighted material is 
justified”). 
 79 See Scott M. Martin, Photocopying and the Doctrine of Fair Use: The Duplication 
of Error, 39 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 345, 352–54 (1992) (describing Professor David 
Nimmer’s criticism of the fair use test as a method for courts to engage in post-hoc 
rationalization and arguing that this is exactly the kind of fluidity that the fair use test 
facilitates and encourages). 
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Guidelines.80  This mechanical appearance has influenced the 
courts’ use of the Classroom Guidelines in their analysis of cases 
involving educational fair uses.81  That treatment affects the way 
educational institutions view and use the Guidelines.  This subpart 
first explores the cases in which the Classroom Guidelines have 
been discussed, delineating three categories of uses the courts have 
carved out.  This analysis sets up the discussion in the next section, 
which describes how this treatment has influenced educators’ use 
(or lack thereof) of copyrighted works for teaching purposes. 
1. The Guidelines as Pseudo Law 
Several courts have used the Classroom Guidelines in one form 
or another, as discussed below.  Regardless of how the courts 
applied them, the courts are using the Guidelines.  Prior to 
examining them, however, courts disclaim the Guidelines’ status as 
positive law.82  Nevertheless, that disclaimer does not change the 
practical effect of the courts’ discussion: they are legitimatizing the 
Guidelines as pseudo law.83 
In Marcus v. Rowley,84 for example, the Ninth Circuit analyzed 
whether the defendant, a teacher, had made “fair use” of the 
plaintiff’s booklet.85  To do this, the court walked through each of 
the fair use factors, eventually finding that the defendant did not 
 
 80 See, e.g., Marcus v. Rowley, 695 F.2d 1171, 1178 (9th Cir. 1983) (“The guidelines 
were designed to give teachers direction as to the extent of permissible copying and to 
eliminate some of the doubt which had previously existed in this area of copyright . . . .”). 
 81 See infra Part I.B.2. 
 82 See Rowley, 695 F.2d at 1178 (“Thus, while [the Guidelines] are not controlling on 
the court, they are instructive on the issue of fair use in the context of this case.”). 
 83 See id. 
 84 695 F.2d 1171 (9th Cir. 1983). 
 85 In Rowley, the plaintiff was a public school teacher who had published, and owned 
the registered copyright in, a booklet on cake decorating. Id. at 1173.  The defendant also 
was a schoolteacher, though she previously had been a student of the plaintiff. Id.  In 
addition to taking the plaintiff’s course and purchasing the plaintiff’s booklet, the 
defendant used the plaintiff’s booklet to compile a packet for the food service careers 
class that she taught. Id.  The booklet she made was “twenty-four pages and was designed 
to be used by students who wished to study an optional section of her course devoted to 
cake decorating.” Id.  The defendant made fifteen copies of her work, which used about 
50% of the plaintiff’s booklet, and placed them on file for her students. Id.  She used 
these packets for three consecutive years. Id. 
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engage in fair use.86  After explaining each factor, the court, in a 
separate section entitled, “The Congressional Guidelines,” applied 
the Classroom Guidelines.87  Prior to this application, the court 
explained that Congressional concern over educational use was so 
great that “it approved a set of guidelines with respect to [this 
use].”88  The court stated that, “while [the Guidelines] are not 
controlling on the court, they are instructive on the issue of fair use 
in the context of this case.”89  Before proceeding to its analysis, the 
court correctly noted that “[t]he [Classroom] [G]uidelines were 
intended to represent minimum standards of fair use,” and “were 
designed to give teachers direction as to the extent of permissible 
copying and to eliminate some of the doubt which had previously 
existed in this area of copyright law[].”90 
So, while the court noted that the Guidelines were not the law, 
it touted their benefits and analyzed them anyway.91  In so doing, it 
considered the Guidelines’ strictures as per se limits on the 
“fairness” of a use, noting that “copying is permissible if three tests 
are met”: brevity and spontaneity; cumulative effect; and notice.92  
It found that “[the defendant’s] copying would not be permissible 
under either” the test for brevity or spontaneity.93  Then, 
classifying the defendant’s book as a “special work,” the court 
found it still failed the brevity, spontaneity, and cumulative effect 
tests.94  “In conclusion,” the court stated, “it appears that [the 
 
 86 See id. at 1175–78. 
 87 See id. at 1178–79. 
 88 Id. at 1178. 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. 
 91 See id. at 1178–79. 
 92 Id. at 1178. 
 93 Id. 
 94 Id.  Rather than cease its inquiry, the court attempted to find an alternative basis 
upon which these tests could be satisfied by classifying the plaintiff’s booklet as a 
“special work.” Id. (As explained supra Part.I.A.2, “special works” are those that 
combine images and text, and are intended for children or a general audience, an 
impossibly vague standard.)  It then tested the special work for brevity, finding that “[the 
defendant’s] copying would not be permissible under this test.” Id.  Moving to 
spontaneity, the court found that the “[d]efendant compiled her [work] during the 
summer of 1975 and first used it in her classes during the 1975–76 school year.  She also 
used [her work] for the following two school years.” Id.  As a result, her “copying [did] 
not meet this requirement.” Id.  Next it assessed the “cumulative effect” test. Id.  The 
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defendant’s] copying would not qualify as fair use under the 
[G]uidelines.”95 
Other courts have taken a similar tack and treated the 
Guidelines as legislative history that constituted “persuasive 
authority.”96  The court in Basic Books v. Kinko’s Graphics 
Corp.,97 like the Rowley court, first examined the four fair use 
factors.98  Then it stated that the Guidelines were part of the 
legislative history,99 which demonstrated a “Congress[ional] 
[attempt to avoid] the maelstrom [of dispute over photocopying 
that was] beginning to churn and . . . to clarify, through a broad 
mandate, its intentions.”100  Like the Rowley court, the court in 
Basic Books proceeded to apply the Guidelines.101  Although the 
court properly noted that the Guidelines represented the minimum 
standard and were “more or less permissive,”102 it found that the 
defendant’s uses violated all three tests—brevity and spontaneity, 
 
court noted that, because the defendant copied only one piece of the plaintiff’s work,” the 
“[d]efendant’s conduct . . . satisf[ied] the second test under the [G]uidelines.” Id.  Finally, 
the court found that the “defendant’s [work] did not acknowledge plaintiff’s authorship or 
copyright and therefore [failed] . . . [the third] test.” Id. 
 95 Id.  By treating any use that falls outside the Guidelines as militating against fair 
use, the court used the Guidelines as the maximum permissible limits of copying. 
 96 Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., Inc. (MDS), 99 F.3d 1381, 1390 
(6th Cir. 1996).  Blackwell Publishing, Inc. v. Excel Research Group, LLC, 661 F. Supp. 
2d 786 (E.D. Mich. 2009), is the most recent Sixth Circuit case that relies on MDS’s 
reasoning.  The opinion, however, does not employ or even mention the Guidelines. 
 97 758 F. Supp. 1522 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).  The defendant in Basic Books was a copy 
shop, which, at the behest of university professors for twenty years, made course 
“packets” by copying and then compiling excerpts of various copyrighted works without 
the copyright owners’ consent. Id. at 1526.  The defendant was a for-profit business that 
marketed its services to university professors. Id. at 1529. 
 98 See id. at 1530–34.  The deck appears to have been stacked against the defendant in 
Basic Books.  The court, when examining the third fair use factor (amount and 
substantiality), stated that “the portions copied were critical parts of the books copied . . .  
since that is the likely reason the college professors used them in their classes.” Id. at 
1533.  If there ever has been reasoning more circular than this, I have not seen it.  By this 
logic, every copied portion of the work is the “heart” of the work merely by virtue of the 
professor selecting it. 
 99 Id. at 1535 (“The Classroom Guidelines . . . are a part of the legislative history of the 
Copyright Act of 1976.”). 
 100 Id. 
 101 See Marcus v. Rowley, 695 F.2d 1171, 1178–79 (9th Cir. 1983); Basic Books, 758 
F. Supp. at 1535–37. 
 102 Basic Books, 758 F. Supp. at 1536 (footnote omitted). 
C02_SIMON_3-21-10_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 3/31/2010  1:05 PM 
474 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 20:453 
cumulative effect, and notice—but did not comment specifically 
on what effect, in terms of fair use, that finding had.103 
The court further declined to hold that the Classroom 
Guidelines’ “prohibitions” constituted rigid bars to certain uses.104  
Finally, when assessing whether the defendant was a willful 
infringer, it noted that the defendant’s handbook attempted to 
escape any application of fair use by claiming the Guidelines did 
not apply.105  But a use “beyond the scope of the Guidelines” did 
not render the law a nullity: fair use law still applied.106 
The courts in Encyclopedia Britannica v. Crooks,107 American 
Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc.,108 and Princeton University 
Press v. Michigan Document Services,109 also used the Guidelines 
 
 103 Id. at 1537.  Professor Ann Bartow has stated that courts, as I argue the courts 
interpreting the Guidelines repeatedly do, “simultaneously interpret[ed] the Guidelines as 
both the minimum and maximum scope of fair use.” Bartow, supra note 5, at 184.  
Generally, this type of interpretation starts with a disclaimer that the Guidelines represent 
the minimum standard of fair use. See, e.g., Rowley, 695 F.2d at 1178.  The court then 
finds that the use is not fair because it falls outside the Guidelines’ limits. See id. 
 104 Basic Books, 758 F. Supp. at 1537.  The court was “convinced that . . . the more 
prudent path” was to consider the prohibitions in light of the fair use factors, rather “than 
[make] a bright line pronouncement . . . that all unconsented anthologies are prohibited 
without a fair use analysis.” Id. 
 105 Id. at 1545. 
 106 Id.  When determining whether the defendant acted willfully, thus triggering higher 
statutory damages, the court looked to the “training [the defendant] provided its 
employees regarding fair use requirements.” Id. at 1544.  It noted that the defendant’s 
handbook referenced the Classroom Guidelines and accurately stated that they 
represented the minimum amount of permissible copying. Id. at 1545.  The handbook 
also stated that the Classroom Guidelines “‘[had] little application for the college and 
university classroom situations’” because the copying would typically exceed them. Id.  
The court found this to be self-serving, stating that the defendant essentially “exempted 
itself from the purview of the Guidelines altogether.” Id.  This implies that the defendant 
is subject to the Guidelines, which therefore have some legal effect.  In other words, the 
Guidelines play some role in legal analysis, if only to determine good faith. 
 107 542 F. Supp. 1156 (W.D.N.Y. 1982).  Crooks concerned multiple defendants—
Board of Educational Services, First Supervisory District, Erie County, New York 
(“BOCES”) and its individual officers and directors. Id. at 1159.  BOCES was an 
educational service provider that copied television broadcasts to videotapes and compiled 
a library of these recordings. Id. (“BOCES was created under section 1950 of the New 
York Education Law for the purpose of providing educational services and specialized 
instruction on a cooperative basis to the 19 school districts within its geographic 
region.”). 
 108 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994). 
 109 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996). 
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as legislative history.  The Crooks court stated that, “[w]hile not 
controlling[,] . . . the Congressional Reports on the 1976 Copyright 
Legislation are helpful in outlining acceptable fair use limits in 
educational settings.”110  Specifically, the court quoted the Senate 
Report for the proposition that “spontaneity” should be considered, 
along with whether the teacher or administration directed the 
copying.111 
The Texaco court only briefly mentioned the Guidelines as 
legislative history, and did not discuss them in its legal analysis.112  
MDS, however, did use the Guidelines extensively; it adopted the 
Texaco court’s description of the Guidelines’ effect as “‘persuasive 
authority,’”113 noting that “[t]he House and Senate conferees 
explicitly accepted the Classroom Guidelines ‘as part of their 
understanding of fair use.’”114  Like the previous courts, the MDS 
court reached the Guidelines only after analyzing the four fair use 
factors.115  But it nonetheless stated that they provided “general 
guidance” on the issue of fair use,116 classified them as a “safe 
harbor,” and found that copying falling well outside their scope 
 
 110 Crooks, 542 F. Supp. at 1175. 
 111 Id. at 1175.  The court also observed that the Senate Report suggested fair use 
inquiries consider the number of copies, the circulation of the copies, and the continued 
use or destruction of the copies. Id. at 1175 (quoting S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 63 (1975)).  
Although not referring to either the House or Senate Reports, the court did, when 
examining market effect, look at the “‘cumulative effect of mass reproduction of the 
copyrighted works.’” Id. at 1169 (quoting Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of 
Am., 659 F.2d 963, 974 (9th Cir. 1981), rev’d, 464 U.S. 417 (1984)).  One must 
remember that the cumulative effect discussed here relates to § 107(4); it is not the same 
as the one discussed in the Classroom Guidelines.  The court noted that “plaintiffs’ 
blanket assertion that off-the-air videotaping can never be fair use is not supported by the 
House and Senate Reports on the 1976 Copyrights [sic] Act when videotaping is used for 
non-profit classroom purposes.” Id. at 1179 n.19.  In Crooks, the court found that the 
defendant copied generally; that teachers requested the videos; that there was no 
provision for returning or erasing the videos after use; and that, “in at least one instance, a 
videotape copy was circulated ‘beyond the classroom.’” Id. at 1175.  The court held that 
the defendant’s use was not fair. Id. at 1179. 
 112 See Texaco, 60 F.3d at 919 n.5. 
 113 MDS, 99 F.3d at 1390 (quoting Texaco, 60 F.3d at 919 n.5). 
 114 Id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94-1733, at 70 (1976)). 
 115 Id. 
 116 Id. at 1391 (“Although the guidelines do not purport to be a complete and definitive 
statement on fair use law for educational copying, and although they do not have the 
force of law, they do provide us general guidance.”). 
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“weigh[ed] against a finding of fair use.”117 Even one dissenting 
judge, who strongly disapproved of the use of legislative history, 
conceded that the Guidelines were a “safe harbor.”118 
Similarly, the court in Bridge Publications v. Vien119 applied 
the Guidelines after analyzing the four fair use factors.120  As a 
result of this analysis, the court found that the “defendant’s use 
d[id] not fit within the special [G]uidelines approved by Congress 
as to fair use in the educational context.”121 
In addition to these cases, one other, which did not involve a 
judicial decision, merits attention.  Addison Wesley Publishing Co. 
v. New York University,122 involved a settlement between a copy-
shop and a publisher.123  The settlement agreement prohibited the 
copy-shop from making copies except in the following cases: (1) 
where it secured the copyright owner’s consent;124  or (2) at the 
 
 117 Id. 
 118 In his dissent, Judge Ryan stated that the majority erred in “using legislative history, 
specifically the ‘Classroom Guidelines,’ to decide the issue of classroom use.” Id. at 1398 
(Ryan, J., dissenting).  He acknowledged that the Guidelines provide a “safe harbor,” but 
emphasized that they were not law and should not be treated as such. Id. at 1410–11.  
Judge Ryan did not see why legislative history should be consulted at all, suggesting that 
the fair use factors did not give rise to any ambiguity. See id. at 1411.  The remainder of 
this criticism was not directed at the Classroom Guidelines themselves, but their status as 
a piece of legislative history.  Judge Ryan concluded that 
[t]he fact that Congress saw fit, very likely in the interests of political 
expediency, to pay unusual deference to the “agreement” of 
interested parties about what they would like the law to be, even to 
the point of declaring (but not in the statute) that the parties’ 
agreement was part of the committee’s “understanding” of fair use, 
does not affect the rule of construction that binds this court. 
Id. at 1412. 
 119 827 F. Supp. 629 (S.D. Cal. 1993). 
 120 Id. at 635.  In Vien, a former member of the Church of Scientology (“COS”) had 
broken away from COS and founded her own religious organization. Id. at 634.  As part 
of new religion, she developed a “course,” which included written materials that had been 
copied from COS’s copyrighted works. Id.  COS sued for copyright infringement. Id.  
The court applied each of the four fair use factors and then found additionally that the 
“defendant’s use d[id] not fit within the special [G]uidelines approved by Congress as to 
fair use in the educational context.” Id. at 636. 
 121 Id. at 636. 
 122 No. 82 Civ 8333 (ADS), 1983 WL 1134 (S.D.N.Y. May 31, 1983). 
 123 Id. at *5. 
 124 Id. at *2.  In other words, the copy-center could make copies after requesting and 
receiving permission from the copyright owner. 
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request of New York University (“NYU”) faculty (i) where the 
requested copying fell within the Classroom Guidelines,125 or (ii) 
where the requested copying had been approved by NYU’s 
General Counsel as conforming to NYU’s Policy Statement on 
Copying (“Policy Statement”).126 
NYU developed its Policy Statement in response to the lawsuit; 
it did not previously have such a policy.127  The opening passage of 
the Policy Statement explained that it sought to address the 
concerns of educators who feared committing copyright 
violations.128  It also sought to reduce the University’s exposure to 
liability.129  Essentially, the Policy Statement sought to create 
certainty where “neither the statute nor judicial decisions give 
specific practical guidance on what photocopying falls within fair 
use.”130 
The Policy itself used the Classroom Guidelines “to determine 
whether . . . the prior permission of a copyright owner” must be 
sought.131  Under the Policy, which is still in place,132 “[i]f 
proposed photocopying is not permitted under the [Classroom] 
Guidelines[,] . . . permission to copy is to be sought.”133  When that 
permission is denied, photocopying can take place only after a 
review by the University’s General Counsel, who will either 
 
 125 Id.  The copy-center could make copies “at the request of a faculty member of a 
non-profit institution” so long as the copying is “in full compliance with the conditions of 
Paragraph II and III of [the Classroom Guidelines].” Id. 
 126 Id.  The copy-center could make copies “at the request of a New York University 
faculty member [if the] copying has been approved by the General Counsel of the 
University in compliance with the University’s ‘Policy Statement on Photocopying of 
Copyrighted Materials for Classroom and Research Use.’” Id. 
 127 Id. at *5.  Although NYU did not previously have a formal policy, it had distributed 
a document entitled “Interim Guidelines Concerning Photocopying for Classroom 
Research and Library Use” on January 18, 1983, which the Policy Statement superseded. 
Id. 
 128 Id. 
 129 Id. 
 130 Id. 
 131 Id. at *6. 
 132 N.Y. UNIV., FACULTY HANDBOOK (1999), available at http://www.nyu.edu/oaa/ 
policies.html#photocopy (discussing the “Statement of Policy on Photocopying 
Copyrighted Materials”). 
 133 Id. 
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approve or deny the request.134  Under the Policy, the University 
will indemnify or defend faculty where the proposed use falls 
outside the Guidelines only if they seek and heed the advice of the 
General Counsel.135 
Each of these decisions has given the Classroom Guidelines the 
appearance of law—creating pseudo law.  That is, the Guidelines 
became a form of law that lacks controlling weight, but retains 
persuasive authority.  Rowley emphasized the Congressional 
adoption of the Classroom Guidelines and called them 
“instructive.”136  It further gave them importance by using the 
Guidelines as a separate test under which it evaluated the fairness 
of the use.137 
Basic Books, MDS, and Vien also elevated the Guidelines 
status as pseudo law.  Calling the Guidelines “legislative history,” 
the Basic Books court stated that they clarified Congress’s 
intentions with respect to educational fair use and evaluated the 
defendants’ use under them.138  Likewise, the MDS court found the 
Guidelines, as legislative history, offered “general guidance,” 
which, when applied, weighed against the defendant.139 
To a lesser extent, Crooks and Texaco achieved a similar result.  
The Crooks court found that the Congressional Reports were 
“helpful” in evaluating fair use,140 while the Texaco court found 
the Guidelines to be “persuasive authority.”141 
Finally, while not a judicial decision, NYU cemented the 
Guidelines place as a substantive legal tool for both courts and 
educators.142  The consent decree expressly adopted the Guidelines 
as a de facto maximum threshold of fair use, requiring consent of 
 
 134 Id. 
 135 Id. 
 136 Marcus v. Rowley, 695 F.2d 1171, 1178 (9th Cir. 1983). 
 137 Id. at 1178–79. 
 138 See Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko’s Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522, 1544–46 
(S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
 139 See Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1390–92 
(6th Cir. 1996). 
 140 Encyc. Britannica Educ. Corp. v. Crooks, 542 F. Supp. 1156, 1175 (W.D.N.Y. 
1982). 
 141 Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 919 (2d Cir. 1994). 
 142 See infra Part I.C. 
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NYU’s General Counsel for any copying that exceeded the 
Guidelines’ scope.143  The same proscriptions applied to NYU 
faculty under the University’s copying policy.144 
2. Guidelines as Sub-Factors or Additional Factors Under § 
107 
Beyond the persuasive authority courts give to the Guidelines, 
some also use the Guidelines directly in their fair use 
determinations.  Because § 107 provides a non-exhaustive list of 
fair use factors, courts may develop other factors.145  In this 
respect, the courts’ use of the Guidelines represent two possible 
scenarios.  First, each could represent “sub-factors” included in 
analysis of some (or all) of the fair use factors.  This is essentially 
what the Crooks and Texaco courts did when, discussing the 
purpose and character of the use, they referenced the Senate Report 
and House Reports.146 
The MDS court also took this approach when assessing the 
third fair use factor, “‘the amount and substantiality of the portion 
used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole.’”147 Here, the 
court observed that “[t]he amounts used in the case at bar . . . far 
exceed the 1,000-word safe harbor that we shall discuss in the next 
part of this opinion.”148  This type of sub-factor use solidifies the 
Guidelines as part of the law—i.e., it adopts them as considerations 
under § 107’s fair use factors. 
 
 143 See Addison-Wesley Publ’g Co. v. N.Y. Univ., No. 82 Civ 8333 (ADS), 1983 WL 
1134, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. May 31, 1983). 
 144 Id. 
 145 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006); see Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., Inc., 
99 F.3d 1381, 1389 (6th Cir. 1996); Texaco, 60 F.3d. at 918–19; Crooks, 542 F. Supp. at 
1175. 
 146 See Texaco, 60 F.3d at 918–19; Crooks, 542 F. Supp. at 1175. 
 147 MDS, 99 F.3d at 1389 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 107(3)). 
 148 Id. (citing H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476 (1976)).  The reference to the Guidelines here 
raises the following questions: Was the court incorporating by reference its analysis in 
the following section?  If so, how much of its analysis did it incorporate?  The best 
reading takes the statement at face value, viewing it as an incorporation of only the word 
limit(s) set by the Guidelines. 
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Second, “other factors” could mean additional factors the court 
may consider beyond the four factors articulated in § 107.149  This 
is the type of behavior in which the courts in Rowley, MDS, and 
Vien appeared to engage.150  Like the use of the Guidelines as sub-
factors, their use as additional factors does more than create 
pseudo law, it adopts the Guidelines as law.151  In other words, the 
courts essentially adopted the Guidelines as additional factors 
under § 107 when they considered and used them in their fair use 
analysis.  There is merit to that line of analysis: when the courts 
state that the defendant’s use falls outside the Guidelines, and 
therefore weighs against fair use,152 they are stating that this 
additional factor (the Guidelines) weighs against fair use. 
Some courts, however, go further and explicitly treat part(s) of 
the Guidelines as an additional factor under § 107.  The Basic 
Books court did just that when it conducted an analysis under a 
section titled, “Other Factors.”153  First, the court noted that the 
defendant’s activities “created a new nationwide business” that 
 
 149 Simply using additional factors does not violate § 107, which contemplates the use 
of factors not listed. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (“In determining whether the use made of a work in 
any particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include . . . .”).  
Additional factors, however, must be tied to the law in some way.  The Classroom 
Guidelines do not exhibit this necessary trait. See Crews, supra note 34, at 618. 
 150 See supra notes 119, 136, 139 and accompanying text. 
 151 See Crews, supra note 34, at 618.  Here it becomes easy to see how blurry the line 
between law and pseudo law is, especially with respect to fair use.  While the four fair 
use factors are the law, courts are free to consider other factors.  What is the difference 
between using an additional factor and looking to the legislative history for guidance?  
From a practical standpoint, none exists: each is treated as part of the fair use analysis.  
The obfuscation is due, in part, to courts’ failure to explicitly state how they use the 
Guidelines in their fair use analyses. 
 152 MDS, 99 F.3d at 1391 (stating that, because the defendant’s use fell outside the 
Guidelines, it “weigh[ed] against a finding of fair use”); see Marcus v. Rowley, 695 F.2d 
1171, 1178–79 (9th Cir. 1983) (stating that the defendant’s use was not fair under the 
statutory factors or the Guidelines); Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko’s Graphics Corp., 758 F. 
Supp. 1522, 1537 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (considering the Guidelines’ “prohibitions” on 
anthologies in light of the other fair use factors). 
 153 Basic Books, 758 F. Supp. at 1534–35.  This section of the opinion is poorly 
organized.  The court discusses the Classroom Guidelines under both heading “A.5,” 
labeled “Other Factors,” and heading “B,” labeled “The Classroom Guidelines.” See id. at 
1534–37.  To make matters worse, the court then places the word “Anthologies” in italics 
and proceeds to make an analysis of this issue. See id. at 1537.  It does not, however, tie 
all of this analysis together. 
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usurped the plaintiffs’ potential profits.154  Then, the court found 
that, because the “Classroom Guidelines express a specific 
prohibition of anthologies[,] . . . [t]he fact that these excerpts were 
compiled and sold in anthologies weighs against [the] 
defendant.”155 
The Vien court made a similar maneuver.  After addressing 
each fair use factor under § 107, it conducted an independent 
analysis of the Guidelines, finding that the defendant’s use “[was] 
clearly not within the letter or spirit of the Congressional 
[G]uidelines.”156  More importantly, however, the court, like the 
court in MDS,157 weighed that finding in its fair use determination, 
stating that, “[u]nder the circumstances of this case, and after 
balancing the four statutory factors, as well as the Congressional 
[G]uidelines on fair use in the educational context, the . . . 
defendant [was] not entitled to fair use protection.”158 
Both Basic Books and Vien did more than just create pseudo 
law; they adopted part(s) of the Guidelines as additional factors 
under the § 107 analysis.159  This means that, under certain 
circumstances, part(s) of the Guidelines should be considered in 
the fair use analysis as a separately weighed factor. 
 
 154 Id. at 1534.  This type of reasoning is problematic because the plaintiffs had not yet 
entered the market.  Some of the approaches discussed infra Part II address this problem. 
 155 Id. at 1535.  It also bears mentioning that the court rejected fair use in this context 
(anthologies) because the defendants “failed to prove [their] central contention[,] which 
[was] that enjoining them from pirating plaintiffs’ copyrights would halt the educational 
process.” Id.  That reasoning is faulty for two reasons.  First, fair use, especially in the 
educational context, does not hinge on the industry at issue “coming to a halt.”  The court 
erroneously concluded that, for a use to be educationally beneficial (and fair), the 
plaintiff must show that absent that use, the educational system could not function.  The 
Copyright Act itself belies such a conclusion. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 110(1)–(2) (2006) 
(exempting from infringement the display or performance of copyrighted materials in 
certain educational situations).  Education would still continue if § 110 did not exist; the 
point is that the absence of that section would hinder education.  Second, the court 
couched its language in terms of piracy.  In that sense, it concluded what it sought to 
prove. 
 156 Bridge Publ’ns, Inc. v. Vien, 827 F. Supp. 629, 636 (S.D. Cal. 1993). 
 157 MDS, 99 F.3d at 1390–91. 
 158 Vien, 827 F. Supp. at 636. 
 159 See id. at 636; Basic Books, 758 F. Supp. at 1534–37. 
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Whether treating the Guidelines as “instructive” (Rowley)160 or 
as part of the four fair use factors,161 courts have elevated the status 
of this legislative history into pseudo law.  When using the 
Guidelines in these ways, courts apparently aim to better inform 
their decisions—but they never examine the relationship of the 
Guidelines to the law of fair use.162  Instead, they treat the 
Guidelines as “persuasive” (Texaco)163 or “helpful” (Crooks)164 by 
virtue of their status as legislative history.165  In that sense, courts 
seem less concerned with the Guidelines’ philosophical and legal 
justification than with the courts’ ultimate fair use decision, using 
the Guidelines to bolster a decision already reached. 
Not only does this blithe use of the Guidelines distort the law, 
it means that the precedential value of law, and its subsequent 
effect, will have distorted results.  In other words, courts’ decisions 
using the Guidelines have negative implications for how the 
Guidelines are viewed and used by the educational community.  
That affects both how teachers educate their students and how 
students learn.  The next subpart details the educational response to 
the courts’ treatment of the Guidelines as pseudo law. 
C. The Educational Response: Consequences of Courts’ Decisions 
As we have seen, the courts’ treatment of the Classroom 
Guidelines, if not always making them (part of) the law, has made 
them look like the law—turning them into pseudo law.166  In either 
case, the courts have erred.  The Guidelines, as repeated by 
 
 160 Marcus v. Rowley, 695 F.2d 1171, 1178 (9th Cir. 1983). 
 161 MDS, 99 F.3d at 1390; Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 919 
(2d Cir. 1994); Rowley, 695 F.2d at 1178; Vien, 837 F. Supp. at 636; Basic Books, 758 F. 
Supp. at 1534; Encyc. Britannica Educ. Corp. v. Crooks, 542 F. Supp. 1156, 1175 
(W.D.N.Y. 1982). 
 162 No court has ever examined whether the Classroom Guidelines have any mooring in 
fair use law. 
 163 Texaco, 60 F.3d at 919. 
 164 Crooks, 542 F. Supp. at 1175. 
 165 One thing the Classroom Guidelines have not done is persuade judges to use them 
by virtue of the reasoning upon which they are based.  Courts have utilized them because 
they are legislative history, not because they have any principled basis in the law.  
Thanks to Harold Krent for helping me articulate this point. 
 166 See Crews, supra note 34, at 618. 
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commentators and judges, are not the law.167  Beyond that obvious 
but overlooked fact, however, is another problem: the Guidelines 
do not have much, if any, mooring to the law of fair use.168  That 
lacuna—between the Guidelines and the Copyright Act—impacts 
the operation of the law.  The copying policies adopted by schools, 
which frequently are based on the Guidelines, will not be shaped 
by the law of fair use—or its purpose.  At best, the concepts and 
rules in the Classroom Guidelines reflect proxies for legal concepts 
found in fair use.169  At worst, they represent solely the interests of 
one or more parties to the Agreement. 
This acceptance of the Guidelines as some type of legal 
authority displaces the law of fair use and “freeze[s] the means for 
satisfying the fair use statue.”170  That, in turn, has consequences 
for educators.  After all, “[h]ow one understands and characterizes 
the [G]uidelines . . . will consequently shape the fair use decision 
based upon them.”171 
 
 167 See id. at 618, 664–68; see also Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., 
Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1410–11 (6th Cir. 1996) (Ryan, J., dissenting); Jessica D. Litman, 
Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 857, 863 (1987) 
(“The legislative history of the 1976 Act contains little evidence of Congress’s specific 
intent on any substantive issue.  Courts searching for such evidence have ultimately relied 
upon an assortment of often conflicting inferences drawn from the absence of such 
evidence.”); id. at 865 (“Yet one can read this history in its entirety and find no evidence 
that any member of Congress intended anything in particular to follow from many 
provisions of the statute.”); id. at 870 (“[A] review of the provision’s legislative history 
will show that credit for its substance belongs more to the representatives of interested 
parties negotiating among themselves than to the members of Congress who sponsored, 
reported, or debated the bill.”); id. at 887–88 (detailing the process of negotiation within 
the Ad Hoc Committee and noting that “[p]arties on both sides of the controversy refused 
to budge, and the compromise came unglued.  At the House and Senate Subcommittees’ 
insistence, the parties continued to hold negotiations with the hope of reaching another, 
more durable compromise.  They agreed, finally, on the language.  They failed, however, 
to agree on what the language meant” (footnotes omitted)); Rothman, supra note 47, at 
1904. 
 168 See Crews, supra note 34, at 616–19. But see, e.g., Michael J. Meurer, Too Many 
Markets or Too Few? Copyright Policy Toward Shared Works, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 903, 
937 (2004) (arguing spontaneous uses as being “fairer” because they “usually have little 
impact on copyright owners’ profit and in aggregate provide significant social benefit”). 
 169 See Meurer, supra note 168, at 936–37. 
 170 Crews, supra note 34, at 665–66. 
 171 Id. at 612. 
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In giving the Classroom Guidelines the effect or appearance of 
law, courts improperly ossified distorted standards (rules?) of fair 
use172 and concomitantly fostered uncertainty.173  The ossification 
process was gradual but steady.  Crooks and Rowley marked the 
first judicial embrace of the Classroom Guidelines and set the stage 
for the NYU settlement, which “[sent] out a clear warning as to 
what the publishers believe[d] the obligations that colleges and 
universities have concerning the duplication of copyrighted 
works.”174  Actually, it did more than that; it created a baseline 
standard, and precedent, for educational fair use, which all other 
educational institutions felt pressured to follow.175  Who could 
blame them?  The publishing companies had “sent [out] hundreds 
of letters to colleges and universities throughout the country urging 
them to adopt the guidelines or face a risk of litigation.”176 
Fear litigation they did: after this broadcast, even though the 
settlement was not law, “a significant number of universities had 
similarly restrictive Guidelines[-]driven photocopy policies in 
place.”177  The resulting standard, which the Association of 
American Law Schools (“AALS”) and the American Association 
of University Professors (“AAUP”) opposed,178 followed the 
Rowley court’s use of the Guidelines as a limit on photocopying.179  
 
 172 Ossification does not refer merely to the development of a rule that is difficult to 
change.  Instead, it describes the process by which courts have improperly relied on the 
Guidelines to erect pseudo law, which has almost no basis in fair use law. See supra Part 
I.B. 
 173 See Michael W. Carroll, Fixing Fair Use, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1087, 1090 (2007) (“[Fair 
use] is so case-specific that it offers precious little guidance about its scope to . . . 
educators . . . who require use of another’s copyrighted expression in order to 
communicate effectively.”). 
 174 Sheldon Elliot Steinbach, Photocopying Copyrighted Course Materials: Doesn’t 
Anyone Remember the NYU Case?, 50 EDUC. L. REP. 317, 320 (1989); see Marcus v. 
Rowley, 695 F.2d 1171, 1178 (9th Cir. 1983); Encyc. Britannica Educ. Corp. v. Crooks, 
542 F. Supp. 1156, 1175 (W.D.N.Y. 1982). 
 175 Crews, supra note 34, at 640. 
 176 Id.; see also Bartow, supra note 5, at 170. 
 177 Bartow, supra note 5, at 170; see also Rothman, supra note 47, at 1953–54 (“The 
settlement in the NYU lawsuit, involving copying of materials for classroom use, led 
many universities and copy stores to license material, even though there was no 
governing case law on the legitimacy or legality of copying works for use as course 
materials.” (footnote omitted)). 
 178 See Steinbach, supra note 174, at 320. 
 179 Crews, supra note 34, at 650–51. 
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The NYU case and the Association of American Publishers’ 
(“AAP”) subsequent lobbying efforts, however important, did not, 
by themselves, confirm legal status of the Classroom Guidelines; 
that was space the Basic Books and MDS courts willingly filled.  
The former did so by expressly analyzing the Classroom 
Guidelines in its “other factors” section,180 and the latter did so by 
confirming the use of the Classroom Guidelines as a tool for 
evaluating fair use.181  These decisions quashed any doubts that the 
Classroom Guidelines would be used as a basis for a fair use 
determination in educational context.182  Additionally, Basic Books 
and MDS, as well as Texaco, did more than merely confirm this 
standard—they legitimized industry clearance practices and made 
them part of the fair use calculus.183 
This distorted ossification has negative effects for educators 
and educational institutions.  First, it creates a fair use system that 
is asymmetrical, failing to consider the educational (students’, 
teachers’, administrators’, and school districts’) interests.  The 
“legalization” of the Guidelines as a maximum standard—or 
perhaps a rule—means the courts adopted the industry “clearance 
culture,”184 framing the fair use debate in terms of market failure 
and industry standards instead of the statutory factors.185  This 
 
 180 See Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko’s Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522, 1535–37 
(S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
 181 Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1390–91 (6th 
Cir. 1996) (Merritt, J., dissenting). 
 182 See Rothman, supra note 47, at 1954 (“[T]he practices that followed in the wake of 
a single settlement and a single court case further entrenched the custom and also 
reinforced legal precedents.”). 
 183 See id. at 1935, 1954; see also Bartow, supra note 5, at 185 (noting that, after the 
Basic Books decision, “the Association of American Publishers (A.A.P.) cited [Basic 
Books] with relish in a letter to a commercial photocopying enterprise in College Park, 
Maryland[,] . . . [in which] the A.A.P. threatened ‘enhanced monitoring of anthologies at 
your facility for copyright infringement’ and ‘a suit seeking a substantial recovery like 
that in the [Basic Books] case’”). 
 184 See Rothman, supra note 47, at 1911–18; see also Bartow, supra note 5, at 151 
(“Publishers . . . have used favorable court decisions and the threat of expensive litigation 
to coerce commercial photocopiers to pay permission fees for the privilege of making any 
copies at all, whether or not the use might be a fair one, and in some cases even when the 
work is not eligible for copyright protection.”). 
 185 See Bartow, supra note 5, at 151 (“[O]ver the past decade[,] the scope of educational 
fair use has been dramatically compressed by judges who ignore the external benefits of 
fair use, and respond only to the lost dollars publishers ascribe to the doctrine.”); Paul 
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means teachers’ arguments that uses are fair because they are 
educational (an express feature of § 107), transformative, or 
something else, are less relevant. 
This focus on market failure, however, is flawed because it 
presumes (i) that market failure is an adequate barometer of fair 
use in the educational context;186 (ii) that transaction costs or social 
value are adequate measures of the market;187 and (iii) that the 
possibility of licensing weighs against a finding of fair use.188  
None of these statements is necessarily true;189 and their 
acceptance places educators seeking to utilize fair use in an 
unenviable position.  Their conduct is evaluated against standards 
 
Goldstein, Fair Use in a Changing World, 50 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 133, 134–43 
(2003); Meurer, supra note 168, at 908 (criticizing judges for relying too much on 
transaction costs and curing market failure); Christopher Sprigman, Copyright and the 
Rule of Reason, 7 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 317, 333 (2009) (“Copyright is 
justified . . . by a fear of market failure created by uncontrolled copying, and resulting in 
sub-optimal incentives to create new artistic and literary works.”). See generally Wendy 
J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the 
Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1631 (1982). 
 186 See Bartow, supra note 5, at 181 (noting in Basic Books the “court’s overarching 
position with respect to market effect was that rather than facilitating educational fair use 
. . . Kinko’s was usurping royalties that rightfully belonged to publishers in the form of 
profits on book sales, or permission fees”); id. at 189 (“[The MDS] court unmistakably 
contemplated reducing the fair use inquiry to market effect alone.”). 
 187 See Gordon, supra note 185, at 1628 (“A particular type of market barrier is 
transaction costs.  As long as the cost of reaching and enforcing bargains is lower than 
anticipated benefits from the bargains, markets will form.  If transaction costs exceed 
anticipated benefits, however, no transactions will occur.  Thus, the confluence of two 
variables is likely to produce a market barrier . . . .”). 
 188 See James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law, 
116 YALE L.J. 882, 895–96 (2007) (“[W]hen a court is determining whether a given use 
of copyrighted material is fair, one important factor is whether there already exists a 
licensing market for the use in question.  If such a market does not exist, then the fair use 
claim gains ground.  If the market does exist, then the fair use claim loses ground.”); see 
also Christina Bohannan, Copyright Harm, Foreseeability, and Fair Use, 85 WASH. U. L. 
REV. 969, 971 (2007) (“[A] copyright owner can nearly always argue that she suffered 
harm, if only because the defendant could have paid a license fee for the use being 
challenged.”). 
 189 See, e.g., Bohannan, supra note 188, at 982 (“[M]arket failure is not an external 
phenomenon that justifies fair use after the proper scope of copyright protection is 
determined.  Rather, market failure is one basis for finding fair use because it represents a 
situation in which a copyright owner suffers no real harm as a result of defendant’s 
allegedly infringing activity.”). 
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designed to serve industry or market interests, not educational 
ones. 
Under such standards, many educational uses are not fair 
simply because they do not fulfill market objectives or conform to 
industry practices.  As Professor Jennifer Rothman has put it, 
“[f]ailing to conform with industry practices is generally viewed 
by [the] courts as ‘unfair.’”190  The asymmetric nature of the 
Classroom Guidelines also puts industry interests ahead of 
teachers’ interests and prevents teachers from using copyrighted 
materials to effectively educate students.191  Additionally, focusing 
on indicia like the market neglects the statutory language, which 
the dissent in MDS noted expressly allows for teachers to make 
copies.192  Under these circumstances, “[t]he four factors to be 
considered, e.g., market effect and the portion of the work used, 
are of limited assistance when the teaching use at issue fits 
squarely within specific language of the statute, i.e., ‘multiple 
copies for classroom use.’”193 
There are other negative consequences as well: the treatment of 
the Guidelines as law has a “chilling” effect on teachers and 
students by enhancing uncertainty.194  Although the Guidelines 
 
 190 Rothman, supra note 47, at 1937. 
 191 Even Crews, who decries the Guidelines, notes their importance in the courts and 
practice: 
The [G]uidelines are . . . a compelling tool for educators who seek to 
apply fair use and create policies.  The [G]uidelines have the 
appearance of having an official status, and they are widely accepted 
by the publishing industry and other proprietor groups who may be 
potential plaintiffs in copyright actions against the educators.  If the 
objective of an educator making policy is to avoid litigation, adopting 
and following the [G]uidelines certainly offers the prospect of 
discouraging a lawsuit. 
Crews, supra note 34, at 693. 
 192 Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1394 (6th Cir. 
1996) (Merritt, J., dissenting). 
 193 Id. at 1395 (emphasis in original) (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006)). 
 194 Professor Michael Carroll has recognized such uncertainty. See Carroll, supra note 
173, at 1115 (stating that the Classroom Guidelines “do provide clarity for a subset of 
educational uses, but, because these guidelines serve only as a floor, many colorable fair 
uses fall outside their ambit and remain subject to the standard four-factor uncertainty” 
(footnote omitted)); id. at 1116–17 (describing examples of fair use uncertainty for 
educators); id. at 1090 (“[Fair use] is so case-specific that it offers precious little 
guidance about its scope to . . . educators . . . who require use of another’s copyrighted 
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seem to give educators a measure of certainty, their status as actual 
law is not settled.195  The uncertainty of fair use and the Guidelines 
is exacerbated by the enforcement tactics of copyright owners, who 
attempt to cement the Guidelines as maximum standards.196  
Because cases like NYU, MDS, and Vien treat the Guidelines as 
legal rules (or inflexible and maximum standards),197 some 
teachers treat them as the law while others do not, relying instead 
on the doctrine of fair use.198  This uncertainty—both as to the 
legal status of the Guidelines as well as fair use itself—can lead to 
one of two consequences: “Depending on the magnitude and the 
context of such uncertainty concerning legal rules, affected parties 
may either over- or under-comply with the stated rule.”199 
This means that, depending on how risk-averse teachers are, 
some will infringe more200 and some will infringe less.201  A 
 
expression in order to communicate effectively.”); id. at 1114 (“If the oft-litigated issue 
of parody remains uncertain ex ante, a second candidate for fair use clarity might be 
educational uses.”). See generally Gibson, supra note 188, at 898–99 (explaining how 
“doctrinal feedback” can create fear-induced licensing markets that self-perpetuate and 
expand). 
 195 While the Guidelines are not settled law, copyright owners and interest groups 
continue to endorse Guidelines. See, e.g., Lois F. Wasoff, Fair Use Guidelines for 
Educational Multimedia, 517 PLI/Pat 111, 124 (1998). 
 196 See L. Ashley Aull, The Costs of Privilege: Defining Price in the Market for 
Educational Copyright Use, 9 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 573, 601 (2008) (“[T]he 
enforcement strategies of copyright owners themselves impact prices [of educational 
use]—both by manipulating uncertainty and by changing the chance of suit against 
particular groups of users.”); id. at 603–05. 
 197 See supra Part I.B.1. 
 198 See Aull, supra note 196, at 602. 
 199 Id. at 602; see Gideon Parchomovsky & Kevin A. Goldman, Fair Use Harbors, 93 
VA. L. REV. 1483, 1497–98 (2007) (“[L]aw and economics scholars have long observed 
that vague standards cause overdeterrence.”). 
 200 At the beginning of the copyright law unit of my Education Law course, I ask 
students to raise their hand if they think they ever have violated copyright law.  Without 
fail, nearly every person raises their hand, and yet none can articulate why, legally 
speaking, they may have infringed a particular work.  This raises four points.  First, 
teachers have little knowledge of what constitutes fair use (discussed below).  Second, 
they think that fair use is so restrictive that it denies them even basic rights, such as using 
a picture in a Power Point presentation, which it clearly does not.  Third, almost no 
teachers have read their school’s copyright policy.  Fourth, because they perceive 
copyright law as rigid and do not even remotely understand its contours, or attempt to do 
so, they continue to use copyrighted works in ways they think violate copyright law.  All 
four of these points are extremely worrisome and, in and of themselves, should motivate 
a new solution to educational fair use. 
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greater reliance on the Guidelines as the law—and worse yet, the 
upper bound of the law202—would lead to fewer fair uses, even 
when justified, for fear of infringement.203  The NYU settlement 
and the subsequent university copyright policies developed 
thereafter are evidence of this.204 
Others who rely more on the fair use factors, by contrast, will 
have greater space in which to teach using copyrighted materials, 
though they may infringe more.  This infringement also may be 
kept quiet to avoid litigation205 and, in the process, produce 
instructors who teach students that violating the law is acceptable, 
 
 201 Aull, supra note 196, at 602 (stating that parties “may either become more risk-
averse than warranted (relying less upon fair use) or less risk-averse than warranted 
(relying excessively upon fair use)”). 
 202 This conception of the Guidelines makes sense because “even the risk-averse actor 
presumably will not seek a license in the face of clear legal precedent that obviates the 
need to do so.” Gibson, supra note 188, at 905.  That would explain, in part, why 
educational institutions use the Guidelines as a maximum standard or as a rule.  The cases 
treat the Guidelines as the maximum extent of the law, and so educational institutions do 
not seek licenses in the face of this “clear precedent.” 
 203 See Gibson, supra note 188, at 900; see also Aull, supra note 196, at 602–04 
(“[P]ublishers and other owners’ actions can impact the price of educational use.”).  
Explaining how doctrinal feedback can lead to a fear of infringement that would limit fair 
use, Gibson states: 
One of the interesting things about the doctrinal feedback 
phenomenon is that it works an expansion of the copyright 
entitlement in an inadvertent, accretive manner.  The whole idea is 
that risk-averse behavior prevents fair use claims from being 
litigated, so a licensing culture emerges based on very few and very 
infrequent guidelines from the positive law.  Instead of looking to 
courts and statutes for guidance, practitioners look to the internal 
practices of the relevant industries and then apply the same market-
referential standards that they would expect courts to apply if they 
were ever to litigate. 
Gibson, supra note 188, at 900. 
 Gibson’s subsequent statement “that those typically blamed for copyright’s 
growth—courts and legislatures—play at best a secondary role in this insidious means of 
expansion,” however, is only partially true. Id. at 900.  He is right that “[d]octrinal 
feedback has little to do with case law and statutes, except insofar as reported decisions 
entrench the statutory ambiguities that give rise to the risk aversion in the first place.” Id. 
at 900–01.  But that answer does not do justice to the decisions themselves, which do not 
merely entrench statutory ambiguities; they set the Guidelines as the maximum standard 
for educational fair use. 
 204 See Addison-Wesley Publ’g Co. v. N.Y. Univ., No. 82 Civ 8333 (ADS), 1983 WL 
1134, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. May 31, 1983); Carroll, supra note 173, at 1115–16. 
 205 See Gibson, supra note 188, at 899. 
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as long as they do not get caught.  But infringement is different 
from litigation because the parties may not enforce their claims.  
Thus, there may be some truth to the fact that non-enforcement 
against individual teachers may make a use “free[r].”206  But that 
same non-enforcement also may make uses costly.  Because there 
are so few court decisions, all of which treat the Guidelines as (part 
of) the law, the slight risk of enforcement may be enough to chill 
fair use.207  Even if the uses were “freer,” however, educational 
institutions have copyright policies that take the Guidelines and 
court decisions seriously;208 the cases discussed in this Article 
 
 206 Explaining how copyright owners sometimes choose not to enforce their claims, 
Aull notes 
If enforcement were such that individual educators were never sued, 
then in fact their privileges would be free.  It is not completely 
unheard-of that producers would choose this course of action: in 
other contexts, theorists have suggested that copyright owners 
purposefully fail to bring suit against a particular class of infringers, 
in order to undercut competitors without offending antitrust statutes 
and to maintain market power by encouraging dependency on their 
products (particularly software) by non-business users. 
Aull, supra note 196, at 605 (footnotes omitted). 
 207 See Gibson, supra note 188, at 890 (describing how “even a risk-neutral actor with a 
good fair use claim would choose to secure a license rather than take the small risk of 
incurring a severe penalty”); id. at 888–900 (describing how doctrinal feedback works 
with respect to licensing, which may lead to the possibility that “X, being risk-averse and 
aware of the severe consequences of an adverse ruling, decides not to take that chance 
and so seeks and pays for a license from Y instead”). 
 208 E.g., UNIV. OF CAL., UC SYSTEMWIDE COPYRIGHT POLICIES AND RESOURCES, UC 
COPYRIGHT, 1986 POLICY AND GUIDELINES ON THE REPRODUCTION OF COPYRIGHTED 
MATERIALS FOR TEACHING AND RESEARCH (1986), available at http://www.universityof 
california.edu/copyright/systemwide/ucpolicies.html (click through “1986 Policy on the 
Reproduction of Copyrighted Materials for Teaching and Research”) (using the 
Classroom Guidelines as the per se maximum and stating that, “[i]f the copying is not 
within the Guidelines, permission should be obtained from the copyright owner before 
any copies are made[,] [and] [i]f it is unclear whether copying would require such 
permission guidance should be requested from the Office of the General Counsel”); CAL. 
UNIV. OF PA., FACULTY HANDBOOK 92 (2009), available at http://www.cup.edu/ 
nu_upload/faculty_handbook_2009.pdf  (wrongly stating the law in its policy, which 
says, “If a faculty member wishes to reproduce copyrighted materials for class use—
whether they are printed or non-print materials such as maps, computer software, and 
illustrations; whether or not they may be in print; whether the materials are photocopied 
or retyped; whether the materials are sold or distributed gratis to students—permission 
must be sought beforehand from the publisher; and in most cases a fee for permission 
to use them must be paid beforehand.  Failure to do so is in violation of federal law.  
Information about how to obtain copyright permission, according to guidelines of the 
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show how publishers and copyright owners can shape use and 
“chill” fair use.209 
Commentary and recommendations on fair use confirm this 
suspicion.  One commentator suggests to teachers methods of 
“protect[ing] yourself.”210  Among them, he advocates following 
attorney-approved guidelines, if available; drafting a copying 
policy that uses the Classroom Guidelines “and a check of current 
case law;” educating teachers on the copying policy developed; 
and securing permission to use a work, which he erroneously 
describes as “often a simple matter of calling the publisher’s office 
and asking.”211 
Another commentator notes that “[t]here are two sure methods 
by which the professor will limit liability.”212  The first requires the 
professor to “stay within the boundaries of the Guidelines.”213  The 
second, which kicks in only when the first is “not feasible,” is to 
“request copies or anthologies from a commercial copy center that 
will handle all necessary permissions.”214  Another author states 
that the Guidelines “should be used to assist in determining 
whether copying procedures or policies are in keeping with the 
copyright laws.”215 This author also treats the Guidelines as law.216 
 
Association of American Publishers, may be obtained at the office of the Provost or at the 
Book Store.” (emphasis in original)). 
 209 See supra Part I.C; see also Aull, supra note 196, at 603–04 (noting that “publishers 
and other owners’ actions can impact the price of educational use” by choosing who and 
when to sue). 
 210 John William Maddox, Copyright Violation and Personal Liability in Education: A 
Current Look at “Fair Use,” 1995 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 97, 103–04. 
 211 Id. at 104.  Andre Hampton describes how difficult securing permissions can be in 
his article, Legal Obstacles to Bringing the Twenty-First Century into the Law 
Classroom: Stop Being Creative, You May Already Be in Trouble, 28 OKLA. CITY U. L. 
REV. 223, 236–40 (2003) (discussing how securing permissions can be difficult for 
audiovisual works). 
 212 Kasunic, supra note 7, at 292.  Kasunic also says that educators should consider the 
four fair use factors before photocopying. Id. 
 213 Id. 
 214 Id. 
 215 Mark L. Merickel, The Educator’s Right to Fair Use of Copyrighted Works, 51 
EDUC. L. REP. 711, 717 (1989). 
 216 Id. at 718–19 (“If we look back to the ‘Agreement on Guidelines for Classroom 
Copying,’ we will see that Part III.B and C state that ‘there shall be no copying of or from 
works intended to be ‘consumable’ in the course of study or of teaching.’ This rule 
clearly includes workbooks.” (emphasis added)). 
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These commentators’ advice reflects their understanding of 
how the courts have treated the Classroom Guidelines—as positive 
or pseudo law.  Even Professor Kenneth Crews, who adamantly 
opposes the Guidelines, both their concept and their use by the 
courts, recognizes that they have import in practice.217  In other 
words, these commentators base their advice on the Classroom 
Guidelines as an authoritative legal source.  This commentary also 
illustrates how the chilling effect trickles from the courts (e.g., the 
NYU case) to practical advice (e.g., lawyers and commentators) to 
implementation (e.g., school policies).  Because of this acceptance, 
Professor Ann Bartow has suggested that non-compliance with the 
Guidelines may render uses falling outside them “willful.”218 
Finally, the courts’ treatment of the Classroom Guidelines 
fosters a misunderstanding of the law, which may encourage 
ignorance or distrust.219  The uncertainty discussed above confuses 
 
 217 Noting how educators may use the Guidelines as an aid, Crews states: 
The guidelines are . . . a compelling tool for educators who seek to 
apply fair use and create policies.  The guidelines have the 
appearance of having an official status, and they are widely accepted 
by the publishing industry and other proprietor groups who may be 
potential plaintiffs in copyright actions against educators.  If the 
objective of an educator making policy is to avoid litigation, adopting 
and following the guidelines certainly offers the prospect of 
discouraging a lawsuit. 
Crews, supra note 34, at 693. 
 218 Bartow, supra note 5, at 206 (“Moreover, capitulation by educational institutions to 
publishers’ demands may render teaching professionals willful, rather than innocent 
infringers, thereby increasing their personal liability.”). 
 219 My own experience teaching fair use to educators has been frustrating.  When I 
explain to the students that the Guidelines are not law, they stare at me quizzically.  
“What, then, are they?” they ask.  “What do they mean?”  As I strain to emphasize that 
they are merely suggestions made to teachers, the students press me further.  “So can I 
make more than one copy per student?” one woman asks.  “Of course!”  I reply.  “After 
all, these are just guidelines, and who among you hasn’t needed an extra copy for that 
absent-minded student?”  But then I am always met by (rightly) quizzical looks: “So what 
are we supposed to do?!”  I cannot give them a definitive answer—I can tell them only 
they should try to get permission to use works, and failing that, to make sure their 
material relates to the curriculum that they teach.  Aside from those maxims, and a few 
others—including do not copy whole books verbatim—I struggle to give them the 
answers for which they are searching.  In the end, we always come back to the four fair 
use factors, which are designed to be interpreted by judges, not educators.  Additionally, 
some students, exasperated, refuse to try to understand the concept of fair use.  That 
acceptance of ignorance fosters ignorance among students. 
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teachers and students.220  Beyond the uncertainty, and perhaps 
what leads to it, is the confusion among teachers about whether the 
Guidelines are law.  Even if we accept the Guidelines as law, 
teachers have great difficulty applying them.  Further complicating 
matters is the “prohibitions” section of the Guidelines,221 which at 
least one court applied flexibly.222  On this point, teachers do not 
understand how the “rule” stating “prohibitions” could be anything 
other than mandatory.  As a result of this misunderstanding (and 
many do not even exhibit this level of misunderstanding), 
ignorance or frustration becomes prominent.  Ignorance of the law 
is a detriment to society—and in the educational system, a 
detriment to students as well as the educational system in general; 
the sad irony is that it is the law itself that causes ignorance and 
misunderstanding.223 
 
 220 See supra notes 191, 194 and accompanying text. 
 221 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 69–70 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 
5683–84. 
 222 Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko’s Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522, 1537 (S.D.N.Y. 
1991) (“Defendant urges the court to seek a less rigid view of the meaning of the 
Guidelines.  We are convinced that this is the more prudent path than a bright line 
pronouncement . . . that all unconsented anthologies are prohibited without a fair use 
analysis.”). 
 223 See Goldstein, supra note 185, at 134 (emphasizing that fair use is indeterminate 
because it “is a constitutive doctrine,” which “entails a reconstruction of copyright, a 
weighing of the benefits to be secured from excusing a particular use against those to be 
secured from barring it[,]” and because “the doctrine is historically and technologically 
contingent”).  I add that the doctrine, as by now should be apparent, is contextually 
contingent: whether a use is fair depends on when, how, and under what circumstances it 
is used.  Even publishers acknowledge that “the whole subject [of fair use] is . . . 
confusing,” preventing any firm rules; “no consensus exists among the publishers 
surveyed about fair use.” Mortimer D. Schwartz & John C. Hogan, Copyright Law and 
the Academic Community: Issues Affecting Teachers, Researchers, Students, and 
Libraries, 17 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1147, 1176 (1984).  Schwartz and Hogan made this 
observation based on the results of a survey submitted to “commercial publishers, 
university presses, scholarly and scientific journals” inquiring about word count in 
determining fair use. Id. at 1163. 
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II. SO IT’S BROKEN, NOW LET’S FIX IT: EXPLORING 
ALTERNATIVES TO THE CURRENT JUDICIAL ANALYSIS OF 
EDUCATIONAL FAIR USE 
 The search for a new model of educational fair use is driven by 
the doctrine’s uncertainty and the failure of the Guidelines, which 
are neither calibrated to the necessities of teaching nor based on 
the law.  To what extent educational uses of copyrighted materials 
should be “free” is a matter of debate.224  One scholar has framed 
the debate over access to copyrighted works for educational 
purposes in terms of morality and distributive justice.225  Others 
have rightly noted that educational fair uses have far-reaching 
effects—on students, teachers, education, and society as a 
whole.226 
One author has downplayed the benefit of educational fair use, 
claiming that it is favored because many people feel, intuitively, 
 
 224 Perhaps this difference of opinion centers on divergent cultural perspectives, akin to 
those articulated by Professor Lawrence Lessig in REMIX: MAKING ART AND COMMERCE 
THRIVE IN THE HYBRID ECONOMY (Penguin Press 2008). 
 225 See Margaret Chon, Intellectual Property “From Below”: Copyright and Capability 
for Education, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 803, 818–19, 836–37 (2007) (noting that, “[f]rom a 
distributive justice standpoint, fair use is a choice in favor of access to a knowledge good 
that recognizes socially beneficial uses that may not always be better internalized by the 
rights holder” and, further, educational fair use is markedly different from other fair uses 
because of its “positive spillover effect on society as a whole”). 
 226 Kasunic, supra note 7, at 290–91.  Contextualizing the effects on students, teachers 
and society, Goldstein notes that 
[t]he value that a schoolteacher personally derives from photocopying 
a magazine article for his class may be lower than a bargain with the 
copyright owner would require.  But if the benefits to be received by 
his students—and, though more distant, by society from having well-
informed citizens—could somehow be measured, taxed, collected, 
and distributed, the aggregate could well exceed what the copyright 
owner would require. 
Goldstein, supra note 185, at 137–38; see also Chon, supra note 225, at 837; Gordon, 
supra note 185, at 1630 (noting that markets may not work in education because 
“teaching and scholarship may yield significant ‘external benefits;’”  because “all of 
society benefits from having an educated citizenry and from advances in knowledge, yet 
teacher salaries and revenues from scholarly articles are arguably smaller than such 
benefit would warrant”; and because, “[w]hen a defendant’s works yield such ‘external 
benefits,’ the market cannot be relied upon as a mechanism for facilitating socially 
desirable transactions”). 
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that educational works should be free to use.227  She has argued 
that educators have used rhetoric to reinforce this misguided 
claim.228  “Fair use,” she and others commonly claim, is a 
“privilege,” not a right.229  Although the author is partially correct 
to assert that “neither traditional nor modern copyright cases fully 
recognize an educational, status-based exemption to intellectual 
property rights,”230 her characterization of “fair use” as a  privilege 
is wrong.  A copyright itself is a privilege; it is a gift of positive 
law.231  Fair use, then, should be seen as just as much a right as the 
owner’s copyright itself.232 
 
 227 See Aull, supra note 196, at 576. 
 228 See id. at 580–81. 
 229 Id. at 582; see also Parchomovsky & Goldman, supra note 199, at 1521 (agreeing 
with the view that copyright gives the author rights and fair use is merely a “Hohfeldian 
privilege” (citing Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as 
Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 30 (1913))).  I argue infra note 232 that 
the copyright and the fair use doctrine represent competing rights (or privileges), and at 
least one court has endorsed such a view. See Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 
268 F.3d 1257, 1260 n.3 (11th Cir. 2001) (“I believe that fair use should be considered an 
affirmative right under the 1976 Act, rather than merely an affirmative defense, as it is 
defined in the Act as a use that is not a violation of copyright.” (citing Bateman v. 
Mnemonics, Inc., 79 F.3d 1532, 1542 n.22 (11th Cir. 1996))).  Just to give a preview, a 
copyright owner has a right to copy its protected expression—which implies, in 
“Hohfeldian terms,” that the user has a “correlative duty” not to copy the protected 
expression. Hohfeld, supra, at 31 (“Recognizing, as we must, the very broad and 
indiscriminate use of the term, ‘right,’ what clue do we find, in ordinary legal discourse, 
toward limiting the word in question to a definite and appropriate meaning.  That clue lies 
in the correlative ‘duty,’ for it is certain that even those who use the word and the 
conception ‘right’ in the broadest possible way are accustomed to thinking of ‘duty’ as 
the invariable correlative.”).  In other words, the right to copy imposes a correlative duty 
on the unauthorized user not to copy.  But a similar statement can be made of fair use 
when conceived as a “right”: the right to copy (or access) a protected expression  imposes 
a correlative duty on the copyright owner not to interfere with that copying (or 
accessing).  This is precisely the basis from which the fair use model developed in Part 
III.B works.  In this way, I fundamentally disagree with David R. Johnstone’s analysis in 
Debunking Fair Use Rights and Copyduty Under U.S. Copyright Law, 52 J. COPYRIGHT 
SOC’Y U.S.A. 345, 368–70 (2005). 
 230 Aull, supra note 196, at 579. But see 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006) (expressly stating that 
fair use includes “teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or 
research, is not an infringement of copyright”); id. § 110 (delineating status-based 
exemptions from infringement for certain educational uses of materials). 
 231 See Tom W. Bell, Copyright as Intellectual Property Privilege, 58 SYRACUSE L. 
REV. 523, 529–31 (2008) (describing copyright as “[a] statutory exception to common 
law rights and obligations that grants special powers and immunities to copyright 
holders,” and rejecting the characterization of copyright as Hohfeldian property); id. at 
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535 (“Even as a matter of positive law, the [Copyright] Act’s protections provide 
copyright holders with only limited use rights.  Copyright holders must forbear not only 
unauthorized uses of their works, but even unauthorized uses that profit others.”); see 
also 17 U.S.C. § 110; David A. Simon, In Search of (Maintaining) the Truth: The Use of 
Copyright Law by Religious Organizations, 16 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 41–50, on file with author), available at http://papers 
.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1465203 (abstract). 
 232 Perhaps the copyright and the fair use doctrine should be seen as “dual rights” or 
“dual privileges”—and I think that is how they are conceived.  That conception is visible 
in the way a fair use analysis is conducted: judges attempt to balance the copyright 
owner’s interest against the public’s interest. Cf. Bohannan, supra note 188, at 985–87 
(arguing that the balancing approach—where courts weigh the interests of the copyright 
owner against the public—is wrongheaded).  Darren Hudson Hick makes a cogent 
argument that fair use cannot possibly be a right—and therefore must be conceived of as 
a privilege—in his article, Mystery and Misdirection: Some Problems with Fair Use and 
Users’ Rights, 56 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 485, 491–92 (2009).  Essentially, Hick 
claims that describing fair use as a right means that a non-copyright owner would have 
the right to use, and possibly access, an author’s unpublished work. See id. at 492–93.  
He claims that is absurd, and that, even if we describe fair use as a right as applied only 
to published works, this description fails. See id. at 493–95. 
 Hick, however, misconstrues the nature of the fair use right.  The principle of fair 
use, like the principle of copyright ownership, derives from the copyright law itself.  
Copyright law, in turn, is based on creating incentives for authors for the public’s benefit. 
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.  The author’s “right” to his work is not a natural one—it 
is a statutory grant designed to encourage creation. See Bell, supra note 231, at 529–31.   
 To that end, Hick’s statement about unpublished works assumes too much; it implies 
that the author does have a right to that work, Hick, supra, at 493, perhaps even a moral 
right, which, of course, the author does not. But see 17 U.S.C. § 106A (providing rights 
of attribution and integrity to authors of a “work of visual art”).  The author’s “rights,” 
however one defines them, are based on the incentive theory of copyright.  See, e.g., 
Bohannan, supra note 188, at 983.  In effect, they are privileges granted to the author.  
Fair use “rights” are based on the public interest and the recognition that copyright 
ownership does not mean absolute and exclusive ownership.  Fair use is a privilege or 
right in the same sense as the copyright itself.  Thus, it is plausible to conceive of both the 
copyright and fair use as competing rights or privileges. 
 Hick comments that “it is difficult to understand how granting one group (authors) a 
right thus gives parallel rights to another group (users).” Hicks, supra, at 494.  I am not 
sure where the difficulty lies.  The Copyright Act grants authors rights (or privileges) in 
their work, and it also grants users the right (or privilege) to fairly use those works 
without the permission of the copyright owner.  Thus, it is not a matter of granting to a 
class of individuals a right that somehow, concomitantly but without explanation, births 
to another class a different and conflicting right.  It is a matter of the Copyright Act 
granting rights to both users and owners based on two different aspects of the same 
underlying theory.  In any case, all of copyright law is, in effect, a privilege. (Note that 
fair use is explicitly categorized as neither a right nor a privilege by the text of 17 U.S.C. 
§ 107.) 
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This Article rejects the fair use-as-a-privilege view;233 and, 
beyond that, it accepts the contention that educational fair use is 
different from other kinds of fair uses given its nature, purpose, 
and effect.  This view works from the fundamental premise that, in 
education, the non-use of a work can be more detrimental to 
society than a use would be to the copyright owner.234  Because 
educational uses differ from all other uses, but not all educational 
uses are “fair,” the courts have coped by adopting the Classroom 
Guidelines.235  This mistake has led to the problems identified in 
Part I;236 principally, creating legal uncertainty for educators who 
wish to make copies or otherwise invoke fair use for educational 
purposes.  Scholars have recognized this uncertainty in education: 
for example, Professor Pamela Samuelson, who has argued that 
fair use is more predictable than many would like to believe,237 has 
noted that, out of all the different categories of fair use, “[t]he only 
clusters of fair use cases in which it is quite difficult to predict 
whether uses are likely to be fair is in the educational and research 
use clusters.”238 
In attempting to correct this uncertainty, courts have chilled 
fair use, diverged from the law, and impeded the mission of 
educators across the country.239  Authors and publishers have 
further pushed educational fair use in the wrong direction, 
emphasizing industry “clearance culture” and insisting on making 
 
 233 See Aull, supra note 196, at 60l; supra note 232 and accompanying text. 
 234 Kasunic, supra note 7, at 290–91 (“If photocopying were unavailable, educators 
would likely do without certain relevant works rather than demand that students purchase 
them.  While educational photocopying certainly results in some loss to authors and 
publishers, this loss must be weighed against the loss to students and the educational 
system if works were not used by professors.  Educators and students would do without 
information that could have benefitted [sic] their studies.  In short, neither the public nor 
the copyright owner gains from the non-use of copyrighted works.”). 
 235 See id. at 280–81. 
 236 See supra Part I.C.  
 237 Samuelson, supra note 30, at 2541 (“This Article argues that fair use law is both 
more coherent and more predictable than many commentators have perceived once one 
recognizes that fair use cases tend to fall into common patterns, or what this Article will 
call policy-relevant clusters.”). 
 238 Id. at 2542 n.28. 
 239 Joseph P. Liu, Copyright and Breathing Space, 30 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 429, 429 
(2007). 
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the Guidelines the upper limit of the law.240  In short, the current 
mechanisms governing educational fair use are malfunctioning and 
are on the verge of breaking. 
Some have argued that such certainty can never be achieved in 
the realm of fair use.241  They argue that fair use, by its very nature 
as a legal standard, will leave teachers grabbing smoke.242  Indeed, 
some argue that it is our expectation of certainty that dooms our 
quest for a solution.243  They suggest that we “[a]ccept the fact that 
fair use analysis will always be fact intensive, and predictability 
always will be an elusive goal.”244 
I reject this approach in education.  To accept the current state 
of the law, or something similar, would be to further endorse 
industry custom, allowing copyright owners to “leverage the 
vagueness of the law,”245 which, in turn, would force educators 
farther and farther away from legitimate uses of copyrighted 
works.  As Professor Jason Mazzone has observed, “[f]air use is 
free use”:246 it “is a use that does not require permission because it 
is not infringement.”247  We should not let the challenges of 
uncertainty, and the attendant browbeating publishers, bully this 
concept into the darkness of circular arguments about licensing.248 
To the contrary, this challenge is taken head on by proposing a 
new model for educational fair use.  Before reaching this new 
model, however, this Part explores several potential changes that 
scholars have proposed to render fair use more palatable.249  These 
 
 240 See Rothman, supra note 47, at 1911–20. 
 241 Martin, supra note 79, at 347. 
 242 Joseph P. Liu, Fair Use: “Incredibly Shrinking” or Extraordinarily Expanding?, 31 
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 571, 578 (2008). 
 243 See Martin, supra note 79, at 353, 392–93. 
 244 Id. at 392. 
 245 Mazzone, supra note 15, at 398. 
 246 Id. 
 247 Id. at 404. 
 248 See, e.g., Bohannan, supra note 188, at 971 (“Fair use turns primarily on whether the 
use causes harm to the copyright owner, but the copyright owner can nearly always argue 
that she suffered harm, if only because the defendant could have paid a license fee for the 
use being challenged.”); Gibson, supra note 188, at 906. 
 249 For many scholars “palatable” means copyright veers in the direction of the 
Constitution, instead of away from it. See Bohannan, supra note 188, at 980. 
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include changing the elements of copyright infringement,250 
modifying the constituents of fair use or their application,251 
adopting a code of best practices to govern educators’ conduct,252 
and creating new apparatuses to administer fair use.253  After 
reviewing and evaluating these choices, this Article proposes a 
model for fair use in education based on the framework of an 
administrative agency, which offers the best solution to the 
problems of uncertainty in the context of education. 
A. New Infringement Elements 
Recent literature has attacked copyright for straying from its 
Constitutional roots, advocating a refocusing or restructuring of the 
infringement analysis.254  Professor Shyamkrishna Balganesh, for 
example, has argued that, to properly calibrate copyright to its 
incentive-based design, copyright infringement should be based on 
the reasonable foreseeability of the copier’s use at the time of 
creation.255  Balganesh’s theory is premised on the idea that 
copyright incentives should play a role in the infringement 
analysis; this inclusion limits the “windfall” a copyright owner 
may receive when it reaps benefits from uses of the copyrighted 
material that were unforeseen (in terms of their form or purpose) at 
the time of the work’s creation.256  To accomplish this goal, 
Balganesh proposes that “foreseeable copying” should “operate as 
a third element in the determination of copying”: in addition to 
proving valid ownership and copying, the plaintiff would have to 
 
 250 See infra Part II.A. 
 251 See infra Part II.B.1–2. 
 252 See infra Part II.B.3. 
 253 See infra Part II.B.4. 
 254 See Bohannan, supra note 188, at 980. 
 255 See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Foreseeability and Copyright Incentives, 122 HARV. 
L. REV. 1569, 1581–89, 1603–25 (2009) (detailing the courts’ failure to implement 
copyright law’s incentive structure when deciding doctrinal issues, including fair use, and 
describing a new model of fair use based on foreseeability, which better addresses this 
goal). 
 256 Id. at 1571.  Professor Justin Hughes correctly points out that Balganesh is not 
advocating “windfall profits from unexpected hits be curtailed because such proceeds are 
reasonably unforeseen.” Justin Hughes, Copyright and Its Rewards, Foreseen and 
Unforeseen, 122 HARV. L. REV. F. 81, 82 (2009).  He notes that Balganesh avoids this by 
“defin[ing] financial returns as ‘unforeseen’ . . . in terms of purpose or technology.” Id. 
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prove that “the defendant’s use (that is, copying) of the protected 
work was foreseeable to the plaintiff—in form and purpose—when 
the work was created.”257  This objective theory258 relieves fair use 
of its duty to discern which uses are “transformative” enough to 
render a use non-infringing.259 
Though it does have difficulties,260 Balganesh’s proposal is an 
insightful and well-reasoned one.  Applying it to educational uses 
of copyrighted works, however, shows that it is no substitute for a 
fair use inquiry.261  Nearly all educational uses will infringe under 
 
 257 Balganesh, supra note 255, at 1605 (emphasis omitted).  Under this test, the law 
would mirror that of the “eggshell plaintiff” in tort. Id.  As a result, “it should matter little 
to the foreseeability determination that the defendant copied the entire book, or made a 
million copies of it, rather than a few.” Id.  Hughes has responded that this proposal has 
structural flaws, especially in light of express Congressional language that contemplates 
copyright persist in unforeseen technologies. Hughes, supra note 256, at 87–88. 
 258 Balganesh’s theory is based on objective foreseeability. Balganesh, supra note 255, 
at 1611 (“It is worth emphasizing that even though it may appear as if the foreseeability 
inquiry is one of subjective intent—that is, whether one or both parties actually expected 
the grant to cover a use—in reality, the determination is always objective.”).  This 
standard would ascribe certain baseline characteristics to the plaintiff-creator. See id. at 
1611–13 (“Such a standard would presume creators are, at a minimum, informed—in the 
sense that the creator knows of the different mediums in existence in which the work can 
be employed—and rational—in that the creator intends to either directly or indirectly 
control the markets for those different mediums.” (emphasis added)). 
 259 Id. at 1606–07 (“Under current doctrine, questions of this nature[, i.e., those 
involving transformativeness,] are relegated to the fair use inquiry.  Given that fair use is 
an affirmative defense, the burden then falls to the defendant to show how his actions (of 
copying) were not harmful to the plaintiff.  It places the entire focus on the defendant, 
glossing over the uses that the plaintiff might have legitimately expected to control in 
creating the work.” (emphasis added) (footnote omitted)). 
 260 Wendy Gordon has noted the merit in Balganesh’s view while concomitantly 
criticizing it in several respects. See Wendy Gordon, Trespass-Copyright Parallels and 
the Harm-Benefit Distinction, 122 HARV. L. REV. F. 62, 65–66, 72, 74–80 (2009) 
(criticizing Balganesh’s theory of foreseeability, supplementing it to protect authors from 
“new technologies that cannibalize[d] their existing markets,” and discussing the harm-
benefit distinction, which teaches us that “an owner will respond less readily to 
opportunities to maximize the beneficial use of her property than she will to opportunities 
for avoiding harms to it”). 
 261 Balganesh does not argue that his infringement analysis should supplant fair use, 
and I do not seek to attribute that view to him here.  He does mention, however, that his 
proposal would move some fair use questions into the infringement analysis. Balganesh, 
supra note 255, at 1606.  Hughes argues that part of Balganesh’s proposal actually 
transplants the fourth fair use factor into the infringement analysis. Hughes, supra note 
256, at 90–91.  While Balganesh’s inclusion of “purpose” into the foreseeability calculus 
makes his proposal different from the market effect—which considers only technology—
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this proposal, especially when teachers are making direct copies 
for classroom use.262  Put another way, much of teachers’ 
infringement is foreseeable.263  But finding that a teacher or 
student has infringed copyrighted material says little about whether 
the use is fair.  Therefore, merely re-crafting the infringement 
analysis does not solve the problem of educational fair use. 
Most recently, Christopher Sprigman has modified Balganesh’s 
proposal using themes from antitrust law, arguing that the 
“foreseeability requirement . . . will not in itself supply an 
administrable theory of copyright harm.”264  This, he argues, 
results from the Supreme Court’s approach to the Sonny Bono 
Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998 (“CTEA”)265 in Eldred v. 
Ashcroft,266 which illustrates that “[w]hat is ‘foreseeable’ in any 
particular copyright case is uncertain and readily manipulable.”267  
 
Hughes argues that this proposal, coupled with the transformative inquiry in the first fair 
use factor, essentially is part of the current fair use inquiry. Id. at 91. 
 Though he disagrees with the reasoning on which it is based, Hughes does note a 
principal difference between the Balganesh proposal and these two parts of fair use: 
The chief difference concerns market substitution.  While the 
Balganesh proposal would excuse technologies and purposes that are 
unforeseen even when they have an adverse impact on existing and 
foreseen markets, in the standard analysis a new technology’s adverse 
impact on the existing and foreseen markets would weigh strongly 
against fair use. 
Id. at 91 (footnote omitted).  To the extent that this can be read to imply that fair use’s 
role should be diminished, this Article disagrees.  Furthermore, contrary to some courts’ 
views, see Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1400 (6th 
Cir. 1996); Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko’s Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522, 1530–31 
(S.D.N.Y. 1991), transformativeness can exist when portions of several works are copied 
and juxtaposed—that is the whole basis for teaching; teachers often (and rightly) use 
sometimes unrelated materials in conjunction with one another for pedagogical purposes. 
 262 See, e.g., Bartow, supra note 5, at 178 (discussing how the court in Basic Books 
erred by failing to realize “the incongruity of applying transformative use analysis to the 
context of course packet duplication[, the purpose of which] . . . is to expose students to a 
variety of viewpoints, which are arguably most pedagogically useful when 
unadulterated”). 
 263 There will be some uses that are not foreseeable at the time of creation.  For 
example, when I use clips from South Park in my Education Law class to illustrate the 
(un)acceptable methods of teaching, the use, at least in its purpose, is not foreseeable. 
 264 Sprigman, supra note 185, at 322. 
 265 Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 
2827 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2006)). 
 266 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (deciding the constitutionality of the CTEA). 
 267 Sprigman, supra note 185, at 322. 
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As a result, “where the effect of the infringing conduct is 
ambiguous” in terms of harm,268 Sprigman would require the 
plaintiff to plead and prove (“actual or likely”)269 harm—here 
defined in terms of market failure and creation incentive270—as an 
affirmative element of his infringement case.271 
By contrast, in cases where “we know . . . [that the infringing 
conduct] will harm author incentives over the run of cases, . . . we 
should preserve copyright’s current strict liability rule,” and 
“perhaps . . . strengthen it by limiting the availability of the fair use 
defense in these cases of ‘per se’ copyright liability.”272  One per 
se rule would presume harm for “consumptive” infringement: 
“infringement involving the reproduction and distribution of copies 
that are either exact or near enough so that they are almost certain 
to compete with the original work for patronage.”273  One example 
of this is the “reproduction and distribution of exact copies of a 
copyrighted song.”274 
Sprigman’s proposal, like Balganesh’s, faces problems in the 
educational setting.  First, his proposal involves both rules and 
standards, arguing for some per se rules of infringement and a rule 
of reason for infringing conduct that has ambiguous effects on the 
creation incentive.275  The rule-based approach does provide some 
certainty, but it does so in the wrong place.  Under this proposal, 
 
 268 Id. at 323, 328 (noting that “in most copyright cases it is the plaintiff that has 
superior access to information about harm—harm to himself, directly, and, by extension, 
harm to other authors similarly situated” (emphasis added)). 
 269 Id. at 330. 
 270 Id. at 339 (“The plaintiff might seek to prove, for instance, that there is significant 
cross-elasticity of demand between the original and the derivative, and therefore allowing 
unauthorized reproduction and distribution of the derivative will in fact divert enough of 
the sales that the original author might otherwise have enjoyed that the court is able 
reasonably to conclude that the loss, if assessed ex ante, would have affected the author’s 
incentive to create.”). 
 271 Id. at 330 (“Employing this liability standard would present greater complexity—the 
plaintiff’s prima facie case in every rule of reason infringement action would include not 
just proof of infringing conduct, but an assessment of whether harm is likely.”). 
 272 Id. at 323. 
 273 Id. at 335.  Sprigman does provide several caveats to this approach, but none of 
them negate the points made infra. 
 274 Id. 
 275 See id. at 324–38. 
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“consumptive” uses are per se infringing.276  That means that a 
large amount of a teacher’s uses will be infringing.  Furthermore, 
like Balganesh’s proposal, it focuses on changing the infringement 
analysis and therefore does little with fair use.277  Thus, even if 
teaching uses were somehow taken out of the per se category of 
infringement, teachers would still face the problem of fair use: if 
the defendant managed to show some harm, the fair use inquiry 
would be tainted by this first-order assumption.278 
B. Modifying the Fair Use Analysis 
Because modifications to the infringement cause of action will 
not suffice to accommodate educational fair use, a modification to 
the fair use analysis is the next logical place to look for a solution.  
Scholars already have labored in this area, proposing changes to 
the fair use inquiry.279  Some of these proposals have been directed 
at refocusing the fair use inquiry while others have set out to 
redefine it.280  These approaches follow one of four patterns: the 
implementation of burden-shifting;281 the re-conceptualization or 
modified application of the fair use factors;282 the use of a code of 
best practices; and the use of a new entity to determine fair uses.283 
1. Burden-Shifting Approach 
In a paradigm similar to Balganesh, Professor Christina 
Bohannan has advocated incorporating foreseeability and harm 
into the fair use analysis.284  This approach to fair use would 
require “courts . . . [to] presume harm only where the defendant’s 
use usurps the copyright holder’s most foreseeable markets, or 
those markets which a reasonable copyright owner would have 
taken into account in deciding whether to create or distribute the 
 
 276 See id. at 335–36, 338–39, 342. 
 277 See id. at 340; see also Balganesh, supra note 255, at 1603–13. 
 278 See infra notes 303–14 and accompanying text (discussing Professor Matthew Sag’s 
reconceputalization of fair use). 
 279 See generally Bartow, supra note 5; Bohannan, supra note 188, at 184. 
 280 See generally Balganesh, supra note 255; Bohannan, supra note 188. 
 281 See infra Part II.B.1. 
 282 See infra Part II.B.2. 
 283 See infra Part II.B.4. 
 284 See Bohannan, supra note 188, at 987–1002. 
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copyrighted work.”285  She argues that courts, when examining fair 
use, actually have used some variant of this harm formulation.286 
This approach faces several difficulties.  First, it over-protects 
users, even in education.  Her model would restrict cognizable 
harm to only a use that “usurps the copyright holder’s most 
foreseeable markets, or those markets which a reasonable 
copyright owner would have taken into account in deciding 
whether to create or distribute the copyrighted work.”287  That 
bifurcated approach gives unduly broad protection to users.  The 
“usurpation” requirement necessarily excludes cases where a use 
does not usurp, but instead (substantially) dilutes, the most 
foreseeable market.  In education, this would protect an author 
only if teachers’ photocopying, for example, took the place of the 
copyrighted work.  That is not likely to happen, even if several 
school districts photocopied an entire fiction novel for every 
eighth-grade class.  This type of copying, however, is unfair. 
The second requirement, which can be satisfied in two ways—
the most foreseeable market or the market reasonably factored288—
also has backwards effects in education, exempting from 
infringement questionable uses.  Assuming market usurpation, 
would every author who pens a novel, for example, “reasonably 
take into account”289 the fact that their work might be used, in 
whole or in part, in classrooms?  If so, that assumes that every 
author reasonably thinks that (i) her work is of a certain quality 
and (ii) likely will yield the author profit from its use in a 
classroom.  Those are not reasonable assumptions as applied to the 
objective, ordinary author;290 thus, Bohannan’s proposal would 
exempt from copyright infringement nearly all fiction books used 
in a classroom setting. 
 
 285 Id. at 989.  I will refer to these market requirements as the “most foreseeable 
market” and the “market reasonably factored.” 
 286 See id. at 1002–31. 
 287 Id. at 989 (emphasis added). 
 288 Id. 
 289 Id. 
 290 If these are reasonable assumptions for an author to make, nearly all uses of his or 
her work will be presumptively unfair. 
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Second, this approach over-protects authors: if the copyright 
owner proves usurpation plus the existence of the most foreseeable 
market or the market reasonably factored, harm is presumed.291  
After such a showing, the burden would shift to the defendant to 
show that no harm occurred.292  But when the burden shifts, the 
defendant’s fate already will be determined because it likely will 
have no empirical data to the contrary.293  Why is this a problem?  
If harm is found (by usurpation of either the most foreseeable 
markets or the markets reasonably factored) in education, it is rare 
that the school will have any evidence whatsoever of market 
effects.  Thus, it will not be able to meet its burden of showing no 
harm.  Furthermore, using the fair use factors at this point will be 
less effective because, as Professor Matthew Sag points out, their 
use depends on the first-order presumption of harm.294 
Finally, and most importantly, this model does little to create 
certainty for educators, which has been the primary problem with 
the fair use inquiry.  Instead of implementing firm rules, Bohannan 
introduces a different type of standard which focuses on (at least 
as) amorphous legal concepts (as the fair use factors).295  Under 
this approach, in addition to looking at their own uses of the 
copyrighted works, teachers and lawyers will begin guessing 
whether that educational use is a type the author reasonably 
factored into their decision to create the work.  Further uncertainty 
is introduced when Bohannan suggests that courts should consider 
how a defendant’s use can increase sales.296  How, for instance, 
 
 291 See Bohannan, supra note 188, at 1028. 
 292 Id. 
 293 See id. 
 294 See Matthew Sag, God in the Machine: A New Structural Analysis of Copyright’s 
Fair Use Doctrine, 11 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 381, 395 (2005). 
 295 See Bohannan, supra note 188, at 988–90. 
 296 See Bohannan, supra note 188, at 1028–30.  Although evidence of increased sales 
can be obtained, litigants must wait to do so until after the infringing work is produced. 
See Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1274–75 (11th Cir. 2001) 
(noting that the evidence of “relevant market harm” was limited “due to the preliminary 
injunction status of the case”).  In cases of injunctions, the court would be speculating as 
to whether the work would increase or decrease sales—and that approach does not seem 
to find support in Bohannan’s proposal, which at times seems to require proof of actual 
harm. See, e.g., Bohannan, supra note 188, at 1015 (discussing MDS and stating that 
“[t]he case should have been remanded for fact findings on this issue so that harm could 
be determined”). 
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can Generic School determine whether its use will have a positive 
effect on the sale of the copyrighted work?  This new inquiry, 
while valuable for the fair use inquiry generally, lacks the 
clarifying mechanism or quality that educators so insatiably covet. 
2. Re-Conceptualization or Modified Application 
Beyond Bohannan’s approach, other tactics, such as a retooling 
of fair use, also have been proposed.  Professor Joseph P. Liu has 
suggested that the four fair use factors be reduced to two; retaining 
only the purpose and character of the use and the impact of the use 
on the market.297  These two factors would be balanced directly 
against one another,298 with courts “look[ing] at whether a work is 
non-commercial, whether it is transformative, and more generally, 
whether the use serves a positive social purpose” and comparing 
that purpose to “the potential for the use to harm” the current and 
future market(s) for the work.299 
Liu’s thought experiment may create more certainty, but it does 
so in the wrong direction.  Depending on how much weight each 
sub-factor is given, the results will likely come out against most 
educational fair uses.  This results from eliminating two important 
factors for educational uses: the nature of the copyrighted work, 
and the amount and substantiality of the portion used.300  Many of 
the works used by teachers are factual in nature, and the amount of 
the work used may be incredibly small or at least not significant.  
When, for example, a teacher copies portions of a history textbook 
or several sections of a long article and uses them in class, the 
nature of the work (factual) and the amount used (e.g., two 
chapters) should be considered. 
Furthermore, the sub-factor analysis shows that two factors do 
not greatly reduce uncertainty; in reality, courts are applying 
various factors.301  This approach probably would not produce 
 
 297 Joseph P. Liu, Two-Factor Fair Use?, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 571, 572 (2008) 
[hereinafter Liu, Two-Factor Fair Use]. 
 298 Id. at 578. 
 299 Id. 
 300 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006); Liu, Two-Factor Fair Use, supra note 297, at 572. 
 301 See, e.g., Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1267–68 (11th 
Cir. 2001) (the court used several factors to determine the outcome of the case). 
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outcomes substantially different than the current cases dealing with 
educational fair uses.  Furthermore, it leaves the status of the 
Guidelines intact, and focuses exclusively on two factors that have 
little relevance, in their traditional sense, in educational fair use 
(market harm and transformativeness) while excluding the two 
factors that have the most relevance in education (nature of the 
work and the amount and substantiality of the portion used).302 
Also working within fair use’s confines, Professor Matthew 
Sag has argued for a re-conceptualization of the factors and how 
courts apply them.303  First, Sag argues that “fair use is a structural 
tool that allows copyright to adapt to changing circumstances,” 
and, as a result, it “must remain a somewhat open-ended standard 
developed by the judiciary through . . . common law 
adjudication.”304  The revisions to fair use that Sag proposes seek 
to change the current judicial practice of “treating the factors as 
outcome-determinative as opposed to question-framing, [which] 
masks a priori assumptions and distorts judicial reasoning.”305  
Based on this idea—“that the factors . . . provide [only] a 
framework for their analysis by raising certain second[-]order 
questions”—Sag argued that courts should consider three first-
order assumptions when deciding fair use.306 
First, courts should consider the idea/expression dichotomy, 
which is linked to the core notion about what should be 
copyrightable.307  Second, courts should consider consumer 
autonomy: this idea, derived from the first-sale doctrine, states that 
consumers have a right to manipulate copyrighted works once 
purchased.308  Third, the principle of medium neutrality, which 
 
 302 Although “factors two and three may be of doubtful relevance in all cases,” Liu, 
Two-Factor Fair Use, supra note 297, at 577, they are important in educational fair use 
cases.  This is true even if “courts . . . have repeatedly recognized the limited relevance of 
factors two and three.” Id.  The objection I raise here is not—as Liu predicts it might 
be—based on reductionism. Id. at 584.  It is not paucity or simplicity of defense this 
objection fears; it is the lack of consideration for educational fair uses and their express 
statutory mooring. 
 303 See Sag, supra note 294, at 382–85. 
 304 Id. at 384. 
 305 Id. at 386. 
 306 Id. at 395. 
 307 See id. at 425–27. 
 308 See id. at 428–32. 
C02_SIMON_3-21-10_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 3/31/2010  1:05 PM 
508 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 20:453 
states that the fairness of a use does not change depending on the 
medium of expression,309 should inform courts’ fair use 
determinations.310 
Sag’s proposed first-order assumptions that would guide the 
fair use analysis, while well reasoned, do little to inform courts of 
what constitutes educational fair use.  Part of this problem results 
from his proposal’s exclusion of statutorily-preferred uses—such 
as teaching, which includes making multiple copies for classroom 
use.311  The principles of idea/expression and medium neutrality 
have less obvious application to many educational uses of 
copyrighted works, where the mere fact that the use is educational 
is the central purpose for deeming it fair.  Many times educational 
uses will not be transformative, strictly speaking—that is what § 
107 recognizes when it states that making “multiple copies for 
classroom use” is fair use.312  Thus, a first-order principle that 
focuses on the idea/expression dichotomy will not inform an 
analysis of whether photocopying several articles for students is 
fair use—the expression is copied.313 
Consumer autonomy also does not change the educational fair 
use calculus: copyright owners’ inability to control the consumer 
uses of the copyrighted material (and consumers’ attendant 
freedom to use the work) says nothing about educational 
 
 309 Id. at 432 (“Medium neutrality is the principle that a use should not receive less 
protection, simply by virtue of being expressed in a different medium.”). 
 310 See id. at 432–34. 
 311 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006). 
 312 Id. 
 313 The idea/expression first-order assumption may be beneficial for judicial analysis.  
If, for example, a teacher photocopies 25% of five articles for her students (one copy per 
student), the court might examine more closely both whether the copyrighted work falls 
within copyright’s “core” protective purposes, Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 
U.S. 569, 586 (1994) (examining the second fair use factor), and whether the teacher 
appropriated the “heart” of copyrighted work’s protected expression. Harper & Row, 
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 565 (1985) (concluding that the court of 
appeals erred in overruling the district judge’s finding that the defendant took “‘the heart 
of the book’”).  There, the court may focus on the ideas the articles portrayed, rather than 
the expression themselves, to determine whether a use was fair.  In making such a 
determination, the court must be vigilant and avoid the trap of circularity to which other 
courts have fallen victim. E.g., Basic Books, Inc., v, Kinko’s Graphics Corp., 758 F. 
Supp. 1522, 1533 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 69 (1976), reprinted in 
1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5682. 
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copying.314  For these reasons, Sag’s approach, while useful, does 
not apply to educational fair uses. 
In addition to the modifications proposed by Liu and Sag, 
Professor Laura A. Heymann has proposed “refocus[ing] the [fair 
use] inquiry, and . . . realign[ing] it with the ultimate question the 
fair use doctrine asks.”315  She attempts to do this by “tying the 
transformativeness inquiry to” the factor that considers the purpose 
and character of the use.316  This approach also would require 
taking the reader’s perspective to determine transformativeness, 
focusing on interpretation instead of intent.317 
At first glance, this approach seems better tailored to education 
because it would focus on the school, the teacher, or the student in 
determining transformativeness.318  But Heymann notes that this 
perspective would not change the result reached in Sony Corp. of 
America v. University City Studios, Inc.,319 or American 
Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc.320 because “[i]n neither case 
should the transformative inquiry be dispositive or relevant—both 
cases are predominately about displacing the copy in which the 
work is instantiated and, thus, are both better analyzed with respect 
to other fair use factors.”321  If that is the case, then numerous 
types of copying done by teachers will be analyzed under the 
current fair use factors.  We therefore arrive back where we 
started: staring the uncertainty of the factors and the Guidelines 
square in the face. 
 
 314 See Sag, supra note 294, at 429 (“The first sale doctrine combined with the absence 
of any ‘use’ right  in copyright allow a strong degree of autonomy for consumers; 
copyright owners are generally unable to control the use (as opposed to copying) of their 
works by the public.”). 
 315 Laura A. Heymann, Everything Is Transformative: Fair Use and Reader Response, 
31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 445, 448 (2008). 
 316 Id. 
 317 Id. at 453. 
 318 See id. (stating that the determination would be based on how a reasonable reader 
would interpret the use of the work). 
 319 464 U.S. 417, 456 (1984) (finding that “time-shifting”—taping television programs, 
using a video cassette recorder, to watch them later—was transformative and constituted 
fair use). 
 320 60 F.3d 913, 923 (2d Cir. 1994) (“Texaco’s making of copies cannot properly be 
regarded as a transformative use of the copyrighted material.”). 
 321 Heymann, supra note 315, at 457. 
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Professor Glynn Lunney has, after reexamining Sony, argued 
that the Supreme Court articulated a “presumption in favor of fair 
use and a broad conception of the public interest that fair use 
protects.”322  Working from that starting point, Lunney claims that 
“transformativeness” is not controlling or even entitled to much 
weight; the crux of the fair use analysis turns on the evidence 
supplied by the copyright owner: once the defendant invokes fair 
use, the plaintiff bears the burden of showing, “by [a] 
preponderance of the evidence, that the net benefit to society will 
be greater if a use is prohibited.”323  In other words, the copyright 
owner must show “concrete evidence of ‘a demonstrable effect 
upon the potential market for, or the value of, the copyrighted 
work’” for the use to be infringing.324  In Lunney’s “ideal world,” 
where courts had “perfect information, [they] could resolve the fair 
use issue by determining precisely the social value of additional 
authorship resulting from prohibiting a use and then comparing 
that value to the social value of allowing the use to continue.”325 
While it has been criticized as mischaracterizing the judicial 
treatment of fair use,326 Lunney’s approach moves us in the right 
direction.  Requiring the copyright owner to prove that the harm 
outweighs societal benefits captures some educational uses.  At the 
very least, it would force courts to consider how educational uses 
can be beneficial to society without being transformative and, 
therefore, that educational uses can be fair without satisfying the 
market harm approach.327 
 
 322 Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Fair Use and Market Failure: Sony Revisited, 82 B.U. L. REV. 
975, 977 (2002). 
 323 Id. at 977. 
 324 Id. at 1014 (quoting Sony, 464 U.S. at 450). 
 325 Id. at 998–99. 
 326 See Bohannan, supra note 188, at 985–87. 
 327 Professor Lunney briefly explores this type of analysis in his discussion of how the 
market-failure approach did not appropriately address the societal concerns in Texaco. 
See Lunney, supra note 322, at 1021–22.  He points out that, in Texaco, the heightened 
costs for the research institution—which would have to increase its subscriptions to 
access research materials—either would be internalized by the company (in which case it 
detracts from their ability to do research) or would be passed along to consumers (in 
which case it would raise the cost of access to new technology and socially beneficial 
products). Id. (“To cover the fixed costs of innovations, patents, secrecy, or other means 
of obtaining a lead-time advantage must offer research institutions some market power in 
the exploitation of their discoveries in order for their research to prove profitable.  As a 
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Unfortunately, this scheme—either in the abstract or as applied 
generally across fair use categories—does not solve the problems 
educators face.  Like with many of the other approaches discussed, 
teachers still cannot predict which uses will cause market harm328 
and which uses will have societal benefits that outweigh the 
additional authorship produced from prohibiting a use.329  Consider 
a teacher who copies several songs, poems, and pieces of various 
articles.  It is not feasible to suggest that any reliable data on the 
harm of this use would exist, or that a court could properly weigh 
the harm and benefit of the use.  In this sense, the unpredictability 
 
result, while research institutions may be able to pass some of these licensing fees along 
to consumers, part of the fees will come out of the rents the research institutions would 
otherwise earn on their discoveries.  As these rents would otherwise go towards the costs 
of the research itself, using some part of these rents to pay licensing fees for copies of 
scientific journal articles means that research institutions will have to cut expenses 
elsewhere.  As a practical matter, this means that institutions like Texaco Research will 
have to reduce their expenditures on research personnel, supplies, or facilities in order to 
come up with the licensing fees that the American Geophysical majority made possible.  
The American Geophysical decision thus increased payments to publishers, but such 
increased payments will come at the expense of the authors and their research.”).  
Applying this observation to education, the costs would be borne by the taxpayers, no 
matter how they are defined (e.g., school district, students, teachers), which diverts 
resources away from teaching and student education.  If “[i]ncreasing the revenue of 
publishers at the expense of the authors and their underlying research scarcely seems 
likely ‘[t]o promote the Progress of Science,’ as the Constitution requires,” id. at 1022 
(quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8), it is hard to fathom that doing the same thing to 
educators would command a different conclusion. 
 328 Bohannan may be overzealous in her criticism of Lunney’s approach as “both under- 
and over-protect[ing]” copyright because it does not “pay[] sufficient attention to proof of 
harm.” Bohannan, supra note 188, at 986.  Bohannan claims this approach over-protects 
because it is “virtually always possible to imagine some abstract social value associated 
with a defendant’s use of copyrighted material.” Id.  It under-protects, she says, because 
it assumes all uses cause harm, which they do not. Id. at 986–87.  But these are problems 
with the current fair use factors, as courts can easily over- or under-protect a work 
depending on what kind of value-judgments they make about the defendant’s use and the 
fair use factors.  Additionally, Lunney’s approach is not relegated to abstract values.  He 
does retain a focus on harm, emphasizing that to discern the balance, courts should 
examine whether the use reduces “revenue associated with the copyrighted work; and, if 
so, how, if at all, that reduction would likely affect the production of copyrighted works.” 
Lunney, supra note 322, at 999. 
 329 Bohannan criticizes Lunney’s approach for its abstractness and impracticality, as 
well. Bohannan, supra note 188, at 986 (“[T]he balancing approach leaves courts too 
much discretion, producing incorrect and inconsistent results.  When dealing with uses of 
copyrighted material, there is likely to be substantial disagreement over which values are 
at stake and how they should be measured.”). 
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and impracticality of Lunney’s approach make it unsuitable for 
educational fair use. 
The proposals, however, do not cease there.  Professor Ann 
Bartow has suggested a “judicial resuscitation” where the courts 
would modify the four fair use factors to deal explicitly with 
educational uses.330  As to the purpose and character of the 
secondary use, “there should be a STRONG presumption in favor 
of educational use,” which could be rebutted “only if the ‘non-
educational’ work is lengthy and available for purchase at a 
reasonable price, and a substantial portion, perhaps one third or 
more, of the work is reproduced, therefore effecting an 
unequivocal market substitution.”331  With respect to the nature of 
the copyrighted work, “reasonable permission fees should be 
permissible only if the work” is aimed at the educational market, is 
in print, and “there is an actual, demonstrable market substitution 
problem.”332  The amount and substantiality inquiry, too, would be 
modified.333  It would build off the second factor and require per 
page fees if the work is aimed at the educational market; but 
substantiality would not be used to assess this factor.334  Finally, 
Bartow would require publishers to prove lost sales or profits 
instead of relying on circular licensing arguments.335 
Bartow’s approach, like Lunney’s, focuses more on providing 
greater movement for users within the doctrine of fair use.336  Her 
presumption of educational uses as fair addresses some of 
educators’ concerns by shifting the burden of proof.337  
 
 330 Bartow, supra note 5, at 227. 
 331 Id. at 227–28. 
 332 Id. at 228. 
 333 See id. 
 334 Id. 
 335 See id. at 228–29. 
 336 See Bartow, supra note 5, at 151 (stating that the “scope of educational fair use has 
been dramatically compressed by judges who ignore the external benefits of fair use”); 
see also Lunney, supra note 322, at 977 (“Sony stands not for the proposition that fair use 
is justified only in those exceptional cases where a licensing scheme or some other 
market mechanism is impractical.  Rather, Sony stands for the recognition of fair use as a 
central and vital arbiter between two competing public interests.”). 
 337 See generally Bartow, supra note 5, at 150 (stating that fair use “is the ‘most vital 
piece of the law that fulfills copyright’s constitutional mandate’” (quoting Ann Shumelda 
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Additionally, the requirement of licensing only for those works 
that are aimed at the educational market makes good sense: 
because the creation of those works depends on revenues from the 
educational market, their use in education should come at a cost.338  
Despite these benefits, none of them provides the amount of 
certainty educators desire.  Under this proposal, although 
educational uses are supposed to be presumed fair, they may not 
be; and that determination is not one that educators can make.  Put 
another way, given the courts’ history with educational fair use, it 
is not clear how strong a presumption this would be in practice.  
Additionally, a strong presumption is an amorphous standard.  
Bartow speculates as to the limits of the presumption, but the 
demarcation point—where a use is rebutted because it is too 
substantial, even for education—is likely to be a fact-sensitive 
inquiry.  In that sense, the fair use factors still provide the general 
framework of analysis, which means that, while there is less 
uncertainty, it still exists in great quantities.339 
Professor Gideon Parchomovsky and Kevin A. Goldman have 
taken a different approach.  They propose creating “fair use 
harbors”: Congress, they argue, should “enact[] clearly defined, 
nonexclusive fair use safe harbors.”340  Although uses falling 
within the harbors “would be considered per se fair[,] . . . 
 
Okerson, Buy or Lease? Two Models for Scholarly Information at the End (or the 
Beginning) of an Era, DAEDALUS, Fall 1996, at 55, 63)). 
 338 It is a different and interesting question whether educators could use such works for 
a purpose other than the one which the creator contemplated.  If, for example, a teacher 
wrote a critical essay of consumable workbooks by using some portions of the 
workbooks, and distributed the essay to students studying English, that use probably 
should not be unfair. See, e.g., Chi. Sch. Reform Bd. of Trs. v. Substance, Inc., 79 F. 
Supp. 2d 919, 921–22, 941 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (holding a teacher liable for copyright 
infringement where the teacher, who also was the editor of a newspaper, reproduced 
copies of entire standardized tests in the newspaper and criticized them therein).  The 
same could be said of an art teacher who makes a collage from copyrighted materials 
intended for science classes (e.g., diagrams of covalent bonds, graphs, etc.).  For it to be 
feasible, modifications to this licensing approach would have to be made. 
 339 Liu, Two-Factor Fair Use, supra note 297, at 572. 
 340 Parchomovsky & Goldman, supra note 199, at 1502.  Professor Bartow also has 
suggested that the Guidelines might be rewritten to better accommodate educational fair 
use. See Bartow, supra note 5, at 225–26 (“Congress could continue to categorize 
educational copying within the rubric of fair use, but discard or amend the current 
Guidelines and promulgate educational fair use with a far wider scope.”). 
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[u]ses . . . fall[ing] outside of them would be analyzed under 
existing doctrine.”341 
In proposing this model, the authors meet several potential 
objections.  First, they attempt to preempt the challenge that a fair 
use harbor will become a ceiling instead of a floor.342  They 
specifically mention the Classroom Guidelines’343 treatment by 
courts as an example of this objection.344  According to the 
authors, several “important differences” exist “between the 
Classroom Guidelines and [their] proposed safe harbors.”345  First, 
the Classroom Guidelines “were negotiated, in effect, not to reflect 
a minimum level of utility, but rather as a sort of middle ground 
compromise.  Given this status, it was easier for parties on all sides 
to fall into the trap of letting the floor become the ceiling.”346  That 
explanation, however, is not entirely convincing.  Even though the 
Guidelines were the result of a compromise, they expressly stated 
that they represented the minimum allowable fair use;347 the fact 
that they were negotiated should not make a significant difference, 
as Congress enacts all laws only after negotiating and horse-
trading. 
Second, because they “lacked the force of law[,] . . . the 
Guidelines became a convenient benchmark for litigation.”348  This 
argument is more convincing349—courts misapplied the 
Guidelines, sometimes using them as a ceiling either because they 
used them merely to justify a conclusion already reached or 
 
 341 Parchomovsky & Goldman, supra note 199, at 1502. 
 342 Id. at 1524 (quoting Gibson, supra note 188, at 398). 
 343 They do note that the Classroom Guidelines were not “bright-line” safe harbors. Id. 
at 1525.  Other scholars have noted that the Guidelines mix rules and standards. E.g., 
Mazzone, supra note 15, at 413–27 (introducing his two Models and noting that rules or 
standards can be used accordingly). 
 344 Parchomovsky & Goldman, supra note 199, at 1525. 
345    Id.  
 346 Id. 
347    Eric D. Brandfonbrener, Fair Use and University Photocopying: Addison-Wesley 
Publishing v. New York University, 19 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 669, 686 (1986). 
 348 Id. 
 349 While this makes more sense, there is still at least one argument in response: if the 
Guidelines lacked the force of law, that provides a reason for them not to become “a 
convenient benchmark for litigation.”  In other words, lawyers would rather rely on law 
to give legal advice, or file lawsuits, than they would rely on legislative history. 
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because they used them sloppily.350  In that sense, “safe harbors” 
with the force of law would provide more certainty for educators; 
they would clearly articulate some limit of acceptable copying. 
The safe-harbor proposal would not, however, provide 
practical certainty: educators would have the benefit of a safe 
harbor, but it would be one that was designed to apply broadly to 
all uses of works.  That does not help educational uses, which we 
have seen frequently use more of a work than other uses.  
Furthermore, failing to tailor these safe harbors to education risks 
that educators will retain the same fears and uncertainty as before: 
because they do not know and cannot ascertain how far outside the 
Guidelines they may venture, they will likely stay within them.  In 
other words, the Guidelines, despite trying to increase fair use, 
may chill it. 
Finally, the authors state that “even if the critics are absolutely 
correct, we still believe that on the whole our proposal will 
improve the current state of affairs.”351  In other words, the use of 
this standard may harm some parties, but, overall, it will be a boon.  
Nevertheless, despite David Hume’s comment about the error of 
induction,352 the best evidence of how something will work in the 
future is how it has worked in the past.  As we have seen, and as 
these authors readily admit, the Classroom Guidelines have been 
used as a ceiling rather than a floor;353 the authors do not provide 
strong reasons for thinking that a law to the same effect would 
have contrary results. 
 
 350 See Parchomovsky & Goldman, supra note 199, at 1496, 1504. 
 351 Id. at 1526 (emphasis added). 
 352 See DAVID HUME, AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 17 (Forgotten 
Books 2008) (“Matters of fact, which are the second objects of human reason, are not 
ascertained in the same manner; nor is our evidence of their truth, however great, of a like 
nature with the foregoing.  The contrary of every matter of fact is still possible; because it 
can never imply a contradiction, and is conceived by the mind with the same facility and 
distinctness, as if ever so conformable to reality.  That the sun will not rise tomorrow is 
no less intelligible a proposition, and implies no more contradiction, than the affirmation, 
that it will rise.  We should in vain, therefore, attempt to demonstrate its falsehood.  Were 
it demonstratively false, it would imply a contradiction, and could never be distinctly 
conceived by the mind.”). 
 353 See Parchomovsky & Goldman, supra note 199, at 1525. 
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3. Best Practices 
Although novel, reformulating fair use is not the only 
mechanism scholars have proposed to improve it.  A recent 
movement, spearheaded by Professor Peter Jaszi, has proposed a 
solution geared toward scholars’ observations—like those of 
Jennifer Rothman and Lawrence Lessig—that copyright has 
created a “clearance culture” by adopting the custom of copyright 
owners.354  The solution is a “code of best practices”:355 general 
principles of conduct educators should follow when using 
copyrighted materials (specifically visual media).356 
This code of best practices is built on observations about the 
problems teachers face when instructing students about, and in the 
process using, film media.357  Over one hundred and fifty members 
 
 354 CTR. FOR SOCIAL MEDIA, AM. UNIV. SCH. OF COMMC’N, CODE OF BEST PRACTICES IN 
FAIR USE FOR MEDIA LITERACY EDUCATION 14 (2008), http://www.centerforsocialmedia. 
org/files/pdf/Media_literacy.pdf [hereinafter CODE FOR MEDIA EDUCATION] (“Most 
‘copyright education’ that educators and learners have encountered has been shaped by 
the concerns of commercial copyright holders, whose understandable concern about 
large-scale copyright piracy has caused them to equate any unlicensed use of copyrighted 
material with stealing . . . .  This code of best practices, by contrast, is shaped by 
educators for educators and the learners they serve, with the help of legal advisors.”); see 
also Michael Madison, Rewriting Fair Use and the Future of Copyright Reform, 23 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 391, 396–416 (2005) (arguing that § 107 should be rewritten 
to reflect a standard of fairness based on social practices). See generally CTR. FOR SOCIAL 
MEDIA, AM. UNIV. SCH. OF COMMC’N, STATEMENT OF BEST PRACTICES FAQ (2007), 
http://www.centerforsocialmedia.org/files/pdf/faqapr07.pdf [hereinafter FAQ]. 
 355 The “code of best practices” will be referred to as the “CBP.” 
 356 CODE FOR MEDIA EDUCATION, supra note 354, at 9; see FAQ, supra note 354.  There 
also is a code of best practices for documentary filmmaking. CTR. FOR SOCIAL MEDIA, 
AM. UNIV. SCH. OF COMMC’N, DOCUMENTARY FILMMAKERS’ STATEMENT OF BEST 
PRACTICES IN FAIR USE (2005), http://www.centerforsocialmedia.org/resources/public 
ations/statement_of_best_practices_in_fair_use/.  Film scholars too have developed their 
own code of best practices. SOC’Y FOR CINEMA & MEDIA STUDIES, STATEMENT OF BEST 
PRACTICES FOR FAIR USE IN TEACHING FOR FILM AND MEDIA EDUCATORS (2005), 
http://www.cmstudies.org/documents/SCMSBestPracticesforFairUseinTeachingFinal.      
pdf. 
 357 See PETER JASZI, CTR. FOR SOCIAL MEDIA, AM. UNIV. SCH. OF COMMC’N, 
COPYRIGHT, FAIR USE AND MOTION PICTURES (2007), http://www.centerforsocialmedia 
.org/files/pdf/fairuse_motionpictures.pdf [hereinafter PETER JASZI, COPYRIGHT AND 
MOTION PICTURES].  The CBP for documentary filmmakers was designed to respond to 
problems documentary filmmakers faced. PATRICIA AUFDERHEIDE & PETER JASZI, CTR. 
FOR SOCIAL MEDIA, AM. UNIV. SCH. OF COMMC’N, UNTOLD STORIES: CREATIVE 
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of various educational institutions convened ten times to create the 
CBP.358  Legal scholars subsequently reviewed the CBP prior to its 
adoption.359 
While there appears to be little data on the effectiveness of the 
CBP in education, the CBP for documentary filmmakers has 
enjoyed success.360  Jaszi and Professor Patricia Aufderheide 
publicized this CBP, and gradually copyright owners began to 
accept its validity.361  Even insurance companies “[that] offer 
errors and omissions insurance to filmmakers” came around, 
“offering to cover fair use claims.”362 
Despite its success, the CBP has limits, particularly the one 
directed at media education.363  Its creators explicitly note that it 
“does not tell [educators and students] the limits of fair use 
rights.”364  It avoids this rigid approach and “[i]nstead . . . 
describes how those rights should apply in certain recurrent 
situations.”365  That means that the CBP will not cover all 
situations, and thus “[e]ducators’ and students’ fair use rights 
may . . . extend to other situations as well.”366 
While the CBP offers practical value by providing a set of 
principles by which educators can act, its lack of certainty leaves 
us in a similar space as the Guidelines.  The first principle (and 
attendant limitations) of CBP for media education, for example, 
illustrates the vagueness that would create uncertainty for 
educators in other situations: 
 
CONSEQUENCES OF THE RIGHTS CLEARANCE CULTURE FOR DOCUMENTARY FILMMAKERS 4 
(2004), http://www.centerforsocialmedia.org/files/pdf/UNTOLDSTORIES_Report.pdf. 
 358 CODE FOR MEDIA EDUCATION, supra note 354, at 2. 
 359 Id. 
 360 See CTR. FOR SOCIAL MEDIA, AM. UNIV. SCH. OF COMMC’N, SUCCESS OF THE 
STATEMENT OF BEST PRACTICES, http://www.centerforsocialmedia.org/files/pdf/success_ 
of_the_statement.pdf; JASZI, COPYRIGHT AND MOTION PICTURES, supra note 357, at 30–
32; Pat Aufderheide & Peter Jaszi, Fair Use and Best Practices: Surprising Success, 
INTELL. PROP. TODAY, Oct. 2007, at 26, available at http://www.centerforsocialmedia 
.org/files/pdf/IPTodaySuccess.pdf. 
 361 See JASZI, COPYRIGHT AND MOTION PICTURES, supra note 357, at 3032. 
 362 Id. at 32. 
 363 See CODE FOR MEDIA EDUCATION, supra note 354, at 1. 
 364 Id. 
 365 Id. 
 366 Id. 
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PRINCIPLE: Under fair use, educators using the 
concepts and techniques of media literacy can 
choose illustrative material from the full range of 
copyrighted sources and make them available to 
learners, in class, in workshops, in informal 
mentoring and teaching settings, and on school-
related Web sites. 
LIMITATIONS: Educators should choose material 
that is germane to the project or topic, using only 
what is necessary for the educational goal or 
purpose for which it is being made.  In some cases, 
this will mean using a clip or excerpt; in other 
cases, the whole work is needed.  Whenever 
possible, educators should provide proper 
attribution and model citation practices that are 
appropriate to the form and context of use.  Where 
illustrative material is made available in digital 
formats, educators should provide reasonable 
protection against third-party access and 
downloads.367 
It is not clear how this type of principle helps teachers 
determine the proper amount they can use.  Think back to the 
example given at the beginning of the Article—a teacher wants to 
photocopy and distribute three short chapters of a particular book.  
How would a principle like this one help her?  Could she use less 
of the copyrighted work to make the same point?  What if she 
could but the effectiveness of the message would be decreased?  
Could she use information in the public domain instead?  These are 
questions without definite (or readily discernable) answers under a 
CBP.  These broad principles do not provide the certainty 
educators are seeking. 
Further complicating the issue is the legal status of CBPs.  
They are not the law—they are suggested customs that educators 
develop.  Although they may become the law at some later point, 
for now they are just suggested principles by which to develop 
customs—and there is no guarantee they become accepted 
 
 367 Id. at 1011 (emphasis added). 
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custom.368  Furthermore, given the dearth of case law, identifying 
the point at which they become de facto law—if that happens—
will be difficult.  More importantly, if our goal is to change the 
current custom or culture, the question becomes, why wait?  And, 
for that matter, why risk it?  Why risk any liability from a 
preemptive attack in the form of a lawsuit by publishers or 
copyright owners?  This type of attack, if waged soon enough, 
could place us in constraints more restrictive than the Guidelines.  
The lack of legal authority, as well as this “time lag,” represent a 
challenge to the CBP’s approach. 
Additionally, the CBP notes that “[a]lthough professional 
groups create such codes, no one needs to be a member of a 
professional group to benefit from their interpretations.”369  This 
certainly is a beneficial effect of the CBP, but it also raises the 
issue of which organizations should be charged with creating a 
CBP.  Moreover, it highlights an important reality: as the CBP’s 
popularity grows, numerous groups and organizations will propose 
codes for various uses.  In a world replete with non-organizational 
actors, how can teachers reliably use a particular set of codes or 
principles? 
Certification may be one method of controlling which codes 
are authoritative—but then the certification institution becomes a 
non-binding committee on fair use.  The certification decisions will 
represent what a small cadre of individuals think fair use should 
be—and this certification, at least at first, has no legal effect.370  
There is still no certain way of discerning which codes are the 
“best” or the “most legal.”  One would expect, not only infighting 
among various groups for authoritative control of the process, but 
also opposition from groups with opposing interests, such as 
publishing houses.  These groups likely would create their own set 
 
 368 While the documentary CBP has enjoyed success, there is no guarantee that 
educational CBPs will have similar success. But see Hume, supra note 352, at 17. 
 369 CODE FOR MEDIA EDUCATION, supra note 354, at 7. 
 370 This type of situation has pushed the author in the direction of an administrative 
agency, which would act as this certification entity, but do so with the force of law.  This 
also raises a question of fairness: how can we be sure that the CBP will be “fair” without 
any opposing voice?  As the adoption of clearance culture has shown, “unfair” practices 
can be adopted quickly and become fair.  Without any opposing viewpoints in education, 
there is some risk that unfair practices will become customary. 
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of codes.  Then, if a court were faced with a lawsuit and ended up 
looking to “custom” to determine fair use, there likely would be 
numerous codes from various institutions.  This discussion 
demonstrates that the benefits of a CBP are inversely related to the 
number of CBPs available. 
That uncertainty again highlights the main problem with 
shifting the balance of “cultural power” using guidelines.  
Clearance culture represents the current law—courts apply circular 
licensing arguments and the Guidelines.371  But CBPs are not law, 
and beyond how much practical effect they have—as not all CBPs 
will be as successful as those for documentary filmmakers—
further questions remain about what legal authority they have.  
Currently, they are not the law;372 and there is no reason to think 
that courts would consult non-judicial CBPs to create new federal 
common law. 
Despite this uncertainty, some might argue this kind of 
vagueness—vagueness based on CBPs—is desirable.  In this way, 
educators have space in which to work without having the rigidity 
of rules.  It also provides flexibility so that, when customs change, 
they will still be legal.  But this argument still leaves educators 
wanting more.  As discussed above, CBPs are not current law, and 
their legal status remains uncertain until cases are litigated.373  
Additionally, they provide no substantive guidance about what, 
specifically, educators can do with copyrighted works.  Without 
specific rules about what uses are fair, educators will still be 
guessing as to the fairness of their uses.  In other words, the CBP 
illustrates the need for a new solution, one that takes into account 
the changing fair use principles but also ex ante certainty for 
educators. 
To achieve flexibility and certainty, this Article advocates a 
separate standard for educational fair use—one that is broader and 
more expansive than the type used for other uses.374  In other 
 
 371 See Bohannan, supra note 188, at 971; see also Parchomovsky & Goldman, supra 
note 199, at 150509. 
 372 See Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 139091 
(6th Cir. 1996). 
 373 See id. 
 374 See infra Part III. 
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words, educational fair use would apply in certain educational 
contexts.  The CBP, however, advocates universal application of 
the fair use doctrine.  The CBP for media education, for example, 
includes “Principle Three: Sharing Media Literacy Curriculum 
Materials”: 
PRINCIPLE: Educators using concepts and 
techniques of media literacy should be able to share 
effective examples of teaching about media and 
meaning with one another, including lessons and 
resource materials.  If curriculum developers are 
making sound decisions on fair use when they 
create their materials, then their work should be 
able to be seen, used, and even purchased by 
anyone—since fair use applies to commercial 
materials as well as those produced outside the 
marketplace model.375 
This Article argues that this view is misguided because 
educational fair use is unique; it is different from other kinds of 
fair uses. 
Section 110 of the Copyright Act illustrates this difference by 
exempting certain educational uses of works—i.e., those in the 
classroom.376  This exemption indicates something about 
educational fair use—Congress rightly thought educational fair use 
was different from other kinds of uses and so should be given 
broader scope.  As a corollary, some uses of copyrighted works 
 
 375 CODE FOR MEDIA EDUCATION, supra note 354, at 1112. 
 376 17 U.S.C. § 110 (2006).  One might think that § 110 might, then, be a good place to 
build a new fair use model.  Why not just expand § 110 to cover situations we think are 
fair?  There are several problems with this approach.  First, § 110 is an exemption, 
deeming non-infringing all uses that fall within its ambit.  But an educational fair use 
model must account for the reality that not all educational uses are fair—thus, expanding 
§ 110 could not cover every use.  Therefore, this approach would capture some uses, but 
would leave the remaining uses in the legal vagueness that currently exists.  Additionally, 
expanding § 110 would be extremely onerous, requiring Congress to articulate specific 
categories of per se fair uses—this may quickly begin to break down into complicated 
rules about copying.  Finally, exemptions created by Congress are difficult to enact, and, 
once enacted, they could not sufficiently react to changing educational circumstances.  
An administrative agency, as proposed infra, could create better rules for fair use (and 
exemptions where appropriate) while retaining the ability to modify these rules based on 
changing technologies and circumstances. 
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will be fair in an educational context but not in other contexts.  
Thus, a student may be able to create a particular movie or song 
using copyrighted materials for class but may not be able to 
distribute that work outside the educational setting. 
Finally, the language of this CBP principle requires educators 
to make a legal judgment, evaluating whether “curriculum 
developers are making sound decisions on fair use.”377  This is 
undesirable.  As we have seen, educators are not equipped to make 
legal judgments—and they should not be burdened with this 
responsibility.  For all of these reasons, the CBP approach does not 
solve the problems of educational fair use. 
4. New Entity to Decide Fair Uses 
In addition to the best practices approach, others have argued 
for a more general solution: creating new entities to decide which 
uses are fair.  Retaining the four fair use factors but reformulating 
the process of adjudication, Professor Michael W. Carroll has 
suggested a new apparatus to better serve the doctrine of fair 
use.378  He advocates that Congress create a “Fair Use Board,” 
which would be analogous to the Copyright Royalty Board,379 in 
that “the Copyright Office would have authority to adjudicate fair 
use petitions and, subject to judicial review, issue fair use 
rulings.”380  Fair use arbiters would issue rulings, all of which 
would be non-binding, that determine the fairness of a use.381  A 
fairness finding would immunize the user from liability for 
infringement, and even if the arbiter made a finding of unfairness, 
 
 377 CODE FOR MEDIA EDUCATION, supra note 354, at 1112. 
 378 See Carroll, supra note 173, at 1087. 
 379 Id. at 1124.  The Copyright Royalty Board is explained supra note 45. 
 380 See Carroll, supra note 173, at 1090, 112328.  Professors Mark Lemley & R. 
Anthony Reese have proposed a similar solution. See Mark Lemley & R. Anthony Reese, 
Reducing Digital Copyright Infringement Without Restricting Innovation, 56 STAN. L. 
REV. 1345, 1413 (2004).  They suggest allowing copyright owners with the option to 
combat infringement over peer-to-peer (“P2P”) networks in “an administrative dispute 
resolution proceeding before an administrative law judge in the Copyright Office.” Id.  
This proposal, like the others described in this Part, is unworkable because, among other 
reasons, it does nothing to shift the burden off the educational user and retains the 
unpredictable fair use factors.  For a more detailed explanation of why these models do 
not work well in educational fair use cases, see supra Part II.B.1–3. 
 381 See Carroll, supra note 173, at 112627. 
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the “petitioner [would] retain[] all other defenses to copyright 
infringement.”382  Either party could appeal the ruling to the 
Register of Copyrights and then to any federal circuit court.383  He 
notes that this is a standard-based approach, as it advocates the 
application of the fair use factors on a case-by-case basis.384 
Professor David Nimmer has sketched a similar approach to 
the administration of fair use.385  This proposal, like Professor 
Carroll’s, would use the Copyright Office to run “an expedited, 
voluntary, inexpensive, non-binding procedure to obtain an 
impartial” fair use determination.386  The individual seeking to use 
a copyrighted work would file a petition and pay a $1,000.00 
(which can increase by an additional $9,000.00) filing fee.387  A 
response from the opposing party and a reply from the petitioner 
would be allowed, and both parties would agree on an arbiter.388  
Rulings would have no precedential effect but could be used in 
determining damages, remedies, and attorneys’ fees.389 
While Carroll’s and Nimmer’s proposals are laudable, they do 
not alter the doctrine of fair use or its legal application.  One 
benefit of these models would be using “[t]he threat of 
administrative fair use adjudication [to] redistribute the balance of 
bargaining power in some measure, [which] should increase the 
range of an aggressive copyright owner’s zone of possible 
agreement.”390  There may be some increase in users’ bargaining 
power, but that redistribution does not change the balance of the 
fair use inquiry, which retains the unruly application of the fair use 
factors.  In other words, this model does nothing to modify how 
courts analyze fair use. 
 
 382 Id. at 1123. 
 383 Id. at 112627. 
 384 See id. at 1123, 1128 (accepting the option that “reduce[s] the costs of obtaining a 
fair use determination ex ante under the current legal standard”).  Carroll’s approach will 
be called “micro-adjudication.” 
 385 See David Nimmer, A Modest Proposal to Streamline Fair Use Determinations, 24 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 11, 11–15 (2006). 
 386 Id. at 11. 
 387 See id. at 1214. 
 388 See id. at 1314. 
 389 See id. at 1415. 
 390 Carroll, supra note 173, at 1129. 
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Another purported benefit of this model is the reduction in 
litigation costs—but those costs will still be substantial.  
Additionally, the petition fee and process may deter schools or 
teachers from petitioning for fair use.391  Over and above a filing 
fee, costs will rise because lawyers will likely be(come) a 
necessary component to argue the user’s case, or at the very least 
to balance out the likely presence of a lawyer on behalf of a 
copyright owner.392  Despite the fact that these micro-decisions 
will be “published on the Copyright Office website,” they would 
be non-precedential;393 therefore, they are unlikely to tell the user 
anything more than the judicial decisions that have utilized the 
Guidelines.394  In fact, these decisions may even continue the 
 
 391 Given the unpredictability of the outcome and the costs associated with filing and 
adjudicating a petition (possibly more than $10,000.00), a school is likely to face 
resistance from the community.  Schools may be able to pool money together to advance 
certain claims, but that seems unlikely given the number of educational uses and the 
variety of teaching techniques. 
 392 Carroll makes the inspirational statement that “the goal should be a procedure that 
would not require a petitioner or a copyright owner to be represented by counsel to 
achieve substantively just outcomes.” Carroll, supra note 173, at 1127.  It seems difficult 
to achieve a “substantively just” outcome in a morass of legal concepts without the aid of 
attorneys or some other assisting advocate.  Realizing this, I think, Carroll tempers this 
statement by permitting “copyright agents” to represent the parties. Id.  These agents will 
add costs and, like in Social Security disability benefits cases, maybe lawyers. See 42 
U.S.C. § 406(a)(1) (2006) (providing the Commissioner of Social Security the power to 
“prescribe rules and regulations governing the recognition of agents or other persons, 
other than attorneys as hereinafter provided, representing claimants before the 
Commissioner of Social Security”); id. § 406(b) (providing for attorney representation).  
Indeed, it seems likely that lawyers will become involved, not only because the copyright 
owner—who typically will represent a well-funded and litigious interest—is likely to 
have a lawyer, but also because the individual filing with the Fair Use Board will likely 
be a lawyer acting on behalf of the user. 
 393 Carroll, supra note 173, at 1126; Nimmer, supra note 385, at 14 (stating that “[t]he 
Register of Copyrights shall make publicly available on a website or otherwise, all 
petitions, responses, and rulings submitted” and that “[t]he court shall not be obligated to 
accord any weight to the Fair Use Arbiter(s)”). 
 394 There is also a possibility that such a system would create more uncertainty.  Given 
that the fair use factors are so unruly to begin with, categorizing non-binding, advisory 
opinions to craft a legal opinion about what is fair use to copy seems far-fetched. Cf. 
Parchomovsky & Goldman, supra note 199, at 1525 (stating that, because they “lacked 
the force of law[,] . . . the Guidelines became a convenient benchmark for litigation”).  
Decisions will not necessarily follow any particular pattern, and many decisions in non-
educational settings will have an uncertain impact on educators as lawyers will try to 
analogize non-educational decisions to educational ones.  Given this possibility, Carroll’s 
C02_SIMON_3-21-10_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 3/31/2010  1:05 PM 
2010] TEACHING WITHOUT INFRINGEMENT 525 
judicial tradition of using the Guidelines.395  For these reasons, 
educators may view the petition process as too costly and 
uncertain, especially given that, beyond the petition process, a 
lawsuit may await.  As a result, educational users will continue 
their current practice of restrictive use of copyrighted materials. 
Professor Jason Mazzone also has entered the fray, presenting 
two models that would allow an agency to “administer fair use.”396  
They differ from those proposed by Carroll and Nimmer, both of 
which involved a form of micro-adjudication,397 because they use 
the informal rulemaking process—otherwise known as notice-and-
comment rulemaking—to regulate and administer fair use.398  
Mazzone’s first model (“Model One”) requires three steps: 
Congress would declare it “unlawful to interfere with fair uses of 
copyrighted works;”399 create an agency to enforce this statute; and 
state expressly “that federal fair use law, including [the agency’s] 
regulations, preempts state laws of contract limit[ing] fair uses of 
copyrighted works.”400 
Under this model, the agency would “specify . . . the uses that 
constitute fair uses of copyrighted works within specific 
 
statement that “intermediaries should accord a favorable fair use ruling the same weight 
as a license from the copyright owner” falls under greater scrutiny. Carroll, supra note 
173, at 112829. 
 395 After all, such administrative decision-makers must rely on previous case law. 
 396 See Mazzone, supra note 15, at 415.  Professor Joseph Liu also has urged a greater 
role for rulemaking in copyright, suggesting that more authority might be delegated to the 
Copyright Office—using the Librarian of Congress’s Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
(“DMCA”) rulemaking-authority as evidence of the feasibility of this approach. See 
Joseph P. Liu, Regulatory Copyright, 83 N.C. L. REV. 87, 14850 (2004) [hereinafter 
Liu, Regulatory Copyright].  Liu notes that the Copyright Office, as it currently stands, is 
ill-equipped to deal with the additional rulemaking duties. Id. at 15657.  Nevertheless, 
he notes that, “by increasing the expertise of the Copyright Office, granting it more 
substantive authority, and ensuring that a wide range of copyright interests are 
represented, these reforms would ideally place more emphasis on the Copyright Office as 
a nexus of coherent copyright policymaking.” Id. at 159.  This type of authority, he says, 
may give “the existing institutional structure . . . a strong, informed, centralized 
policymaking body” that it currently lacks. Id. 
 397 See Carroll, supra note 173, at 1087; Nimmer, supra note 385, at 11–15. 
 398 See Mazzone, supra note 15, at 416, 419. 
 399 Id. at 415. 
 400 Id. 
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sectors.”401  It would, like other agencies under the Administrative 
Procedure Act (“APA”),402 have the ability to adjudicate disputes, 
and have a corresponding appeals process that ultimately could 
reach federal court.403  The agency would have enforcement 
authority, like the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”).404  
Mazzone also advocates judicial deference to the regulations 
developed by the agency in copyright infringement lawsuits.405 
Mazzone’s second model (“Model Two” or “EEOC Model”) 
employs a federal agency, which has “more general responsibility 
in copyright infringement claims” than the agency in Model 
One.406  It mirrors the current structure and function of the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”).407  Model Two 
requires a copyright owner who alleges infringement to file a 
complaint with the agency.408  The respondent would have a 
limited-time opportunity to assert a fair use defense, after which 
the complainant could file in federal court.409  If a timely defense is 
asserted, the agency, like the EEOC, would investigate to 
determine whether infringement has occurred.410 
Mazzone’s Models have a combination of several desirable 
qualities that the other proposals possess in isolation or altogether 
lack.  First, these Models are rule-based:411 this bodes well for 
educators who desire certainty.  An agency that can administer 
rules that specify what uses are per se fair is a valuable tool that 
eliminates much guesswork for educational institutions; and it also 
provides flexibility because the agency may adopt some standards 
or rule-standard hybrids.412  Second, while an administrative 
decision regarding a regulation is not binding on the courts, the 
 
 401 Id.; see Samuelson, supra note 30, at 258087 (detailing the cluster Samuelson calls 
“uses that promote learning”). 
 402 See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 500–596 (2006). 
 403 Mazzone, supra note 15, at 417. 
 404 Id. at 418. 
 405 Id. 
 406 Id. at 419. 
 407 Id. at 419–20. 
 408 Id. at 419. 
 409 Id. 
 410 Id. at 419–20. 
 411 See id. at 415. 
 412 See id. at 425–27. 
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regulations are; i.e., the regulations have the force of law, and 
administrative interpretations of those rules will be given 
deference.413  That means that the rulings will be followed by 
publishers and educational institutions alike.  Third, the process by 
which the rules are formulated is not subject to judicial reasoning 
that employs the fair use factors.414  The notice-and-comment 
rulemaking process allows for greater flexibility in developing 
rules, which will have greater specificity.415  The regulations, 
interpretations, and policy statements, coupled with subsequent 
decisions by the courts, will provide the stability and certainty that 
educators seek. 
These Models, therefore, are a good place to start; but they 
need to be developed and tailored to the educational setting.  
Therefore, the next Part, using Mazzone’s Model One as a rough 
sketch, draws a fuller picture for administering educational fair 
use. 
III. A NEW MODEL FOR EDUCATIONAL FAIR USE 
Mazzone’s model provides a foundation from which further 
discussion can take place.  This Article, like Mazzone’s, advocates 
creating an agency to administer fair use.  It also agrees with 
Mazzone that Congress should give the agency power to specify 
fair uses within “specific sectors.”416  This Part, however, takes 
 
 413 See Chevron v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–44 (1984) 
(“When a court reviews an agency’s construction of the statute which it administers, it is 
confronted with two questions.  First, always, is the question whether Congress has 
directly spoken to the precise question at issue.  If the intent of Congress is clear, that is 
the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the 
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.  If, however, the court determines Congress 
has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose 
its own construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an 
administrative interpretation.  Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to 
the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a 
permissible construction of the statute.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 414 See Mazzone, supra note 15, at 418 (“In determining whether a particular use is fair 
and therefore renders the defendant’s copying noninfringing, courts would defer to [the 
Office for Fair Use]’s regulations.”). 
 415 See id. at 433–37. 
 416 Id. at 415. 
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that proposition one step further and proposes the creation of an 
executive agency devoted exclusively to administering fair use 
within the education “sector.”  The reason education deserves 
special treatment is a matter of policy: the foregoing analysis has 
shown that education is uniquely important, and different from 
many other types of fair uses;417 and educators are not likely to 
agree with publishers on what is fair.418  An agency is needed to 
administer copyright specifically as to fair use.419 
This executive agency, which I call the Copyright Regulatory 
Administrative Body (“CRAB”), will create a workable, flexible, 
and coherent legal framework for educators to assess whether their 
uses are fair.  Because it is limited exclusively to educational fair 
uses, it will not face the myriad problems that the administration of 
fair use generally would.  Interest groups, for example, will be 
more easily identified, isolated, and controlled in this closed, 
“educational universe” of fair use. 
Explaining the creation of the CRAB and how it will operate 
takes several steps, and requires us to work backwards.  First, the 
structure and operation of the CRAB will be outlined, with 
attention given to mitigating the disproportionate influence of 
special interest groups and agency “lock-in.”  This will include 
explaining why Mazzone’s EEOC Model should be rejected in 
favor of a modified form of Model One.  Describing the structure 
and content of the agency first allows us to understand what type 
of language Congress will employ to do this.  Therefore, after 
 
 417 See Bartow, supra note 5, at 211 (“If the creation of course packets or making of 
multiple copies promotes scholarship, and advances the goals of higher education by 
optimizing access to the ideas contained in the copied, copyrighted works, a broad 
construction of educational fair use is more than justified.”). 
 418 Professor Samuelson has stated that “[n]either Congress nor the courts have been 
able to definitively resolve the intense controversy over learning-related uses, even after 
more than forty years of debate.” Samuelson, supra note 30, at 2620.  She also argues 
that “educational and research uses . . . have become so ubiquitous and widely tolerated 
that they may have, in effect, become fair uses after all.” Id.  Even if that is true, it does 
not mean that the current educational uses are broad enough.  Teachers may now be more 
restricted to the customs imposed by industry clearance practices. 
 419 This model heeds the call of Samuelson and others that “commentators should stop 
wringing their hands about how troublesome fair use law is,” and proposes a meaningful 
solution that addresses this worry. Samuelson, supra note 30, at 2621. 
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articulating the CRAB model, the Congressional language that 
should be used to create the CRAB is explored briefly. 
A. Rejecting Model Two 
Mazzone gives us two Models from which to work.420  The 
best choice, at least for educational fair use, is an agency based on 
Model One.  The reason lies both in the adverse effects that Model 
Two would have on educational institutions, as well as the 
beneficial results of Model One. 
Giving the CRAB EEOC-like powers would encourage 
publishers and copyright owners to pursue claims they normally 
would not.  If, for example, the CRAB was given investigatory 
powers similar to the EEOC, publishers would be more likely to 
pursue infringement claims against the educational institutions 
that, in the past, have been left largely un-sued. 
The reason lies in the cost and publicity for both educational 
institutions and copyright owners.  Under the EEOC model, if the 
CRAB investigates an infringement claim, the cost is borne 
entirely by the CRAB and the educational institution; the CRAB 
bears the expense, investigates, and makes particular findings.421  
Additionally, this type of system makes the educational institutions 
look like bad social actors.  This system is set up to investigate 
possible infringement or “wrongdoing” on the part of schools.422  
Thus, for an educational institution, much like for an employer 
under investigation by the EEOC, a finding of infringement is 
detrimental, but a non-finding does not resolve the claim itself; the 
copyright owner still can file a lawsuit in federal court.423 
 
 420 Mazzone, supra note 15, at 415. 
 421 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(g) (2006) (describing the powers of the EEOC, which 
include making technical studies and intervening in a civil action); id. § 2000e-5 
(describing the EEOC’s powers, including bringing a civil action in federal court or 
referring the matter to the attorney general); id. § 2000e-8 (describing EEOC’s 
investigative powers). 
 422 See generally id. § 2000e-5(b). 
 423 29 C.F.R. § 1614.110 (2009) (providing that after a final agency action by a judge or 
otherwise, the EEOC must provide the complainant with notice of their right to appeal 
the final action to the EEOC and “right to file a civil action in federal district court”). 
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Beyond creating an incentive to file complaints, Model Two 
imposes significant costs on educational institutions.  Any time the 
CRAB received a complaint, it would be obligated to investigate 
that complaint and make a determination of infringement.424  Every 
investigation requires lawyers, who, in turn, use discovery.  That 
discovery costs money for educational institutions.  The EEOC, for 
example, has broad investigative powers and routinely requests 
documents from employers.425  These requests are handled by the 
employers’ lawyers.  Under the CRAB, the transaction costs—
these include legal costs, search and information costs associated 
with gathering the required documents, and lost productivity—
imposed by investigations would be significant,426 especially 
considering how easy filing a complaint may be for a publisher or 
copyright owner.427  Employers, for example, face substantial costs 
when a charge is filed with the EEOC: 
Winning [an EEOC charge] avoids court-imposed 
remedies, but it does not free the employer from the 
transaction costs of conducting litigation.  The 
 
 424 Mazzone, supra note 15, at 419. 
 425 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (describing the EEOC’s investigatory power); id. § 2000e-9 
(describing the EEOC’s subpoena power).  The EEOC, by statute, is authorized to access 
“any evidence of any person being investigated or proceeded against that relates to 
unlawful employment practices covered by this subchapter and is relevant to the charge 
under investigation.” Id. § 2000e-8(a).  To obtain this evidence, it may issue subpoenas. 
Id. § 2000e-9.  Using this power, the EEOC has “access to virtually any material that 
might cast light on the allegations against [an] employer.” EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 446 
U.S. 54, 68–69 (1984). 
 426 See Robert C. Ellickson, The Case for Coase and Against “Coaseanism,” 99 YALE 
L.J. 611, 615–16 (1989) (defining “transaction costs” to include “get-together costs,” 
“decision and execution costs,” and “information costs”); David Sherwyn et al., In 
Defense of Mandatory Arbitration of Employment Disputes: Saving the Baby, Tossing 
Out the Bath Water, and Constructing a New Sink in the Process, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. 
L. 73, 81 (1999) (“Responding to a charge costs an employer who does not have in-house 
counsel thousands of dollars in attorneys’ fees.”); id. (“Additional employer costs include 
the loss of productivity of other employees involved in the case, adverse publicity, and of 
course, liability.”). 
 427 Under the EEOC regulations, individuals who feel they have been discriminated 
against under Title VII “must consult a Counselor prior to filing a complaint in order to 
try to informally resolve the matter.” 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(a).  At that initial meeting, the 
Counselor informs the complainant of their rights and responsibilities. Id. § 
1614.105(b)(1).  Barring a different choice, the last Counselor conducts a final interview 
with the complainant within thirty days, id. § 1614.105(d), after which time the 
complainant may file its complaint alleging discrimination. Id. § 1614.106(b). 
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employer must retain lawyers, respond to an EEOC 
investigation of the employee’s complaint, conduct 
and respond to discovery, and pay other litigation-
related expenses.  The employer must also bear the 
cost of any time which human resources personnel, 
managers, and other employees dedicate to 
depositions, document requests, meetings with 
lawyers, and appearances in court.428 
The costs would be similar—though reduced—for educational 
institutions responding to the CRAB’s investigations.429  These 
costs also may be detrimental to student learning and society.  
Educational institutions will be forced to spend money locating 
material and outside counsel instead of spending it to educate their 
students.  A less educated citizenry means a less productive and 
competitive citizenry.  Additionally, teachers, administrators, and 
possibly students would spend time with lawyers or engage in 
other non-educational activities necessitated by investigations. 
These monetary risks would encourage schools to settle with 
copyright owners.430  Thus, the CRAB, if based on the EEOC 
Model, would encourage resolution of claims through mediation or 
settlement simply to avoid educational costs.431  Doubtless such 
 
 428 Seth D. Harris, Law, Economics, and Accommodations in the Internal Labor 
Market, 10 U. PA. J. BUS. & EMP. L. 1, 60–61 (2007) (footnotes omitted). 
 429 Under this Model, investigations of educational institutions may be less costly or 
complex than investigations of employers.  For example, in an EEOC investigation, the 
employer typically disputes the reasons for an adverse action, the details of the 
employment policy, to whom the policy applies, and the treatment of other similarly 
situated employees.  In the educational context, these issues may not be as complex since 
schools will have copying policies in place and teachers’ conduct is not being compared; 
the issues are related more to infringement and use.  Those are factual issues, but not 
nearly as complex as in employment discrimination actions.  How much less these 
investigations would costs schools is beyond the scope of this Article.  Thanks to Jason 
Mazzone for raising this point. 
 430 See Sherwyn, supra note 426, at 81–82 (“Because defending discrimination lawsuits 
in federal court can cost an employer hundreds of thousands or even over one million 
dollars, employers are induced to settle a case regardless of the worthiness of the 
plaintiffs’ allegations.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 431 See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(b)(1)–(2) (requiring that the EEOC must explain to 
complainant her rights, which include alternative dispute resolution as well as counseling 
activities); Sherwyn, supra note 426, at 80 (“The agency with which the employee files a 
charge will investigate the allegation and try to settle the matter by having the employer 
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negotiation and settlement will mean concessions by the school, 
which likely would include licensing fees or completely ceasing to 
copy the work altogether.  That result would be contrary to the one 
sought by creating an administrative agency.  As noted before, fair 
use is use without authorization; it is free.432  Encouraging 
settlements on these claims would discourage fair use and further 
entrench the current clearance culture. 
Additionally, positive publicity for copyright owners can be 
bad publicity for schools.  The public nature of the CRAB’s 
decisions, if modeled after the EEOC, would negatively affect 
schools, regardless of the outcome.433  If the determination is 
favorable to the educational institution, the copyright owner may 
still pursue litigation.  If the determination is unfavorable to the 
educational institution, that prods schools into the licensing or 
other agreements that fair use may not require, or else risk 
litigation.  If the case is litigated after an unfavorable decision, the 
school’s decision not to comply is disclosed.434  Noncompliance 
makes schools look like bad actors.  Again, the EEOC provides a 
rough analogy: “[EEOC] [l]itigation also publicly discloses the 
employer’s decision to deny an accommodation and thereby 
increases the likelihood that prospective employees in the external 
labor market will learn about the decision.”435  This negatively 
impacts schools’ reputations and reinforces the industry culture, 
 
remunerate and/or reinstate the employee.”); U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission, EEOC Investigations—What An Employer Should Know, http://archive. 
eeoc.gov/employers/investigations.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2010) (“In many cases, you 
may opt to resolve a charge early in the process through mediation or settlement.  At the 
start of an investigation, EEOC will advise you if your charge is eligible for mediation, 
but feel free to ask the investigator about the settlement option.  Mediation and 
settlement are voluntary resolutions.” (emphasis in original)). But see 29 C.F.R. § 
1614.105(b)(1) (noting that a complainant must be advised of “the right to file a notice of 
intent to sue pursuant to 1614.201(a) and a lawsuit under the ADEA instead of an 
administrative complaint of age discrimination under this part”). 
 432 See Mazzone, supra note 15, at 398. 
 433 See generally U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Questions and 
Answers—Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Requests, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/ 
foia/qanda_foiarequest.cfm (last visited Jan. 26, 2010) (advising that EEOC Orders, 
Directives, and Decisions can be publicly viewed and copied at EEOC District Offices). 
 434 See Harris, supra note 428, at 60. 
 435 Id. (footnotes omitted). 
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which emphasizes payment-for-use in lieu of fair use.  All the 
more reason for copyright owners to file complaints. 
Thus, Model Two encourages copyright owners to file 
complaints with school districts across the country.  One can 
imagine a scenario where copyright owners and publishers file 
complaints far and wide.  In investigating these complaints, the 
CRAB will necessarily impose substantial costs—monetary, 
reputational, and educational—on educational institutions.  In 
other words, Model Two’s design prejudices educational 
institutions by forcing them to combat infringement claims.  That 
starting position casts them as wrongdoers.  Both of those 
outcomes do not further the goals of fair use or education.  Thus, 
Model Two is rejected as a platform on which to build the CRAB. 
B. The CRAB: Structure, Organization, and Powers 
Although Model Two cannot solve the educational fair use 
problem, Model One may do so with further explanation and 
adaptation.  To review, Model One started with three separate acts 
of Congress: 
First, Congress [passes a statute] . . . that make[s] it 
unlawful to interfere with fair uses of copyrighted 
works and subject[s] offenders to civil penalties. . . .  
Second, Congress . . . create[s] an agency . . . to 
enforce this statute. . . .  Third, Congress . . . 
specif[ies] that federal fair use law, including [the 
agency’s] regulations, preempts state laws of 
contract that limit fair uses of copyrighted works.436 
The basic principle in this scheme starts from the right place: 
by affirmatively placing the obligation on copyright owners to 
comply with fair use laws, educational institutions have more 
space within which to teach.437  Because the burden is on the 
copyright owners not to interfere with fair use, educational 
institutions will not face investigative costs.  Additionally, as 
described below, the agency itself will be able to enforce its 
 
 436 Mazzone, supra note 15, at 415. 
 437 This conception of fair use better reflects the view that copyright and fair use each 
represent dueling rights. See supra note 232 and accompanying text. 
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regulations against copyright owners seeking to frustrate or 
interfere with educational fair use. 
With that guiding principle, the CRAB, like Mazzone’s Model 
One, would operate by both notice-and-comment rulemaking, 
informal adjudication, and enforcement mechanisms.438  The 
differences between the CRAB and Model One lie in the details; in 
that sense, the CRAB may be seen merely as an outgrowth of 
Model One. 
1. Negotiated Rulemaking Versus Informal Rulemaking 
Model One assumes that a regular, informal rulemaking 
process under 5 U.S.C. § 553 of the APA would be the best course 
of action.439  It does not consider a negotiated rulemaking process 
under 5 U.S.C. § 561.440  To understand the difference, and the 
template after which the CRAB should be modeled, we should 
understand each individually.  During this discussion, the benefits 
and drawbacks of each will be briefly discussed. 
Informal rulemaking, also known as notice-and-comment 
rulemaking, provides a procedure that is designed to include public 
participation.441  In the first step of this process, the agency 
publishes a general notice of a proposed rulemaking in the Federal 
Register.442  Next, the agency must provide “interested persons an 
opportunity to participate” in rulemaking by submitting comments, 
data, views, or argument.443  The agency then publishes the rule at 
least thirty days before it takes effect.444  Although notice-and-
comment rulemaking encourages participation in the rulemaking 
 
 438 See Mazzone, supra note 15, at 415–18. 
 439 Id. at 415–16. 
 440 5 U.S.C. § 561 (2006). 
 441 Int’l Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 407 
F.3d 1250, 1259 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (explaining that “[the notice-and-comment 
requirements] are designed (1) to ensure that agency regulations are tested via exposure 
to diverse public comment, (2) to ensure fairness to affected parties, and (3) to give 
affected parties an opportunity to develop evidence in the record to support their 
objections to the rule and thereby enhance the quality of judicial review” (citation 
omitted)). 
 442 5 U.S.C. § 553(b). 
 443 Id. § 553(c). 
 444 Id. § 553(d). 
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process, public participation is limited.445  Prior to publishing the 
notice of the rule provided by the agency, for instance, an agency 
typically spends a large amount of time and research developing a 
rule.446  This extensive development results, in part, from the “hard 
look” standard of judicial review, which encourages the agency to 
build a substantial record.447  In this process, the agency becomes 
cognitively committed to the proposed rule, an effect known as 
“lock-in.”448  Agency lock-in makes the agency less receptive and 
responsive to public comments; few agencies actually change rules 
in response to public comments.449  This effect can be mitigated 
 
 445 See Stephanie Stern, Cognitive Consistency: Theory Maintenance and 
Administrative Rulemaking, 63 U. PITT. L. REV. 589, 597–99 (2002). 
 446 See id. at 597 (“The timing of rulemaking encourages agency lock-in by 
concentrating the bulk of decisionmaking in the pre-notice period.  Notice occurs after 
the agency has completed substantial amounts of development, analysis, and review.”). 
 447 See id. at 621 (“[T]he nature and timing of notice and comment rulemaking can 
result in a premature psychological commitment to a position.  Due to judicially-imposed 
requirements, political and executive controls, and agency management practices, the 
bulk of regulatory decisionmaking and theory-formation occurs when the agency 
prepares a proposed rule for publication, long before the public has a formal opportunity 
to comment.”).  The “hard look” standard of review is derived from several cases, 
including Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile 
Insurance Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983), but was coined by Judge Leventhal. Matthew C. 
Stephenson, A Costly Signaling Theory of “Hard Look” Judicial Review, 58 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 753, 754 n.1 (2006).  Essentially, hard-look review requires the court, when 
reviewing the agency’s explanation for its decision, to “consider whether the decision 
was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear 
error of judgment.” Motor Vehicle, 463 U.S. at 43 (internal citations omitted).  To satisfy 
this requirement, the agency must develop a record such that the court can determine 
whether 
the agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to 
consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the 
problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to 
the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not 
be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise. 
Id.  In other words, this approach emphasizes “the adequacy of the record and the quality 
of the agency’s explanation.” Stephenson, supra, at 758. 
 448 Stern, supra note 445, at 592 (“Agency lock-in, or resistance to modification of 
proposed rules during the notice and comment process, impinges on the participatory and 
deliberative ideals of rulemaking.  Agency lock-in can occur when agency staff develop a 
strong psychological commitment to a proposal or when certain interest groups 
communicate their views in advance of the notice of proposed rulemaking.”). 
 449 See id. at 598–60 (reviewing empirical studies). 
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where an agency views its own decision to propose a rule as less 
than final.450 
Another form of rulemaking is called “negotiated rulemaking,” 
which adds a new component to the front end of the rulemaking 
process.451  This process involves interest groups during the 
formation process of the initial proposed rule.452  Negotiated 
rulemaking begins when the “head of the agency determines . . . 
[it] is in the public interest.”453  The agency head, when making 
this determination, must consider numerous factors, including the 
need for the rule, the identifiable interests affected by a rule, the 
ability to achieve balanced representation in the committee, the 
likelihood of a timely consensus, and the costs and resources 
available.454 
To aid in determining the identity of the interested parties, as 
well as these parties’ concerns, the agency may use a 
“convener.”455  The convener will then issue a report of his 
findings.456  If the agency decides not to establish a committee, it 
must publish notice.457 
If the agency decides to establish a negotiated rulemaking 
committee, it must publish notice of its intent to do so, which 
includes a description of the rule’s subject and scope; the interested 
 
 450 See id. at 599. 
 451 See 5 U.S.C. § 561 (2006). 
 452 See Stern, supra note 445, at 642. 
 453 5 U.S.C. § 563(a). 
 454 Id. § 563(a)(1)–(7) (“(1) there is a need for a rule; (2) there are a limited number of 
identifiable interests that will be significantly affected by the rule; (3) there is a 
reasonable likelihood that a committee can be convened with a balanced representation of 
persons who—(A) can adequately represent the interests identified under paragraph (2); 
and (B) are willing to negotiate in good faith to reach a consensus on the proposed rule; 
(4) there is a reasonable likelihood that a committee will reach a consensus on the 
proposed rule within a fixed period of time; (5) the negotiated rulemaking procedure will 
not unreasonably delay the notice of proposed rulemaking and the issuance of the final 
rule; (6) the agency has adequate resources and is willing to commit such resources, 
including technical assistance, to the committee; and (7) the agency, to the maximum 
extent possible consistent with the legal obligations of the agency, will use the consensus 
of the committee with respect to the proposed rule as the basis for the rule proposed by 
the agency for notice and comment.”). 
 455 Id. § 563(b). 
 456 Id. § 563(b)(2). 
 457 Id. § 565(a)(2). 
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parties; the people representing such interests and the agency; the 
proposed agenda and schedule for the committee; a description of 
administrative support for the committee; a solicitation for 
comments on the proposal to establish the committee; and an 
explanation of how to nominate another or apply for 
membership.458  The cap on participants is twenty-five unless the 
agency head decides more are necessary.459  While the committee 
may establish its own operating rules,460 its operation and existence 
terminates “upon promulgation of the final rule under 
consideration, unless the committee’s charter [otherwise 
provides].”461  The resulting rule is then subject to the standard 
notice-and-comment rulemaking process under § 553.462 
The chief goals of negotiated rulemaking—reducing litigation 
and time used to create a rule—have been called into question by 
empirical research.463  It is clear that, while “[a]ny agency action 
relating to establishing, assisting, or terminating a negotiating 
rulemaking committee” cannot be reviewed in court, the 
subsequent rule published can be.464  Negotiated rulemaking may 
not actually reduce time spent or litigation.465 
 
 458 Id. § 564(a). 
 459 Id. § 565(b). 
 460 Id. § 566(e). 
 461 Id. § 567. 
 462 Id. § 553; see Cary Coglianese, Assessing Consensus: The Promise and 
Performance of Negotiated Rulemaking, 46 DUKE L.J. 1255, 1257 (1997) (“The 
committee meets publicly to negotiate a proposed rule.  If the committee reaches 
consensus, the agency typically adopts the consensus rule as its proposed rule and then 
proceeds according to the notice-and-comment procedures specified in the APA.” 
(footnotes omitted)). 
 463 See Coglianese, supra note 462, at 1261; id. at 1271–86 (reviewing the time-savings 
of negotiated rulemaking); id. at 1289–1309 (reviewing results of frequency of litigation 
in negotiated rulemaking). 
 464 5 U.S.C. § 570. 
 465 See Coglianese, supra note 462, at 1261; id. at 1332 (“Negotiated rulemaking has 
long been regarded as necessary to avoid litigation and conflict.  My analysis shows that 
this is not the case.  Litigation is not the inevitable product of agency rulemaking.  Many 
agencies, after all, do not face much conflict between interest groups.  Among those 
agencies that do face conflicting interest groups, public managers appear much more 
adept than ordinarily assumed at anticipating interests and managing conflict in the 
normal rulemaking process.” (footnotes omitted)). 
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2. Modified Process of Notice-and-Comment Rulemaking 
While negotiated rulemaking may narrow issues and focus 
deliberations, it too closely resembles the Ad Hoc Committee that 
developed the Classroom Guidelines.466  There are differences, 
including the comment period and nomination and objection 
process for group members;467 but these differences do not change 
the fundamentals: interest groups, including copyright owners and 
publishers, will push a narrow scope of, and educational 
institutions will be forced to compromise on, fair use.468  That did 
not work out well for educational institutions in the past,469 and 
there isn’t much reason to suspect any different result this time 
around. 
Because the dynamic of the group-model negotiated 
rulemaking does not differ from the dynamic of the Ad Hoc 
Committee,470 this Article rejects it as a plausible approach.  
Instead, it accepts informal rulemaking as a better starting place for 
developing the CRAB. 
Informal rulemaking, however, does not adequately address the 
concerns of educational institutions because the agency is subject 
to capture and lock-in.471  Thus, it must be adapted.  This Part does 
not purport to completely remodel the APA or provide a complete 
account of how this new model would work.  Instead, it will offer 
some suggestions that can assist the CRAB in achieving its goals. 
First, to avoid agency lock-in,472 the notice-and-comment 
process should be a three-level, two-tiered, open process.  “Three 
level” means that three independent groups will operate within the 
CRAB to propose a rule.  These groups can function in one of two 
ways.  In the first scenario (“Sequential Groups”), Group 1 
 
 466 See supra Part I.A.2. 
 467 Compare Part III.B.1, with Part I.A.2. 
 468 See supra Part I.C (discussing how universities were forced to accept the Classroom 
Guidelines at the threat of litigation). 
 469 See supra Part I. 
 470 One important difference between the two is that, in negotiated rulemaking, a 
member of the agency participates. 5 U.S.C. § 565(b) (2006) (“Each committee shall 
include at least one person representing the agency.”). 
 471 See Stern, supra note 445, at 596–97. 
 472 See id. 
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prepares the initial rule.  Group 2 will review Group 1’s proposed 
rule and data and present potentially opposing views.473  Group 3 
will review both Group 1’s and Group 2’s data and proposed rules, 
and then adopt its own rule. 
In the second scenario (“Competing Groups”), Groups 1 and 2 
operate on the same time frame and propose competing rules based 
on the same data.  Group 3 then reviews the data and both 
proposals, and it can accept or reject one, reject both, create a 
mélange of the two, or create its own rule. 
“Open” means that the CRAB will receive comments and 
suggestions on a rolling basis.  These comments and suggestions 
should be related to areas in which new fair use rulemaking should 
take place.  For example, the AALS might submit a comment on 
the need for fair use regulations concerning casebook copying.  
“Open” also means that there should be a streamlined and easily 
accessible comment process, as described below. 
“Two-tiered” means employing two notice-and-comment 
periods.  The first period will be a notice of general nature 
(“General Rule Notice”), stating, for instance, that the CRAB is 
contemplating a rule regarding educational photocopying of 
textbooks.  After the CRAB publishes the General Rule Notice, the 
public will be able to comment on the topic. 
After the first comment period closes, the CRAB’s three-level 
process will resume under either the Sequential Group scenario or 
the Competing Group scenario.  Under the Sequential Group 
scenario, Groups 1 and 2 will sift through the comments and 
present counter-arguments to the others’ proposal(s).  After this 
process, the CRAB’s Group 3 will develop a more concrete rule, 
and the effect of lock-in will be both reduced and beneficial.474  
 
 473 The ability of agencies to argue different views may be able to reduce the likelihood 
of agency lock-in. Id. at 626–27. 
 474 Lock-in, while detrimental, also has benefits, such as preventing agency capture. Id. 
at 596 n.41 (“In an earlier era of regulatory history, commentators may have viewed lock-
in as a positive attribute of agencies because of the overwhelming concern with ‘agency 
capture.’  Lock-in does prevent capture by powerful interest groups, at least in cases 
where the agency was insulated from interest group pressures before publication of the 
proposed rule.”).  Additionally, the lock-in effect would be reduced because the initial 
rule is developed in response to the public comments, and thus the agency would not 
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After Group 3 proposes and publishes a rule, the notice-and-
comment period begins again.  After the close of that period, the 
three-level system activates, eventually producing a final rule as 
promulgated by Group 3. 
 
view itself as entirely committed to the rule, especially knowing another round of 
comments (likely) from a similar group of people would follow. 
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The CRAB Group 3 Reviews 
Comments, Group 1’s Rule, Group 
2’s Rule 
The CRAB Group 3 
Publishes Final Rule 
FIGURE 1 
THE CRAB RULEMAKING PROCESS: 
SEQUENTIAL GROUPS 
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Under the Competing Groups scenario, the comments are 
processed differently, with Groups 1 and 2 independently 
developing and proposing rules.  Each Group submits its rule to 
Group 3, which considers, along with the comments, both Groups’ 
rules.  Group 3 then proposes its own rule, which may entail some, 
all, or none of the other Groups’ proposed rules. 
 
 
The CRAB Meets 
and Confers 
The CRAB Proposes a 
General Statement of the 
Rule (Similar to Policy 
Statement) 
Comment Period 











The CRAB Group 3 Reviews 
Group 1’s and Group 2’s Rule  
The CRAB Group 3 Publishes 
a Proposed Rule 
Comment Period 
on Proposed Rule 
The CRAB Group 3 Reviews 
Comments, Group 1’s Rule, 
Group 2’s Rule 
The CRAB Group 3 
Publishes Final Rule 
FIGURE 2 
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3. Group Identification and Involvement 
As part of the “open” component of the modified rulemaking, 
there must be a proper framework for making, receiving, and 
sorting through comments.  History teaches us that copyright 
owners and publishers will be represented adequately in the notice-
and-comment process.475  Aside from the lessons of the Ad Hoc 
Committee, the current participation of interest groups in Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”) anti-circumvention 
rulemaking shows that their involvement will be robust.476 
The concern, then, should be about educators’ participation.  
To solve part of the participation problem, existing educational 
groups or associations should participate and communicate with 
one another in the process.477  Additionally, new educational 
associations should be formed.  In particular, each state should 
form an educational committee comprised of educators and 
lawyers who will convene to discuss issues of fair use in their 
classrooms.  Further, each state might be a member in a national 
organization, which would consist of a standing committee that 
could solicit comments and a convening committee that would 
 
 475 See infra note 476 and accompanying text. 
 476 The Electronic Frontier Foundation has been particularly vocal in this regard, 
criticizing the Librarian of Congress for not taking consumer comments seriously and 
acquiescing to moneyed interests.  FRED VON LOHMANN  & GWEN HINZE, ELECTRONIC 
FRONTIER FOUNDATION, DMCA TRIENNIAL RULEMAKING: FAILING THE CONSUMER 3–4 
(2005), available at http://w2.eff.org/IP/DMCA/copyrightoffice/DMCA_rulemaking_ 
broken.pdf  (“[D]uring the 2003 rulemaking, 51 initial comments requesting exemptions 
were filed, and 337 reply comments were filed.  Of these, 254 reply comments were filed 
by consumers in support of the consumer-oriented exemptions proposed by the EFF and 
Public Knowledge (PK). . . .  In the end, none of the 4 classes of consumer-oriented 
exemptions requested by EFF and PK were granted.  In each case, the Register and 
Librarian of Congress determined that any harm to consumers was ‘de minimis’ based on 
the evidence presented by proponents.”). 
 477 At primary and secondary education levels, some of these organizations include the 
National Association of Education School Principals, http://www.naesp.org (last visited 
Sept. 1, 2009); the American Association of School Administrators, http://www.aasa.org 
(last visited Sept. 1, 2009); and the National Association of Secondary School Principals, 
http://www.nassp.org (last visited Sept. 1, 2009).  At the post-secondary and graduate 
education levels, these include the National Association of Colleges and Employers, 
http://www.naceweb.org (last visited Sept. 1, 2009); the Association of American 
Universities, http://www.aau.edu/ (last visited Sept. 1, 2009); and the American 
Association of Law Schools, http://www.aals.org/ (last visited Sept. 1, 2009). 
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hold meetings semi-yearly to discuss fair use issues in educational 
institutions. 
Additionally, electronic rulemaking should be used to facilitate 
group involvement.  In his article, Mazzone cites an article by 
Professor Beth Noveck  in which she describes how the online 
structure of e-commenting and e-rulemaking can have a great 
effect on participation.478  Several of her suggestions to increase 
involvement bear mentioning here.  First, she discusses the merits 
of creating a listserv, run by the CRAB to which individuals and 
groups can subscribe.479  Subscribers could receive updates and 
proposed rules via email, which would facilitate rule making being 
accessible to all.480  Second, Noveck suggests using a Rich Site 
Summary (“RSS”) feed to provide notice to institutions and 
individuals, thereby soliciting comments and suggestions.481  
These two suggestions are in addition to the existing practices of e-
rulemaking that use websites.482  Third, the model by which 
comments are received and reviewed is critical.483  While this 
Article is not meant to detail all of those requirements, Noveck’s 
article is a smart place to start. 
4. Adjudication 
In addition to rulemaking, the CRAB also should have 
adjudicative powers, as Mazzone suggests.484  The basics of his 
proposal do not need much tinkering.  Essentially, Mazzone 
proposes an informal adjudication process that would entitle a 
party to judicial review of a “final agency action.”485  Appellate 
courts reviewing agency actions would conduct a review consistent 
 
 478 Mazzone, supra note 15, at 416 & n.81 (citing Beth Simone Noveck, The Electronic 
Revolution in Rulemaking, 53 EMORY L.J. 433, 480–92 (2004)). 
 479 See generally Noveck, supra note 478, at 471–74. 
 480 See id. 
 481 See id. at 477–79 (noting that an RSS can facilitate discussion). 
 482 See id. at 444. 
 483 See id. at 479–91 (describing numerous methods of improving online commenting, 
including rule descriptors, taxonomies, threaded comments, and comment 
authentication). 
 484 Mazzone, supra note 15, at 419 (suggesting that CIRO, an organization created 
hypothetically by Mazzone for the same purposes as CRAB, should have adjudicative 
power). 
 485 See id.; see also 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 704 (2006). 
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with the “arbitrary,” “capricious” and “hard look” standard 
currently used by federal courts.486  To be reviewable, of course, 
the party seeking review must first exhaust all administrative 
remedies, including a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge 
and an appeal to the CRAB Appeals Review Council.487 
5. Enforcement 
Under Model One, Mazzone advocates that the agency have 
enforcement powers like the FTC.488  The CRAB should have 
similar enforcement powers.  The CRAB’s enforcement power 
would necessarily be coupled with an investigative power similar 
to the FTC, which includes compulsory powers to collect 
information and documents.489  These powers provide judicial 
deference—a court cannot review the FTC’s action until it issues 
an order to cease and desist.490  All appeals travel from the agency 
to the federal circuit courts.491 
The primary benefit of the CRAB’s FTC-like enforcement 
powers will, however, come from its deterrent effect on copyright 
owners.  Like employers responding to EEOC complaints, 
copyright owners responding to FTC investigations face 
 
 486 See 5 U.S.C. § 706; supra note 447 and accompanying text. 
 487 See supra Figure 1. 
 488 See Mazzone, supra note 15, at 436. 
 489 See 16 C.F.R. § 2.1 (2009) (“Commission investigations and inquiries may be 
originated upon the request of the President, Congress, governmental agencies, or the 
Attorney General; upon referrals by the courts; upon complaint by members of the 
public; or by the Commission upon its own initiative.  The Commission has delegated to 
the Director, Deputy Directors, and Assistant Directors of the Bureau of Competition, the 
Director, Deputy Directors, and Associate Directors of the Bureau of Consumer 
Protection and, the Regional Directors and Assistant Regional Directors of the 
Commission’s regional offices, without power of redelegation, limited authority to 
initiate investigations.”); id. § 2.7 (detailing compulsory process in investigations). 
 490 15 U.S.C. § 45(c) (2006) (“Any person, partnership, or corporation required by an 
order of the Commission to cease and desist from using any method of competition or act 
or practice may obtain a review of such order in the court of appeals of the United States, 
within any circuit where the method of competition or the act or practice in question was 
used or where such person, partnership, or corporation resides or carries on business, by 
filing in the court, within sixty days from the date of the service of such order, a written 
petition praying that the order of the Commission be set aside.”); FTC v. Standard Oil 
Co. of Cal., 449 U.S. 232, 245 (1980). 
 491 15 U.S.C. § 45(c)–(d). 
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substantial costs in responding to and complying with 
investigations.492  As an additional deterrent, those subject to 
CRAB investigations, like those subject to FTC investigations, 
would face criminal and civil penalties.493  This deterrent effect is 
tempered by the “high standard”494 that the FTC not commence an 
investigation unless it has “reason to believe that . . . any unfair 
method of competition or unfair or deceptive act or practice in or 
affecting commerce” is being used and a proceeding would be in 
the public interest.495 
In addition to providing this deterrent effect, it also places 
educational institutions in a good bargaining position vis-à-vis 
publishers and organizations should licensing or other negotiations 
need to take place.  Finally, it reduces litigation costs for 
educational institutions because the FTC brings actions on their 
behalf.496 
C. The Congressional Language and Grant of Authority 
The CRAB is conceived of as an executive agency.497  As such, 
Congress must create it.498  The language used to complete this 
task is important, and could determine the “fairness” of particular 
uses.  Considering the purpose, structure, and function of the 
CRAB, several aspects of the statutory language deserve attention. 
 
 492 See David P. Wales, Reflections on Procedure at the Federal Trade Commission: 
Remarks of J. Thomas Rosch, Commissioner, Federal Trade Commission, 1715 PLI/Corp 
799, 808 (2009) (“The adjudicatory proceedings which follow the issuance of a 
complaint may last for months or years. They result in substantial expense to the 
respondent and may divert management personnel from their administrative and 
productive duties to the corporation.”). 
 493 15 U.S.C. § 50 (describing the civil and criminal penalties for violating reporting 
requirements or refusing to comply with certain FTC requests). 
 494 See Wales, supra note 492, at 808–11 (detailing four consequences of this “very 
high standard”). 
 495 15 U.S.C. § 45(b); see Standard Oil, 449 U.S. at 246 n.14. 
 496 See 15 U.S.C. § 45(b). 
 497 As noted infra Part IV.A, Congress may choose to create the CRAB as part of the 
Copyright Office, an existing legislative agency. 
 498 See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 327 
(Aspen Publishers 2006) (noting that Congress has delegated broad power to federal 
agencies to make, enforce, and adjudicate rules). 
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The language of the statute Congress enacts must be specific to 
education.  In other words, it must create the CRAB explicitly to 
regulate educational fair use.  While “educational fair use” may be 
a term with numerous definitions, it can and should be limited by 
Congress.  In describing the statute’s purpose, for example, 
Congress can expressly state that it designed the statute to free 
educational institutions from fair use’s shackles of vagueness, to 
encourage student learning, to facilitate teaching, and to encourage 
the use of copyrighted materials without fear of litigation.  The 
purpose of the statute will then guide the CRAB’s regulations and 
adjudications. 
Second, Congress can make specific findings about educational 
uses of copyrighted works.  This common component of statutes 
would further explain why Congress decided to delegate its 
lawmaking authority to an agency, and would provide a backdrop 
for evaluating particular agency actions.  In this case, 
Congressional findings could detail, among other things, the 
number of schools that have Educational Guidelines-based 
copyright or copying policies; the importance of fair use in the 
educational setting; the importance of education; teachers’ lack of 
knowledge and understanding regarding copyright law; fair use’s 
vague nature; the deterrent and detrimental effects of limiting 
educational uses; and the need for more certainty among 
educational users of copyrighted works. 
Third, Congress can broadly define the term “educational 
uses”—i.e., describe the general nature of the fair uses 
contemplated by Congress.  This definition should not be overly 
specific.  The CRAB, to fulfill its mission, must develop the details 
of which uses constitute educational fair uses and cannot be 
interfered with; a specific definition risks constraining the CRAB’s 
reach and effectiveness.  The specific limitations on educational 
fair use should probably be created by the CRAB, though they also 
might be included in an express grant of authority from Congress. 
The definition might look something like this: “‘Educational 
uses’ are uses of copyrighted material by students, teachers, aides, 
administrators, or other similar individuals in preparation for 
teaching, in conjunction with teaching, for teaching purposes, or as 
part of teaching activities.”  This definition is not meant to be the 
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only definition in the statute, or even one of any possible 
definition.  It is meant merely to illustrate how Congress might 
broadly define educational uses and the power of the CRAB. 
In crafting this and other definitions, Congress should 
remember the Ad Hoc Committee’s statements that “good teaching 
practice may not always be legal copyright practice,”499 and that “it 
is legally risky for teachers to rely wholly on fair use.”500  
Congress’s mission should go beyond the Ad Hoc Committee, 
which recognized “the need to legitimize current and developing 
reasonable educational practices so that teachers will not be forced 
either to drop them or to continue them ‘under the table.’”501  
Current educational fair use practices and customs are 
unsatisfactory and insufficient.502  New rules recognizing the need 
for educational freedom should be created.  In other words, certain 
uses that publishers have tried to label as infringement should be 
made fair by the statute and its definitions. 
Further questions may arise about what substantive statements 
Congress should make in its delegation.  Mazzone, for example, 
has suggested that Congress should look to the courts for guidance 
on what constitutes fair use.503  This Article rejects that approach, 
arguing instead that Congress should abrogate the Classroom 
Guidelines and the judicial treatment thereof.  Congress may look 
at the case law—not necessarily for substantive guidance on 
educational fair use, but to understand how it might classify 
educational uses.  Samuelson has provided a good base by 
grouping cases into categories, one of which includes educational 
fair use.504  These cases might show Congress the benefits and 
drawbacks of classifying certain uses as “educational.”505 
Additionally, Congress should shy away from any statement 
that defers to the judiciary’s interpretation of fair use as applied to 
educational works—although incorporating the doctrine generally, 
 
 499 Rosenfield, supra note 38, at 6. 
 500 Id. at 51. 
 501 Id. at 7. 
 502 See supra Part I. 
 503 Mazzone, supra note 15, at 426–27. 
 504 Samuelson, supra note 30, at 2582. 
 505 Id. at 2587. 
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as does the Copyright Act, should not present a problem.  Past 
judicial treatment of the Guidelines has resulted in a distorted 
standard of educational fair use.  Thus, judicial deference can be 
harmful to the CRAB, the mission of which would be expressly 
and specifically defined by Congress.  To develop fair and sound 
regulations concerning educational fair use, the CRAB should 
promulgate regulations using its procedures as defined above, 
referencing the case law only to ensure that its regulations find 
grounding in the fundamental principles of fair use law.506 
D. The Regulations Envisioned 
It would be best to end with a brief and general description of 
the CRAB’s regulations.  Many of the points made here will be 
addressed in Part IV, so they will be only sketched here.  The first 
question is what kinds of regulations the CRAB would promulgate.  
Most regulations should be maximum limits, or rules, on uses of 
copyrighted works in education.  These should be simple to 
understand and apply, using plain language percentages and 
including simple methods of computation.507  Not every regulation 
needs to be in the form of a rule, and the CRAB should be free to 
promulgate standards or rule-standard hybrids to address specific 
concerns.508  Rules should address all kinds of copying, from 
photocopying, to recording televisions shows, to uploading content 
 
 506 The CRAB should also make rules specific to issues in education involving the 
electronic classroom.  Posting materials on Blackboard, see Blackboard, http://www. 
blackboard.com/ (last visited Jan. 17, 2010), for example, may present unique situations.  
Some rules might apply equally to paper copies and photocopying.  A rule allowing a 
teacher to photocopy for students a percentage of a book, for example, might apply 
equally to posting that material for students online.  Specific questions about posting 
materials online for students is outside the scope of this Article’s discussion.  
Nevertheless, these are issues the CRAB should and could address. 
 507 Word counts may be too onerous, so a page count may be a better way to determine 
percentage limits.  The formulas for computation should include both short-hand 
measurements and more detailed approaches.  For example, one rule could specify a 
certain percentage of copying.  While the rule should contain a detailed description of the 
calculation procedure, it also should include a rough rule-of-thumb, such as, “When 
photocopying portions of science textbooks for classroom use, you generally cannot copy 
more than one chapter from a book and distribute it to your students.”  To ensure that 
such a short-hand rule corresponds to the percentage in the actual rule, it should be based 
on objective evidence of the typical length of a chapter in a science textbook. 
 508 As discussed infra Part IV.C, rules themselves are not always as rigid as they seem. 
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on Blackboard.509  As to specific rules themselves, those are 
outside the scope of this Article.  To make them easy to read, the 
regulations should be grouped into two indices, one grouped by 
subject matter and one grouped by keyword. 
IV. OBJECTIONS 
The administrative approach is not impervious to criticism, and 
it is likely to meet substantial resistance for a variety of reasons.  
This Part explores four possible objections to the CRAB model: 
(A) the CRAB is overly specific; (B) the CRAB unnecessarily 
increases costs; (C) the CRAB’s regulations are too rigid and do 
not provide educators with enough flexibility; and (D) the CRAB, 
paradoxically, creates more uncertainty because of the technical 
and confusing nature of agency regulations.510 
 
 509 Some of the regulations, like those that apply to photocopying, also may apply 
directly to posting materials on Blackboard.  The amount of a book that can be 
photocopied and distributed to students, for example, probably should be the same 
amount that can be posted on a secure Blackboard–type site.  To the extent that online 
materials need to be password protected or otherwise protected from unauthorized 
copying, the CRAB should promulgate separate regulations regarding technological 
protections. 
 510 Two other objections are raised and briefly discussed in this footnote.  First, one 
might suggest we also ought to incorporate a “good faith” component into fair use.  Put 
another way, if the educator is copying in good faith, their copying is per se fair.  That 
approach is untenable, however, because of the nature of a good faith standard.  Good 
faith, of course, must be defined against a backdrop—what constitutes good faith in one 
context may not in another, and all the facts surrounding the copying need to be included.  
That raises two problems.  First, under current standards, some may consider the 
Guidelines as the good faith standard, or are at least highly relevant in the good faith 
determination. Bartow, supra note 5, at 205–06; see also Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko’s 
Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522, 1545 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (using the Classroom 
Guidelines in its “innocent infringer” discussion of statutory damages).  Second, even if 
the Guidelines are not used, the good faith standard will need to be articulated, and it will 
be amorphous.  The unpredictable nature of such a standard will do little to remedy the 
uncertainty surrounding which uses are fair. 
 The second objection says that a better solution would provide blanket immunity to 
educational uses of copyrighted materials.  This would, the argument goes, save lots of 
costs and headaches.  That solution is easy, but it fails to take into account the legitimate 
interests of copyright owners.  This would destroy, for example, the incentive of authors 
who create copyrighted works expressly for educational use.  If the authors’ incentives 
are destroyed, they likely will no longer create these educational works.  The results of 
this could be disastrous—no materials would be created exclusively for educational use 
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A. Specificity Requirement 
Creating an administrative agency specific to education is 
unique.  It differs from Mazzone’s proposal because it is not 
designed to address all possible fair uses;511 it is confined to a 
specific universe of uses.  While this specificity will provide 
clearer direction for educators, one may object that the creation of 
such a specific agency is unnecessary; if we are going to accept an 
administrative agency, why not create one that administers fair use 
generally?512 
There are several responses to this objection.  First, as we have 
seen, educational fair uses pose particular problems.  The 
Guidelines, for example, are not the law but have been treated as 
such, creating uncertainty and asymmetric rights for educators.513  
Additionally, not just any agency will do.514  The nature of 
educational uses of copyrighted materials requires particular 
tailoring that sufficiently considers the value of educational uses.  
Thus, the body administering fair use must be specifically tailored 
to education to obviate these problems. 
If still not satisfied, then the next option would be to implement 
a Mazzonian approach but define specific categories of uses, as 
Professor Samuelson already has shown us is possible.515  Thus, 
the administering agency would delegate powers and create 
regulations specifically as to each category of fair use.  Mazzone 
briefly suggested that the agency’s “regulations would specify, 
consistent with the provisions of § 107 of the Copyright Act, the 
 
because no author could ever recover the costs of publishing the book.  Therefore, broad 
immunity for educators is not a viable solution.  It is another issue altogether whether the 
Eleventh Amendment bars suits against educators. See Bartow, supra note 5, at 223–24. 
 511 See Mazzone, supra note 15, at 433 (arguing for the creation of an administrative 
agency because “[r]egulations issued by an administrative agency . . . work wholesale . . . 
[and] apply to all users”). 
 512 If we need specificity of this nature, for example, why not create “a separate agency 
for environmental problems in Hawaii because Hawaii has a different ecosystem.” E-mail 
from Harold Krent, Dean and Professor of Law, Chicago–Kent College of Law, to David 
A. Simon, Law Clerk, Hon. Martin C. Ashman (Aug. 7, 2009, 16:51 CST).  Thanks to 
Harold Krent for raising this objection. 
 513 See supra Part I.C. 
 514 See Mazzone, supra note 15, at 420 n.99 (citing commentators’ criticisms of the 
effectiveness of Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution Policy). 
 515 See Samuelson, supra note 30, at 2541. 
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uses that constitute fair uses of copyrighted works in specific 
sectors.”516  But the description ends there.  “Specific sectors,” as 
referred to by Mazzone, probably means § 107’s express 
mentioning of “criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching . . . 
scholarship, or research,”517 though he does not explicitly say so.  
Those categories are good places to start drawing categorical lines, 
but Samuelson’s article is another. 
In other words, the categories should focus on the use of the 
work, not the work itself.  Regulations concerning use of several 
articles or a movie clip in a classroom would fall under the 
“educational” category of uses, rather than specific categories 
concerning articles or movies with rules pertaining specifically to 
the use of those types of materials.  Thus, rules and regulations 
would address how much of a movie or book you could copy in the 
educational setting.  There might be, for instance, regulations 
regarding the use of multiple articles when creating a “course 
pack,” or regulations concerning the use of copying photographs 
for classroom or educational use. 
Thus, under this scheme, educational fair uses would occupy 
one area that the fair use administration would regulate.  In this 
case, the CRAB’s contribution would not go to waste.  The agency 
could still implement the CRAB model to the degree it aligns with 
the overall language, purpose, and structure of the legislation 
creating the agency.  It may even function as a sub-agency within 
the larger one, such as the Copyright Office. 
That raises another issue: even under such an approach, one 
might wonder why we need a new agency at all.  Why not, for 
example, use the FTC or some other extant administrative body?518  
The reason lies in expertise.  The FTC is an administrative body 
with a specific task519—to expect them to immediately understand, 
regulate, and enforce copyright law and the nature of the interests 
at stake is impossible. 
 
 516 Mazzone, supra note 15, at 415. 
 517 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006). 
 518 Thanks to Harold Krent for commending to my attention this point. 
 519 See Federal Trade Commission—About Us, http://www.ftc.gov/ftc/about.shtm (last 
visited Oct. 21, 2009). 
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Perhaps, as Professor Liu suggests,520 the Copyright Office 
offers an existing institution in which to implement the CRAB.  
But, as Mazzone points out, the Copyright Office has come under 
scrutiny for favoring the interests of copyright owners.521  Even so, 
there may be measures that Congress could take consistent with the 
CRAB proposal to limit capture, which have been outlined in the 
modified rulemaking process.522  Thus, if the objection is centered 
on newness of the agency, it is possible to move the CRAB into the 
Copyright Office with legislation like that already articulated: the 
structural differences from the DMCA-rulemaking also would 
reduce, if not eliminate, many of the obstacles to public 
participation as well as the risk of capture.523  The primary 
additions to the legislation would be centered on where the CRAB 
would reside and the additional powers it would have.  Congress 
would have to clearly articulate those powers. 
B. Increased Costs 
The argument about costs is a familiar one—especially given 
the scholarly embrace of the law and economics movement.524  
Using an agency to administer fair use will increase the raw costs 
of copyright law.  A new agency means new staffing and operating 
expenditures.  The modifications proposed to the notice-and-
comment rulemaking process will add further costs.  Copyright 
owners—and some users—may also face increased costs.  But raw 
costs are only one part of the equation.  Conceiving of them as the 
only result of the agency would be a mistake for several reasons. 
 
 520 See Liu, Regulatory Copyright, supra note 396, at 148–50. 
 521 Mazzone, supra note 15, at 429. 
 522 These mechanisms were outlined in supra Part III.B.2, which describes the modified 
notice-and-comment rulemaking process. 
 523 The Electronic Frontier Foundation has criticized the DMCA as being too technical 
and inaccessible to the ordinary consumer by placing too many requirements on DMCA-
created exceptions. See LOHMANN & HINZE, supra note 476, at 2–4.  Many of these 
problems, most of which deal with defining works and demonstrating non-infringing use, 
would not be required under the CRAB’s rulemaking. 
 524 See David A. Hoffman & Michael P. O’Shea, Can Law and Economics Be Both 
Practical and Principled?, 53 ALA. L. REV. 335, 381 (2002) (quoting JOHN THIBAULT & 
LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE : A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 123 (1975)). 
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First, it fails to account for the current costs imposed on 
educational users.  There are real benefits lost when teachers 
decide against using certain copyrighted materials because they 
think it is illegal.  And, in many cases of educational copying, 
there are no costs imposed upon the copyright owner, in terms of 
either revenue or ability to control copying or distribution.  There 
are even greater costs when institutions that educate our nation’s 
young people internalize that fear.  As has been detailed, 
universities implement restrictive policies that stifle education and 
creative growth.525  Not only does this impede teaching and student 
learning, it also impresses upon teachers and students a constrained 
view of copyright law and one’s ability to create.526  For teachers, 
this means less effective instruction will likely result.  For students, 
it (wrongly) teaches them that many novel and creative uses of 
copyrighted materials are illegal.527 
Second, the imposition of cost should not be viewed as a 
wasteful economic burden but a necessary price for an invaluable 
and inexhaustible good: education.  Taking this approach means 
making a “normative judgment about the value of fair use and 
about the value of fair use clarification.”528  It also means making a 
value judgment about the importance of education vis-à-vis private 
profits of copyright owners.529  Carroll argues that clarifying fair 
use acts as a “free speech safeguard” because it quashes much of 
the uncertainty surrounding fair use—warming, instead of chilling, 
speech.530  But it is more than that.  Implementing policies that are 
education-friendly will allow educators to teach effectively and 
 
 525 See supra Part I.C. 
 526 See generally LESSIG, supra note 224. 
 527 See id. at 293 (describing copyright law as creating a generation of criminals); Lisa 
Dush, Beyond the Wakeup Call, in COMPOSITION & COPYRIGHT: PERSPECTIVES ON 
TEACHING, TEXT-MAKING, AND FAIR USE 114, 122 (Steve Westbrook ed., SUNY Press 
2009) (noting that in the study the author conducted, students “spoke of ‘thinking twice’ 
before they used a copyrighted text in their own compositions, . . . but then used the 
copyrighted text anyway”). 
 528 Carroll, supra note 173, at 1138. 
 529 See id. at 1114.  It is ironic that the Constitution secures copyrights in authors’ 
works for the benefit of the public only to severely restrict the use of those works in 
education. 
 530 Id. at 1138. 
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develop students who will use copyright and fair use laws to their 
advantage, producing social benefits. 
C. Rigidity of Regulations 
Besides costs, some may turn a skeptical eye to prescriptive 
rules that educators must follow under the CRAB.  Such 
skepticism derives from the notion that educators should not be 
required to consult a rulebook to determine how to teach.531  They 
need a flexible approach to fair use, not rigid rules.  This objection 
has merit—there are benefits to standards like the CBP.532  To the 
extent that standards can be used, the CRAB is free to adopt them.  
But, as we have seen, standards can take teachers only so far—and 
while CRAB-promulgated standards, unlike ordinary CBPs, would 
have certain legal effect, they would still be vague.533 
To solve this problem, the CRAB should promulgate more 
rules than standards—setting maximum limits on specific types of 
educational fair uses.  Despite the argument that rules are too 
restrictive, the CRAB’s rules could ameliorate this problem by 
requiring only substantial compliance—or enforce the rules in a 
manner that does not require literal compliance.  This, of course, 
occurs in many other situations, and the speed limit is a good 
example.  Sure, a sixty miles-per-hour speed limit requires you to 
drive at that speed or below; but police generally allow a five to 
ten miles-per-hour window in which to speed—legally.  The 
degree to which speeding is allowable, as any person who has 
received a speeding ticket can attest, varies by municipality, 
county, city, and state. 
The CRAB’s rules could do the same.  Imagine, for example, a 
rule that permitted teachers to photocopy for their students no more 
than 25% of any literary book.  What happens when a teacher 
decides to use two chapters (totaling fifty-five pages) of a book 
containing 200 pages (27.5%)?  If the CRAB’s rules required only 
substantial compliance, then this use might be fair.  Whether it is 
 
 531 This was the general tenor of several objections this Article received at the 2009 
Intellectual Property Scholars Conference. 
 532 See supra note 360 and accompanying text. 
 533 See, e.g., supra note 367 and accompanying text. 
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fair would depend on the custom developed in education.  In this 
way, the rules could incorporate some of the beneficial flexibility 
of the CBP while providing the certainty educators seek.534 
This example also provides an opportunity to speak briefly 
about the effect of maximum rules.  If we twist the facts of the 
aforementioned example just slightly, and say the teacher wanted 
to use seventy-five pages of the book for a total of 37.5%, the use 
would be unfair.  What then?  The answer is simple—the teacher 
could not use the approximately twenty additional pages.  Sure, 
this would affect some educational fair uses and force teachers to 
choose sections of some works over others, but it does not deprive 
them of all of their uses.535  Indeed, the CRAB’s rules should be 
drafted to permit uses that generally would allow the educator to 
use a particular type of material to educate their students on the 
point they desire.536  While the allowable percentage for usage of a 
book may not be 25%, some percentage should suffice. 
D. Complexity of Regulations 
Another objection to the CRAB or any rulemaking procedure is 
that the regulations, not to mention the process of developing them, 
is complicated.  As to the complexity of the process, one must 
assume that groups will form to better address the agency’s 
rulemaking process.  Accepting the administrative model means 
sacrificing the typical case-by-case method of fair use 
adjudication.  Not everyone will be satisfied with the rules and 
regulations, but the avenues of participation are open.  
Participation also requires organization and action—educators 
cannot expect the process will mobilize itself and completely and 
exhaustively protect teachers’ rights without any input whatsoever. 
 
 534 Special thanks to Professor Peter Lee for giving me this idea in a discussion we had 
about one of his current projects. 
 535 It seems that there is a fear of secure limits on fair use, perhaps because of the 
current culture given the Guidelines.  But, at some point, there has to be a limit on 
educational fair use.  Why not promulgate it? 
 536 I realize this is a vague statement that tells us very little.  But this Article is not 
meant to detail the specifics of each and every rule.  Rather, its purpose is to propose a 
model upon which certain types of rules can be based.  Rules should be designed to 
maximize education and respect the legitimate rights of copyright owners. 
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The rules themselves present a greater difficulty.  Taking one 
look at the EEOC’s rules and regulations is intimidating.  The 
Code of Federal Regulations looks like a book and reads like an 
ancient Greek manuscript.  The CRAB’s regulations would 
mitigate these problems in at least two ways. 
First, because the CRAB is specific to education, the number of 
regulations will be far fewer than in employment law.  Second, the 
CRAB regulations should be written with an emphasis on 
common-sense organization and design.  As noted above, these 
regulations should be written practically and include short-hand 
rules that educators can consult and understand easily.  Unlike the 
Guidelines, the rules should focus on direct percentages and 
numbers, rather than adopt amorphous notions of “spontaneity.”537  
A rule governing photocopying textbooks for students, for 
example, might allow 15% of any textbook to be photocopied 
without permission or payment.  This type of rigidity will actually 
provide for greater flexibility: rather than remaining in the straight 
jacket of the Guidelines and uncertainty, rules demarcate clear 
maximum boundaries for educators.  As noted above, these 
boundaries can still accommodate some uses that may modestly 
fall outside a strict limit on a particular use. 
Second, if necessary, would be “A Manual on Educational Fair 
Use” (“The Manual”).  The Manual would lay out permissible uses 
in lay terms, and would also illustrate how the regulations should 
work in practice by using examples and commentary.538  The 
Manual may incorporate additional situations and short-hand rules 
if necessary. 
There may also be educational programs designed to teach 
educators about fair use and encourage them to exercise their rights 
as provided by law.  Finally, the CRAB should administer a 
website where teachers could find answers to frequently asked 
questions, as well as provide an e-mail address and telephone 
number at which a “Fair Use Genius,” who would direct the 
 
 537 See supra notes 59–62 and accompanying text. 
 538 The actual regulations themselves, depending on the kind of regulation (i.e., rule, 
standard, rule-standard hybrid), may benefit from this approach. 
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individual to certain regulations,539 could be reached.  This website 
should also contain the regulations and indices complete with 
hypertext, which would allow teachers to “click through” and 
easily navigate the regulations.  The regulations should be 
hyperlinked to, or contain, the commentary and examples where 
necessary.  Additionally, the website should contain the Manual 
and other webpages containing information about how the CRAB 
works, the procedures that need to be followed, how to obtain 
permissions should they be necessary, contact information, and 
other educational materials.540 
CONCLUSION 
The U.S. copyright doctrine of fair use has been both revered 
for its benefits and criticized for its vagueness.541  Indeed, fair use 
has received much attention in literature.542  Despite this attention 
generally, however, few observations exist about educators’ and 
educational institutions’ struggles with the doctrine. 
For educators, issues began to percolate in 1955, when 
Congress decided to reform the copyright laws.543  Eight years 
later, these Congressional efforts resulted in the Ad Hoc 
Committee of Educational Institutions and Organizations on 
Copyright Law Revision, which was comprised of numerous 
individuals from various organizations, including educational 
organizations, publishers, and copyright owners.544  Between 1963 
 
 539 These individuals, like the “Geniuses” who work at Apple Stores, will not have 
sophisticated, technical knowledge about the regulations themselves or how they operate.  
They will merely be giving non-legal advice; that is, pointing people in the right 
direction. 
 540 In some ways, the EEOC’s website may be a good place to learn the Dos and Don’ts 
of website construction and the accessibility of legal concepts to educators.  See United 
States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Homepage, http://www.eeoc.gov/ 
(last visited Aug. 26, 2009). 
 541 Compare supra note 103 (stating that the rules have been interpreted as the 
minimum and maximum), with supra note 91 and accompanying text (stating that a court 
has revered the benefits of the fair use laws). 
 542 See generally Lloyd L. Weinreb, Fair Use, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1291 (1999) 
(providing a broad overview of the case and literature on the fair use doctrine). 
 543 See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
 544 See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
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and 1976, the Ad Hoc Committee met numerous times, consulting 
with various interest groups.545  Although educators originally 
sought a broad-based, educational fair use exemption, the Ad Hoc 
Committee issued, in 1976, an agreement on educational fair 
use.546  This agreement contained Classroom Guidelines for uses of 
copyrighted works, which purported to state the minimum, not the 
maximum, standards for educational fair use.547 
Even though the Guidelines were not optimal, at the very least 
they promised educators a certain amount of legal certainty that 
had eluded them in the past.  But as educational fair use was 
litigated, that promise was left largely unfulfilled.  Even though the 
Guidelines were not the law, courts used them in their fair use 
analyses.548  Some treated the Guidelines as pseudo law;549 some 
treated them as additional factors under § 107;550 some treated 
them as sub-factors within the four factors listed in § 107;551 and 
some did a combination of the three.552 
As a result of this judicial treatment, the Guidelines effectively 
became part of the law.  Publishers used these decisions to bully 
educational institutions into conforming to the Guidelines as a 
limit on fair use even though they are not the law, have no basis in 
law, and were intended to be a floor, not a ceiling.553  The courts’ 
treatment of the Guidelines has improperly ossified educational 
fair use into restrictive, per se maximum allowances, preventing it 
from retaining the trademark flexibility that has made the doctrine 
so useful. 
Ironically, fair use has chilled fair uses.  Educational 
institutions, now fearful of infringement, avoid the specter of 
liability by severely restricting their use of copyrighted works.554  
This has negative consequences for student learning, as well as 
 
 545 See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
 546 See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
 547 See supra Part I.A.2. 
 548 See supra Part I.C. 
 549 See supra Part I.B.1. 
 550 See supra Part I.B.2. 
 551 See supra Part I.B.2. 
 552 See supra Part I.B.2. 
 553 See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
 554 See supra Part I.B.2. 
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their perception of the law.  Furthermore, past judicial treatment of 
the Guidelines fosters misunderstanding of copyright law among 
educators.  Without knowing the actual bounds of the law, 
educators’ misperceptions and copyright owners’ customs seeped 
into the educational culture, restricting teaching and student 
learning, and generally impeding the educational mission.  The 
Guidelines also created an asymmetrical legal environment that 
catered only to copyright owners’ interests, with the courts 
adopting industry standards in lieu of fair use. 
Based on these failings, a new model for fair use was explored.  
The recent literature contains proposals to either modify or re-
conceptualize copyright infringement or the fair use inquiry.555  
Some scholars have even specifically taken issue with the current 
fair use framework.  They proposed a variety of options, including 
reallocating the burden of proof;556 eliminating some of the fair use 
factors;557 re-conceptualizing the factors by using substantive 
copyright law doctrine to inform their application;558 using a code 
of best practices;559 and creating a new entity to adjudicate or 
administer fair use.560  Examination of these proposals revealed 
that they suffer deficiencies when applied to educational fair use: 
none sufficiently accounted for the value fair use provides, or the 
uncertainty it forces educators to confront.561  As a result, these 
approaches were not used in developing a model for fair use. 
Based on these findings, this Article concluded that the best 
approach was to create a new entity to regulate educational fair 
use.  To that end, a new mechanism for administering educational 
fair use, which built on Professor Jason Mazzone’s previous 
work,562 was proposed.  It suggested a Congressionally-created 
administrative agency—the CRAB—that would regulate 
educational fair use.  The structure and operation of this agency 
were then detailed.  The CRAB would engage in a modified 
 
 555 See supra Part II.B. 
 556 See supra Part II.B.1. 
 557 See supra Part II.B.2. 
 558 See supra Part II.B.2. 
 559 See supra Part II.B.3. 
 560 See supra Part II.B.4. 
 561 See generally supra Part II. 
 562 See supra Part III. 
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notice-and-commenting rule making process, which would reduce 
agency capture and lock-in.  Additionally, the CRAB would utilize 
informal adjudication and enforcement mechanisms. 
After defining the structure and function of the CRAB, the 
Article described the statutory language that would create the 
agency.  This language limited the concept of educational uses 
without limiting the CRAB’s authority to regulate them.  It then 
raised and responded to four possible objections: the CRAB entails 
too much specificity; the CRAB unjustifiably increases costs; the 
CRAB’s rules are too rigid; and the CRAB creates more, rather 
than less, complexity.  The responses to these objections explained 
how the CRAB’s specificity and rigidity were actually advantages; 
how the increased costs, when viewed in context, are necessary to 
improve education; and how the fear of complexity was overstated. 
To recap, this Article has shown that the current state of 
educational fair use is troublesome.  After examining possible 
solutions to this problem, a new model for educational fair use was 
proposed: the CRAB.  Ultimately, the CRAB’s goal is to provide 
educators with the identifiable standards and rules by which they 
can operate, to maintain fidelity to the law of fair use, and to 
facilitate the learning process without fear of litigation by 
publishers and copyright owners. 
 
 
